

Alpata is the Seminole word for 'alligator'

ALPATA

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EDITORIAL

Ashley C. Patriquin

Ad astra

Ashley C. Patriquin

*H*eat. Pure, fierce heat erupted from the engines and blasted energy at the rocky, slightly sandy ground. Had the F-1 engines been untethered, they would have thrust upward with a hitherto and heretofore unmatched level of thrust: 1.5 million pounds. Instead, they sat firmly rooted to the test stand in Huntsville, Alabama in 1965. The sound undoubtedly echoed against the encroaching mountains; some claimed that the energy caused windows to break as far away as Birmingham. The force of these engines and this test reverberated not only through space, but also through time.

When students learn the history of spaceflight, it is rare that Huntsville is mentioned at all. Many only recall President Kennedy's "we choose to go to the moon" or Neil Armstrong's "one small step for man." In reality, the small city in northern Alabama is at the heart of the history of the United States' space program. Immediately following the Second World War, the federal government sought a location for a secret project known as Operation Paperclip. In 1950, the Operation selected the at-the-time relatively uninhabited and isolated Huntsville as the perfect place for housing and testing Redstone Rockets. German expatriate Werner von Braun worked alongside a few hundred fellow countrymen to optimize American missiles for spaceflight.

Operation Paperclip was a direct predecessor to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), but few individuals know of the program at all, much less its controversial choices to involve former-Nazi engineers in key leadership roles. Nonetheless, von Braun remained involved in the United States' Cold War aeronautics enterprises and was eventually appointed the director of Huntsville's Marshall Space Flight Center. For every Soviet Space Race achievement, the engineers at Marshall designed, computed, and tested to match them. While the Soviets tested their N-1 rocket, Huntsvillians awaited the blast of the F-1s, the engines that would bring Americans to the moon.

Huntsville was a hotbed for space innovation and was undeniably critical to the United States' Space Race successes, yet its contributions

remain virtually unknown to the general public. Even so, Huntsville's Marshall Space Flight Center, Redstone Armory, and Research Park have been on the cutting edge of scientific and technological advancement for over half a century. The complex chain of events that led to F-1 engine testing in Huntsville, Alabama influenced the historical trajectory of the city and its people irrevocably.

Innovation does not occur within a vacuum. It is a product of a desire to advance, a desire to push forward valiantly into the future. Innovators create an image of the future towards which to strive; simultaneously, they build upon the efforts, experiences, and failures of their predecessors. They examine the problems of the past with new perspectives in order to propel us into the future. The monographs included in this issue of *Alpata: A Journal of History* exhibit such perspectives, such an effort to innovate. They reexamine events with a fresh set of eyes to uncover new layers and complexities to their historical subjects. Huntsville, Alabama sounds like an unremarkable, southern town without much to recommend it; if one listens a bit closer, the F-1 engines roar to life and echo to the clouds and beyond.

ON THE COVER

Dalia Bronisas Dooley

Blood, Toil, Tears, and Sweat

Dalia Bronisas Dooley

"You are about to embark upon the Great Crusade, toward which we have striven these many months. The eyes of the world are upon you. The hope and prayers of liberty-loving people everywhere march with you...I have full confidence in your courage, devotion to duty and skill in battle."

General Dwight D. Eisenhower
Order of the Day, 1944

The definition left behind following World War II often echoes something along the lines of 'a cataclysmic event that shook the very foundations of human society, leaving a lasting impact that can still be felt to this day.' To study this period of history is to unlock the secrets of the past and gain a deeper understanding of the present. It is to delve into the darkest corners of human nature, to witness the horrors of genocide and the triumph of the human spirit in the face of adversity. It is to explore the political, economic, and social forces that shaped the world we live in today. The study of this war is not just an exercise in historical inquiry, it is an act of remembrance and a tribute to the millions who lost their lives in the struggle for freedom and justice. It is a reminder of the fragility of human civilization and the importance of our collective efforts to ensure that such atrocities never happen again. The study is ultimately a testament to the enduring power of the human spirit and humanity's boundless potential to overcome even the greatest of challenges.

Since the majority of the papers admitted this semester dissected World War II-related subjects, I wanted to find a cover piece enhancing their analyses. As I delved into the papers, I found myself transported back in time to a world unlike any other. The echoes of marching boots and the deafening roar of fighter planes filled my mind as I traced the contours of history. The sights, sounds, and stories of those tumultuous times highlighted by the authors consumed me, each paper revealing another layer of the complex tapestry that was this war. I found myself immersed in these pieces, analyzing this pivotal moment in history, and was struck by the enduring lessons it holds for us all— a reminder of the

power of courage, resilience, and above all, the unbreakable bonds of humanity. These ideals, feelings, and analyses are all pieces that would eventually lead to the cover of Volume 19.

The photograph was taken in 1946, following the end of World War II. Now housed in the National Archives, the photograph is part of a two-photo series of a woman sitting on the ground analyzing Allied propaganda. Though the Archives provide no information other than the date of the photos, I can't help but wonder who the woman is, her occupation, her experience, and her opinions of the war and the echoes that were ringing... *still*. Upon closer analysis of the photo, the unnamed woman has a binder in her lap with what looks like a correspondence log that she is annotating— I can't help but imagine this woman as a history student, a professor, or perhaps an archivist creating the collections and data that offer a glimpse into her time. Her heels, clothes, jewelry, and hair paint a vivid picture of the times and reflect the glamorous surface of the 1940s that rest alongside atrocities occurring in Europe.

This is the first time a photograph has been used as the cover of *Alpata*. My early searches for a viable cover piece led me to the National Archives World War II Photography Collection, which houses tens of thousands of photos. This photo was the first option I stumbled upon, and I knew it was going to be the one at the first glance. Putting the final pieces together left us with what you hold in your hands before you, and I truly hope you enjoy it as much as I do.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Photographs of World War II Posters (1946)
National Archives Identifier: 74229437
Local Identifier: 64-PR-142-1



SPECIAL FEATURE

Catherine Hill

Familiarization of Railroads in 1850s American Life

Abstract

Railroads arrived in the United States in the 1830s; by 1850 Railroad companies endeavored to form corporations and strategize new ways to encourage passengers to use their lines. One method involved advertisements, specifically lithographs, in both subtle and direct ways to influence the American public. In combining established advertising practices with the railroad, corporations made targeted attempts to build their image. Railroad corporations used standard advertising practices to promote the rails and familiarize the American public with the unknown. This essay explores how lithograph images intended to create a positive perspective toward railroads and establish railroads as part of everyday life.

With the arrival of the first railroads in the 1830s from Great Britain to the United States, manufacturers, entrepreneurs, and construction companies sought to lay tracks and ring in a new age of transportation. Previously, canal systems and waterways served to connect regions across the United States, so railroads had to compete with this established transportation system. Twenty years after the initial roads entered the cultural landscape of American life, a rise in advertising and newspaper use propelled efforts of railroads to normalize and champion both their companies and locomotives. Significant corporate mergers of these companies during the ten years following 1850 also strengthened the position of companies and encouraged a more directed advertising strategy to “manufacturing passengers,” a term historian of technology and urban development John Hepp aptly applies.¹ The Baltimore & Ohio (B&O), the Pennsylvania Railroad, and the Reading Railroad expanded and consolidated resources as railroads in the Northeast expanded westward. During the decade from 1850-1860, the popularity of massproduced lithograph images occurred concurrently with the development of the railroad as railroad corporations worked

¹ John H. Hepp, “Manufacturing Passengers: Railroads and Advertising in Philadelphia, 1850-1920” (presentation, Middle Atlantic American Studies Association Annual Meeting, Lancaster, PA, April 8, 2000).

with lithograph companies to create an advertising strategy. The two industries supported each other and ultimately influenced the American public as images of the railroad normalized certain locomotive features and cemented them as part of everyday life, especially in the Northeast.

Railroad corporations' efforts to convince the American public of the new form of transportation occurred as early as the arrival of the first trains, with the assumption of progress as a positive and natural phenomenon. Often a combination of advertisement and more directed propaganda served the goals of corporations. Propaganda here is defined as using strategies to convince or lead the public to reach specific conclusions favorable to the railroad. Historian David Schley's research on the B&O reveals a significant amount of company-directed propaganda encouraging the public to see the complement of locomotives and natural landscapes starting in the 1830s and continuing into the 1850s.² Corporations especially sought to convince the public to use the new form of transportation, competing with both rival types of transportation and the fears of passengers. Historian Wolfgang Schivelbusch's comprehensive analysis of European and American trains, *The Railway Journey*, includes details of the fears and hysteria as individuals sought to normalize the railroad as part of their lives.³ Carroll Pursell's *The Machine in America: Social History of Technology* also provides background on the gradual changes companies made to Americanize the locomotive and transportation changes occurring between 1830-1860 as railroads sought to overtake canal transportation networks.⁴ In order to combat both the fears of

passengers and outside competition, corporations used advertising and media strategies to strengthen business and confidence with the public.

Imagery is a major communication tool acting as a representation of many phenomena and ideas without requiring the viewer to spend a lot of time with the object itself. Lithographs, a specific type of imagery popular during this period, are produced through a specific process of printmaking, allowing for the mass production of an image in black and white, or color (through a more complex process of hand coloring). The design is etched into a stone slab after oil and chemicals are added to repel ink from the stone, ink is then applied to the stone and added to a press with paper to create a reverse image of the initial stone etching.⁵ Still in its rudimentary stages, photography remained expensive and required complex processes for reproduction, so lithographs remained a popular medium in the United States. This was especially the case in Philadelphia, home to two of the largest and most successful lithograph companies in the United States, P.S. Duval & Sons and Currier & Ives (previously Currier until a partnership between James Ives and Nathaniel Currier in 1857 expanded the business. The company will be referred to as Currier & Ives throughout for consistency).⁶ The creation of mass-produced prints in a relatively quick process after the etching on stone reflected industrial developments, with the rise of mass production and assembly line-style production.

Previously, historians and art historians have analyzed the changing experience of urban spaces and the industrial experience through imagery such as lithographs. Very few, however, have focused on railroad corporations or locomotive depictions specifically. A broad range of secondary sources including Sally Gross's *Toward an Urban View: The*

2 David Schley, *Steam City Railroads, Urban Space, and Corporate Capitalism in Nineteenth-Century Baltimore* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2020). Overall, his work follows the capitalist ventures and propaganda operations of the B&O.

3 Wolfgang Schivelbusch, *The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in the Nineteenth Century*, (Oakland: University of California Press, 2014). Main chapters of interest Chapter 6 "The American Railroad" 89-112, Chapter 9 "Railroad Accident, 'Railway Spine' and Traumatic Neurosis," Chapter 10 "Stimulus Shield: or the Industrialized Consciousness" 159-170. Establishing the general fears and anxiety prevalent in the early-mid 19th century as the public sought to understand rail travel.

4 Carroll Pursell, "Improving Technology," *The Machine in America: A Social History of Technology* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995), 65-83.

5 Bryan Le Beau, "Colored Engravings for the People": The World According to Currier & Ives," *American Studies* 35, no. 1 (Spring 1994): 133. Production assembly line style; Pete Marzio, "Lithography as a Democratic Art: A Reappraisal," *The MIT Press* 4, no. 1 (Winter 1971): 38-39. Discusses in detail the gradual move to standardization of lithography starting in the 1820s. The use of different types of stones and their purposes. Including the Duval style use of multiple stones for multiple colors. Compared to Currier & Ives's who add watercolor by hand for colorful prints.

6 Hyatt Mayor, "A Gift of Currier & Ives Lithographs," *The Metropolitan Museum of Art Bulletin* 10, no. 9 (May 1952): 241.

Nineteenth Century American city in Prints, Helena Wright's *The Image Makers: The Role of the Graphic Arts in Industrialization*, and Pete Marzio's *Lithography as a Democratic Art: A Reappraisal* serve as proof of lithographs impact on American life.⁷ These works also provide a framework of methods through which prints are studied in scholarly works and historical arguments. I offer a focused analysis of the methods of railroad corporations and their efforts to familiarize the American public with the railroad between 1850 and 1860 to expand on scholarship detailing lithographs and the American experience.

Together, an analysis of several lithograph styles and an understanding of the prevalence of lithographs' impact on those living in the 19th century will demonstrate the use of railroad propaganda in media to familiarize the American public with locomotives. Combining a familiar medium, lithographs, with increasingly accepted notions of industrial progress and pride, American railroad corporations successfully influenced the American public and normalized the railroad in American life. Based on the most common recurring themes, lithographs of the railroads divide into three separate categories based on the topics depicted. First, the most obvious and simple connection to the railroad is lithographs depicting trains as the central focus or depicting only locomotives with little background matter. The second category of lithographs depicts trains as part of industrial life when included in factory and business lithographs. Finally, the third and most subtle form of railroad advertising in lithographs includes trains as part of the landscape or stand-alone landscapes offering a view from a passenger on the train.

Lithograph Companies

To understand the significance and impact of lithographs, it is necessary to understand the role of printers and the support system between businesses and advertisers. The public and companies alike took

7 Sally Gross, *Toward an Urban View: The Nineteenth Century American city in Prints* (New Haven: Yale University Art Gallery, 1989); Helena Wright, "The Image Makers: The Role of the Graphic Arts in Industrialization," *The Journal of the Society for Industrial Archaeology* 12, no. 2 (1986): 5-18; Marzio, "Lithography."

an interest in lithographs, especially in the 1850s. As lithographs rose in popularity, lithograph companies benefited from a rise in industrial interest and pride, using their own systems of mass production to depict retail businesses, manufacturing, and transportation. One of the most prominent American print-making companies, Currier & Ives printed approximately 7,000 lithographs with many printed between 1850 and 1860.⁸ Currier & Ives's business model included several lithographers and artists who designed their prints, most commonly including landscapes and celebrations of Americana. Currier & Ives's advertising portfolios and prints generated the most income and success for the company at the time of production.⁹ The company continued producing images for the American market until the company declined in 1905 as lithographs fell out of fashion.

Lithography company P.S. Duval & Sons, also located in Pennsylvania, printed thousands of lithographs between 1850 and 1860. Predominantly, P.S. Duval & Sons printed black and white lithographs which focused on imagery of buildings and businesses. The company continued to support commercial practices of nineteenth-century businesses through its imagery. According to Barnhill's analysis of lithograph corporations in the nineteenth-century, Peter S Duval's new corporate building in 1848 hosted more than 30 presses and was likely the largest such company in the nation.¹⁰ P.S. Duval & Sons provided imagery for both homeowners and purchasers at several levels of the market. This is in comparison to Currier & Ives lithographs, which tended to include landscapes and transportation-related images, such as locomotives and ships specifically for display.¹¹ These two Philadelphia companies produced many of the lithographs used in this analysis and are representative of two major

8 Bryan Le Beau, "Colored Engravings for the People," 131. Though it is hard to know exactly how many Ives printed, 133 also shows the domination of Currier & Ives on the lithograph market "95 percent of all lithographs in circulation."

9 Stephanie Delamaire and Joan Irving, "Was Fanny Palmer the Powerhouse Behind Currier & Ives?" *Art in Print* 8, no. 2 (2018): 30.

10 Georgia Barnhill, "Business Practices of Commercial Nineteenth-Century American Lithographers," *Winterthur Portfolio* 48, no. 2/3 (2014): 217.

11 Barnhill, "Business Practices," 220; Wright, "The Image Makers," 14.

lithograph companies operating during this period.¹² The distinctive styles of the two companies also speak to the deliberate designs of the lithographs and their roles in producing imagery-centered propaganda for businesses, including the railroad.

Part I: Trains at the Center

Railroad companies and manufacturing firms spent varying amounts on advertisements and public communications. Statistically, newspapers, brochures, and other printed materials received the most attention, but the specific breakdowns of company spending are at times difficult to determine as bookkeeping in the mid-19th century did not hold consistent standards.¹³ However, 1895 essayist Francais Ayer in Depew's *Hundred Years of American Commerce* speaks to the impact of advertising materials in America as "some of the most remarkable commercial successes the [19th] century have been achieved."¹⁴ Lithographs with direct railroad imagery including tracks, train cars, and the locomotives themselves created a familiar image of the train and consistency of the American train.¹⁵ For lithograph companies, commissions formed the majority of their business models, supporting the frequency and popularity of advertisement and the use of imagery displays during the 1850s.¹⁶ Purposes of the lithographs varied from depictions for business purposes to direct appeals to the public with trains at the center for display.

P.S. Duval & Sons of Philadelphia printed many lithographs from the Pennsylvania region. The respected lithograph company provided im-

ages of businesses, manufacturers, and meeting rooms for use in advertising.¹⁷ A side-cut view of a steam-powered engine at Franklin Iron Works in Philadelphia shows three perspectives of the machine (Fig. 1). The focus on cross sections and detail reflects industrial power and a desire to display those ideas. An advertisement for Kimball & Gorton Philadelphia Railroad Car Manufactory uses color and depicts a horsedrawn travel car below a train car (Fig. 2). The manufactory's advertisement directly aimed to receive the business of railroad companies, like the Pacific Railroad which commissioned the 1852 train car used in the lithograph image. The American public would have also been exposed to the imagery establishing a standard look for the exterior of a railcar compared to a more normalized form of travel, a horse-drawn passenger car. Exposure to imagery and relations to already common aspects of American life acted as a part of the familiarization process. Lithographs aimed towards businesses rather than the public shows companies used lithographs for specific purposes, however, they still influenced a wide audience. Ayer's discussion includes references to both the advertisement of the dealer and manufacturer seeking to "acquaint people with the name and merits of an article," referencing products and services.¹⁸

Imagery designed for the public and general viewing utilized specific styles to appeal to a public audience; successful lithograph companies needed the public to buy their prints along with revenue from advertising.¹⁹ Artist Charles Parson's American "Express" Train from 1855 places the locomotive central to the image and draws the eye (Fig. 4).²⁰ Although Parson's lithograph printed from Currier & Ives, appears in a distinctively less urban setting than the Fairmount image. The 1858 lithograph depicts several forms of transportation while highlighting the locomotive through its use of color (Fig. 3). The locomotive is the most colorful aspect of the lithograph and is front and center with two anonymous waiting passengers. Not only does this piece act as an item

12 Extensive research on the impact of Philadelphia's role in the lithograph market has also been conducted. Currier & Ives and P. S. Duval & Son's operation in Philadelphia has largely contributed to this. Marzio, "Lithography," 39,44. Le Beau, "Colored Engravings," 131.; Barnhill, "Business Practices," 217.

13 Francis Wayland Ayer, "Advertising in America" In *One Hundred Years of American Commerce 1795-1895*, ed. Chauncey M. Depew, (New York: D. O Hayes & Co, 1895), 76.

14 Ayer, "Advertising in America," 78.

15 Pursell, "Machine in America," 78-79.

16 Wright, "The Image Makers," 5. Details city commissions of lithographs for bird's eye views of their city; Barnhill, "Business Practices," 226. Prints sometimes displayed outside of Currier & Ives store, including framed prints.

17 Barnhill, "Business Practices," 220.

18 Ayer, "Advertising in America," 78.

19 Barnhill, "Business Practices," 220.; Wright, "The Image Makers," 5.

20 Barnhill, "Business Practice," 215-217. Barnhill assessed Charles Parson's account book which further details Parson's employment and training in the lithograph business.

for display, but the anonymous passengers, a man and woman, allow the viewer to see themselves in the image. The deliberate drawing of the eye and the distinctive American trains are increasingly evident across 1850s lithographs, with a funnel-shaped chimney or smokestack, guiding light, and cowcatcher.²¹ All these features created an iconic look for the train and in turn created an image with the American public. Across artist illustrations, the locomotive appears to have consistent features, even when colors or rivet details change the general body outline, establishing an 1850s look to the locomotive.

Another popular style involved centering the train and forgoing the background all together. These images depicted a side view of the iron horse with details, distinctive features, and often color. Boston Locomotive Workers and M. W. Baldwin & Co and Lawrence Machine Shop all had lithographers produce side-on train images (Fig. 5, 6). Though it is difficult to assess the direct impact of these images, it is clear several manufacturing companies used the method of lithograph illustrations to attract railroad companies to use their services as part of general advertising.²² There is also some proof locomotive builders detailed designs deliberately to make them “suitable for framing,” appealing to a public audience.²³ Spreading advertisements and train imagery continued to make the train part of everyday life.²⁴ With the increasing circulation of newspapers in the 1850s and the demand for newspapers on the rise, the public established a desire for printed information and continued

to use them as sources of information.²⁵ Although railroad companies themselves did not typically issue this style of lithograph, manufacturing companies and builders' images contributed to America's understanding of the locomotive. As lithographs of this style continued to appear in newspaper publications and advertising which received great public attention during the 1850s.

While manufacturers aided the familiarization of the railroad through advertising lithographs, locomotives all received attention in industrial depictions of factories in the Northeast. The popularity of lithographs speaks not only to their importance as a medium but also to the acceptance that railroad companies used them intentionally.

Part 2: Industrial Progress and the Railway

The Industrial Revolution and the age of industry in the 1850s gained attention and even national pride from businesses and consumers. The rise of industry and the movement towards a capitalist, “buyers-and-sellers” society involved heightened levels of reverence for manufacturing and production. One way to demonstrate and contribute to the sense of pride and achievement included business lithographs of various factories for display in corporate offices, within the factories themselves, or within the homes of those who could afford them.²⁶ Not only is the process of creating lithographs a celebration of mass production and industrial capabilities, but the imagery they depicted also celebrated industry. The combination of railroad and factory repeated in many depictions served to “inculcate the idea of industrialization in the public mind.”²⁷ The depiction of railroads in subtle ways across

21 Pursell, “Machine in America,” 80-81. Pursell discusses the adaptation of American engineers to fit rolling stock and locomotives to the American needs over English patents and designs. Including the addition of cowcatchers to move cattle from the path of engines.

22 Ayer, “Advertising in America,” 78.

23 Wright, “The Image Makers,” 5

24 Wright, “The Image Makers,” 10-11. Notably, not all lithograph advertising attempts were successful. The manufacturing Lawrence Machine Shop produced a lithograph including a locomotive but failed to attract enough customers to save the business, amidst the Panic of 1857.

25 Taylor, “American Newspapers,” In *One Hundred Years of American Commerce 1795-1895*, edited by Chauncey M. Depew, 76-83. New York: D. O. Hayes & Co, 1895, 170.

26 Barnhill, “Business Practices,” 220, 226. Images for display. Gross, “Towards an Urban View,” 33. Commercial purposes of lithographs. Le Beau, “Colored Engravings,” 131. Currier & Ives prided themselves on cheaper prints for the people, differentiating them from other companies. Particularly the more commission based.

27 Wright, “The Image Makers,” 13. Le Beau, “Colored Engravings,” 135. Currier & Ives profited from the fascination of the American public with contemporary urban life.

several factory images enforces a gradual familiarity and a reference to the rising ubiquity of the railroad during this time.

Gas and iron works appeared across the Northeast and particularly in Pennsylvania. Lehigh County claimed a high number of factories and served as a major region of manufacturing productivity during the 1850s. Lithographs from the Lehigh Crane Iron Works (c.1857) and Thomas Iron Works (1857) both depict a factory with billowing smokestacks. A notable sign of progress as coal burning equaled production. Both printed at P.S. Duval & Sons the images provide an insight into factory design. The images include locomotives that moved coal and other goods in the factory, shown operating at the center of the image. The railroad in Thomas Iron Works lithograph is more obvious with three distinctive American locomotives depicted (Fig. 9), all with the iconic conical smokestack and cowcatcher design. Leigh Iron Works includes a smaller image of the locomotive in the middle left of the image (Fig. 8). The Philadelphia Gas Works lithograph does not include a locomotive, but the railroad tracks are along the right of the image (Fig. 7). Though the locomotive is not present, the image still shows the impact of the railroad on the industry and the connections between the manufacturing industry and the railroad. In order for factories to run and progress to be made, railroads operated within the industrial sphere. The connection between industry and the railroad created a celebration of both elements where the pride in manufacturing extended to the railroad.

Mauch Chunk, a city located in east Pennsylvania, north of Philadelphia, appeared in several lithographs. One image from the printer, P. S. Duval & Sons, includes an incline railway on Mt. Pisgah Plane with a group of passengers gathered at the base of the line. The caption to the image deliberately communicates details about the line itself noting, “length 9398 ft and elevation 162 feet” as a celebration of industrial capabilities of the time (Fig. 10). Setting the railway as central to the image celebrates the industrial features in the image, such as the track, while still being surrounded by nature. The lithograph connects railroads to industry because it celebrates the industrious nature of the railway. A theme common during the 19th century which “changed inexorably Americans’ relationship with the landscape.”²⁸ Even without the iconic

locomotive, the presence of the track and passengers surrounding the line establishes respect for the railroad.

The use of lithographs in industry and the inclusion of railroads incorporate the railroad into the sentiments of industrial progress. Ideas of civilization and growth connected with industry and images of successful, billowing factories created a celebratory image and national pride. The inclusion of railroads in these images also gives them distinctive attributes as part of the industrial process. Images produced for corporations and factories influenced the perception of the public while also responding to the way the public viewed industrial processes. P.S. Duval & Sons’ business model contributed significantly with thousands of prints depicting aspects of American life for several areas of the market including advertising, public display, and private collections.²⁹ Exchanges of ideas about progress and industrialization influenced the concepts of the railroad and the way companies sought to depict themselves in the minds of the American public. Lithographs had already established themselves as a respected source of visual information, especially in Pennsylvania. With industry and railroads joining these trends, the focus remained on the depictions and not necessarily on the commissioner of the visual content. Therefore, lithographs including direct and indirect references to railroads continued to connect something familiar, lithographs, with the unfamiliar, the railroad.

Part 3: The Railroad and the Landscape

Railroad propaganda appeared in both subtle and deliberate forms with depictions ranging from the railroad at the center to the railroad blending in with the surrounding landscape. In pursuit of creating a consumer base and establishing their image, railroads commissioned artwork of their railroads and the landscapes surrounding their lines. Records and book-keeping do not always detail specific budgets or commission documents; however, it is widely accepted that railroad companies commissioned images.³⁰ Proof that railroad companies, including the B&O, sent artists to sketch and design locomotives and landscapes sur-

²⁹ Barnhill, “Business Practices,” 220.

³⁰ Wright, “The Image Makers,” 5. Pursell, “The Machine in America,” 83.

²⁸ Wright, “The Image Makers,” 11.

rounding their lines largely comes from artists or informal letters.³¹ The continuation of nature as propaganda, which David Schley details as part of the tactics the B&O and other companies used to encourage passengers in the 1830s, a phenomenon which continued through imagery in the 1850s.³² 1850s imagery most commonly took the form of lithographs from artists' sketches. Some imagery and commissions included paintings, especially later with the rise of the Hudson River School and movement into the western frontier in the 1860s.³³ However, depictions of the railroad, urban development, and nature in the American Northeast most predominantly took the form of lithographs due to their cost effectiveness and public accessibility.³⁴ Just as P.S. Duval & Sons typically depicted industry and manufacturing, Currier & Ives's images flourished with popularity for their colorful depictions of landscapes and Americana.³⁵

As railroads joined the daily lives of the American public in urban spaces, railroad companies sought to play up these connections. Train lines near towns include the railroad to create a connection between nature and urban spaces. Artist James Queen's 1857 print from P.S. Duval & Sons includes residential and town center space in the foreground, Mount Pisgah in the background, and the railroad line and locomotive traveling in the center of the image (Fig. 11). In this image the railroad is small and at the center of the image, however, this is a deliberate choice for the landscape to dominate and incorporate active American life. Being part of nature and finding a natural place in the landscape us-

ing industrial methods served to create a familiarization of the railroad.³⁶ Gradually, the train and the track become part of everyday life and are necessarily part of the image without inducing the fear and anxiety present with the introduction of the railroads.

Nathaniel Currier of the Currier & Ives firm printed several popular lithographs for American railroads. These lithographs, carefully watercolored by hand, focus on the grandness of the landscape with the train as a very small part of the entire picture.³⁷ Rather than an alien entity, the locomotive and its carriages seamlessly fit into the landscape. The 1856 image of New York's Niagara Falls includes a locomotive traveling across a suspension bridge (Fig. 13). The image celebrates both nature and industry, drawing the eye to the colorful scene with the locomotive at the center. Another image of Virginia circa 1857, also from Nathaniel Currier, depicts a train bridge and locomotive leaving Harper's Ferry (Fig. 14). The locomotive, though present, is not central to the image, acting instead as part of the landscape. In addition, the tracks and rail bridge connect the foreground to the background depicting the houses of Harper's Ferry. Artists brought together the industrial and natural elements of the scene to encourage public interest and promote the "glowing descriptions of their [the company's] routes."³⁸ The B&O owned the line and commissioned this image from Currier & Ives as a business decision to celebrate their connectivity and prestige as a railroad company.³⁹ It was in the best interests of the B&O to normalize the train as a part of the landscape and encourage ridership.⁴⁰

The additional style of lithograph presented trains from a new perspective: within the train carriage. The importance of these lithographs lies entirely in the description and context of the images. For example, one P.S. Duval & Sons print depicts the Shamokin coal basin

31 Wright "The Image Makers," 5, 16.

32 Schley, *Steam City*, 29-31. Schley also emphasizes the use of nature to frame commercial and economic practices.

33 Nicolai Cikovsky, Jr, "George Inness and the Hudson River School: 'The Lackawanna Valley,'" *The American Art Journal* 2, no. 2 (Autumn, 1970): 48-50. Lackawanna Valley commission from Delaware, Western & Lackawanna in 1855 but most railroad related painting appear after the 1860s and Westward Expansion.

34 Le Beau, "Colored Engraving," 131, 138. "Colored Engravings for the people": a slogan of Currier & Ives.; Gross, "Toward an Urban View," 19.

35 Delamaire and Irving, "Fanny Palmer," 30.

36 Wright, "The Image Makers," 12-13.; Gross, "Towards an Urban View," 13-15.

37 Mayor, "A Gift," 244.

38 Wright, "The Image Makers," 12.

39 Wright, "The Image Makers," 12.; Schley, "Steam City," 26, 30. B&O marketing and public relations also continued well into the 20th century.

40 Hepp, "Manufacturing Passengers," 3. Companies used advertising to attract passengers through calculated strategies.

and countryside (Fig. 12). At first glance, the image appears to show a standard countryside view with hills, trees, and a few horses. However, the description gives the image its relevance, “View of Shamokin, in the Shamokin coal basin, Northumberland Co. Pa. Located on the Philada. [Philadelphia] & Sunbury R.R.” The description lets the audience know they are seeing a view as if seated on the Philadelphia & Sunbury Railroad. Providing a view from a passenger train marked a purposeful marketing decision as companies encouraged the American public to use the trains for both transportation and sightseeing.⁴¹ Though opinions on speed and travel varied, companies continued to market themselves positively and use nature to calm the anxieties of passengers.

An investigation of railroad and landscape imagery reveals the deliberate nature of these lithographs. Comparing the colorful Currier & Ives images with the more muted P.S. Duval & Sons prints both displayed locomotives and features associated with the railroad to draw connections between the beauty of images and the trains themselves.⁴² Railroad companies encouraged the use of nature for their own gain and development through the use of their railroads and the display of railroad-centered images.

Conclusion

Creating a consumer base and normalizing the railroad required a great deal of exposure and familiarization to the American public. Utilizing the rising popularity of newspapers and advertisements as a communication tool, railroad companies benefited from lithograph imagery and prints from lithograph companies. Lithographs including the railroad were printed for specific purposes such as advertising, display, and communication indicating their influence and power within certain contexts on American life. Even when marketed to a commercial audience, the public still saw images of locomotives and other railroad paraphernalia, creating an image and familiarity with these “iron horses.”

The Panic of 1857 and the beginning of the American Civil War

in 1860 once again changed the corporate model of railroads and their resources. Advertisements declined and the popularity of lithographs also declined drastically after the 1860s. Imagery after the 1860s continued to play a role in the methods of railroad companies, but in new forms as trends changed and technology progressed. In the 1890s, postcards rose in popularity in the United States, with the European market previously popularizing them around the 1860s during the Civil War period. By the 20th century photography, digital imagery and the decline in the traditional American Railroad severely decreased the production of new imagery, especially for commercial purposes. However, propaganda posters and displays of luxury involving the American train were met with some success during the World Wars.

Today, lithographs and imagery from the 1850s are still used for business and display purposes, indicating the long-term success of railroads to familiarize the public with a specific type of locomotive. The 1850s locomotive with the funnel smokestack, cowcatcher, and light which Charles Parsons so accurately depicts (Fig. 4), continues to serve as the model for the “American Express Train” of the mid-19th century. Prints of lithographs are used for aesthetic purposes or by collectors who purchase and display old prints. Auctions and authentication of P.S. Duval & Sons and Currier & Ives prints continue to sell and make money on the collector’s market. Heritage railroads have also used the tactic of the old railroads to create familiarity in the American market with the classic design of a nineteenth-century American locomotive.

The images of lithographs tell us a lot about the way companies wanted to be viewed and the use of nature and industry to gain recognition among the American Public. An understanding of the intended audience, commissions, and designs of these images communicates a lot about corporate practices, railroads, and their ultimate impact on 1850s American life.

41 Hepp, “Manufacturing Passengers,” 3-4. Later guidebooks and other forms used to encourage people to travel as the journey lost importance to the destination.

42 Gross, “Towards an Urban View,” 15. Railroad subsidies to companies in support of certain names and depictions.




Fig. 1: P.S. Duval & Co., Lithographer, and Oliver Byrnerail. Steam engine with 9 in. cyl. 18 in. stroke by J.T. Sutton & Co. Franklin Iron Works, Kensington, Philadelphia, U.S. Built for U. States Arsenal, Frankford, Pa. / Byrne, engineer's assistant; P.S. Duval & Co. Steam lith. press Ph. Pennsylvania Philadelphia, 1853. [Philadelphia: P.S. Duval & Co. Steam Lith. Press, Ph.] lithograph.




Fig. 2: P.S. Duval & Son, Printer. Kimball & Gorton Philadelphia R.R. Car Manufactory, 21st & Hamilton Streets Philadelphia / F. Moras fe. Pennsylvania Philadelphia, ca. 1857. [Philadelphia: P.S. Duval & Son's Lith] Photograph.



Fig. 3: Thos. S. Wagner's Lith., Printer, and Marian S. Carson Collection. Fairmount. Pennsylvania Philadelphia Schuylkill River, ca. 1858. [Philadelphia, Pa.: Thos. S. Wagner's Lith., 38 Franklin Place] Photograph.



Fig. 4: Nathaniel Currier, Lithographer and Charles Parsons. American "Express" Train. New York, 1855. [Fort Worth: Amon Carter Museum of American Art] Photograph.



Fig. 5: Louis N. Rosenthal Lithographer, and Jonathan Ord, Max Rosenthal. M. W. Baldwin & Co, Locomotive Builders, Philadelphia, Philadelphia, ca. 1854 [San Marino: Huntington Library] Photograph.




Fig. 6: J H Bufford's Lith. Printer and Ransom Wright. Boston Locomotive Workers, Passenger Engine. Boston, ca. 1858 [San Marino: Huntington Library] Photograph.



Fig. 7: Bowen, John T., Printer. Philadelphia Gas Works. From the Southwest. Pennsylvania United States of America Philadelphia, 1852. Philadelphia: J. T. Bowen. Photograph. United States of America Philadelphia, 1852. Philadelphia: J. T. Bowen. Photograph.



Fig. 8: P.S. Duval & Son, Printer. Lehigh Crane Iron Works, Catasauqua, Lehigh Co. John Thomas, Superintendent / L. Crepon lith.; p.s. duval & son's Lith. Phil. Pennsylvania Catasauqua, None. [[Philadelphia: P.S. Duval & Co. Steam Lith. Press, Ph. between 1857 and 1866] Photograph.




Fig. 9: P.S. Duval & Son, Printer, Osborn, H. P, photographer. Thomas Iron Works, Hockendauqua. Samuel Thomas Supt. / L. Crepon lith.; Amb. of P.H. i.e., H.P. Osborn Bethlehem; P.S. Duval & Son's Lith. Phil. Pennsylvania Lehigh County, None. [Philadelphia: P.S. Duval & Son's Lith. Phil., between 1857 and 1866] Photograph.



Fig. 10: P.S. Duval & Son, Printer, Osborn, H. P, photographer. Mt. Pisgah Plane at Mauch Chunk / L. Crepon lith.; Amb. of H.P. Osborn Bethlehem; P.S. Duval & Son's Lith. Phil. Pennsylvania Mauch Chunk, None. [Philadelphia: P.S. Duval & Son's Lith. Phil., between 1857 and 1866] Photograph.



Fig. 11: P.S. Duval & Son, Lithographer, and James Fuller Queen, Osborn, H. P, photographer. Bird's eye view of Mauch Chunk, from Mount Pisgah toward Lehigh Gap in the distance / Js. Queen delt. ; ambrotype of H. P. Osborn, Bethlehem. Pennsylvania Mauch Chunk, None. [Philadelphia: P.S. Duval & Son's Lith. Phil., between 1857 and 1867] Photograph.



Enlarged from above with town in the forefront and the Railroad in the background.



Fig. 12: P.S. Duval & Co., Printer. View of Shamokin, in the Shamokin coal basin, Northumberland Co. Pa. Located on the Philada. & Sunbury R.R. Pennsylvania Shamokin, None. [Philadelphia: P.S. Duval & Son's Lith. Phil., between 1851 and 1857] Photograph.



Fig. 14: Nathaniel Currier, lithographer, Harper's Ferry Virginia. 1857. Harper's Ferry. Adam Burns Private Collection.



Fig. 13: Nathaniel Currier, lithographer. The Railroad Suspension Bridge. 1856. Niagara Falls, New York Adam Burns Private Collection.

THE UNIVERSITY of FLORIDA'S
RACIAL ROOTS

The East Florida Seminary's Connections to Contract Labor

LAURA T. NANCE

ABSTRACT

Previous historians have begun dissecting the University of Florida's origin, but the university's connection to the East Florida Seminary (EFS) in Gainesville and forms of neo-slavery in the postbellum era remain uncharted. This project strives to remedy this by investigating the EFS' ties to neo-slavery, like debt peonage and contract labor, after the Civil War. Through the analysis of freedmen's contracts, EFS archives, and Alachua County records, this work establishes clear connections between UF's lineage and neo-slavery in the postbellum South. This project aspires to highlight the forgotten lives of exploited contract laborers and inspire further research into this overlooked aspect of UF's history.

Prior to the Civil War, Thomas Haile was an eminent, wealthy slave-owner with a plantation of nearly 1,500 acres. In 1860, Haile was recorded in tax records as having sixty-six enslaved people in eighteen cabins, making him one of the largest slaveholders in Alachua County.¹ To frame his wealth: his real estate value for the same year was \$15,000—equivalent to nearly half a million dollars today.² During the Civil War, Thomas E. Haile enlisted in the Confederacy to become a First Lieutenant in the Second Florida Cavalry. At the end of the war, Haile returned to his plantation where he, like many other southern plantation owners, engaged in a system of labor known as contract labor, or sharecropping, that replaced slavery.³

A mortgage record from Alachua County dated May 13, 1873 listed Thomas E. Haile Sr. as having five tenant farmers at his Kanapaha planta-

tion: Bill Patterson, Geo, Edward (Edmund) Kelley, William Watts, and William Cromwell.⁴ At least two of the sharecroppers, William Watts and Edward Kelley, were previously enslaved by Haile.⁵ Thomas Haile's brother, John Haile, also had a nearby plantation, San Felasco, which was similarly operated by "twenty-one contract hands."⁶ The work of these exploited contract laborers—many of whom were previously enslaved either by the Hailes or other planters—generated profits that would assist Haile in paying the tuition of several of his fourteen children and grandchildren to attend the East Florida Seminary, a school to which the University of Florida directly claims ancestry.⁷

Thomas Haile and his descendants are far from an anomalous case; a careful analysis of an East Florida Seminary record book dated 1876 to 1899 along with other East Florida Seminary records and about forty preserved freedman's contracts for Alachua County from 1866 to 1868 show notable overlap. From these sources, and cross-referencing ancient Alachua County probate, marriage, and deed records, I confirmed that at least five parents or grandparents of East Florida Seminary (EFS) students employed contract laborers. They are Augustus H. Johnson, Joseph J. Jones, W. H. Stringfellow, Benjamin W. Powell, and the aforementioned Thomas E. Haile. Between these five men, they employed no less than twenty-one contract laborers.⁸ These men serve as case studies as to how the East Florida Seminary indirectly financially benefited from contract labor, debt peonage, and other forms of neo-slavery that

4 Alachua County Clerk of the Court, Ancient Records: Mortgage Records, Book C, 389.

5 Kirkman and McCarthy, *The Historic Haile Homestead at Kanapaha Plantation*, 52.

6 Edward K. Eckert, "Contract Labor in Florida during Reconstruction," *The Florida Historical Quarterly* 47, no. 1 (1968): 44.

7 Record book no. 2, 1876-1899, Volume: 1. East Florida Seminary Records, Series 164. Special and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL (hereafter cited as Record book no.2, East Florida Seminary Records).

8 Alachua County: freedman's contracts, 1866-1868, Box: 1, Folder: 1, James David Glunt Collection, Special and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL.

1 Karen Kirkman and Kevin McCarthy, *The Historic Haile Homestead at Kanapaha Plantation: An Illustrated History* (Gainesville, Florida: Historic Haile Homestead, Inc., 2014), 45.

2 Manuscript census returns, Eighth Census of the United States, 1860, Alachua County, Florida, Population Schedule, National Archives Microfilm Series M-653, roll 106.

3 Kirkman and McCarthy, *The Historic Haile Homestead at Kanapaha Plantation*, 46-52.

perpetuated the subjugation of black workers in the postbellum South. The end of the Civil War and the ratification of the 13th Amendment marked the emancipation of millions of enslaved people. This mass liberation created an immense labor shortage for southern plantation owners who now faced an incoming harvest without any field hands. With the abolition of slavery, many plantation owners turned to contract labor as a source of cheap, easily exploited workers. Most commonly, this contract took the form of an agricultural system in which white landowners allowed black laborers to live and work on the land in exchange for a share of the crop or a wage.

Sharecropping was the primary form of contract labor in Florida and was arguably more exploitative than wage-contracts.⁹ In Gainesville, state government officials and the Freedmen's Bureau officially sponsored the return of freedmen to plantations, even visiting plantations to speak to the newly freed workers to urge them to remain. Instead of concerning themselves with the welfare, autonomy, and desires of the freed slaves, the state and Freedmen's Bureau prioritized the state's economic recovery after its devastating loss in the Civil War. Their campaigns to urge recently freed slaves to stay on plantations was largely successful because "by 1866 most ex-slaves had returned to their former plantations."¹⁰

In many regards, sharecropping mimicked the conditions of slavery. Although the black workers engaged in contract labor were technically free under federal law, the labor system replicated the conditions of slavery. Like slavery, sharecropping intended to maintain the supremacy of the white, planter elite through a supply of cheap labor and the reinforcement of the economic, social, and political inferiority of black Americans. White plantation owners utilized plantation stores, varying pay rates, and fraudulent means to ensure that their black laborers remained in a perpetual state of debt peonage.¹¹

Those that attempted to abandon the plantation might meet ominous threats of having 'the law' come after them. Considering many black workers at this time were illiterate, and unfortunately not well-

versed with labor legislation, this threat gave planters an "immense psychological advantage" over their black workers.¹²

This fear was likely further intensified by the power of the Ku Klux Klan in Florida and the ever-present threat of lynching. From the mid-1860s to the 1940s, Florida had the highest rates of lynchings per capita in the South with forty-eight known lynchings occurring in Alachua County alone.¹³ It is not far-fetched to contend, then, that contract laborers might have feared not only legal repercussions, but racial violence if they attempted to leave their plantation in pursuit of better conditions. These laborers were "free," but as historian Edward Eckert poignantly states in his article on contract labor in Florida during Reconstruction, black workers were "bound...to the soil as effectively as outright ownership had done before the Civil War."¹⁴ Slavery had simply taken on a new name, sinisterly masquerading itself as progress.

These were the horrific conditions that men like Thomas Haile exploited to generate the wealth that allowed for him to send many of his children and grandchildren to the East Florida Seminary, which had a tuition equivalent to present-day rates of \$30,000 in 1853.¹⁵ With this steep cost of attendance, only upper-class, or potentially upper-middle class, families could presumably afford to send their children to the EFS. Considering that, in the mid-19th century, the economic structure of Gainesville was "tied directly to rural agriculture," many of these upper-class families who sent their children to the Seminary were likely plantation owners, such as the Hailes, who built their wealth on the backs of exploited, oppressed black laborers.¹⁶

The University of Florida (UF) traces its roots to several smaller

9 Eckert, "Contract Labor in Florida during Reconstruction," 37.

10 Eckert, "Contract Labor in Florida during Reconstruction," 36.

11 Eckert, "Contract Labor in Florida during Reconstruction," 39.

12 Eckert, "Contract Labor in Florida during Reconstruction," 46.

13 Aida Mallard, "Local Descendants of Lynching Victims Tell Their Story and Impact on Their Lives," *The Gainesville Sun*, November 11, 2020.

14 Eckert, "Contract Labor in Florida during Reconstruction," 50.

15 Ahmad Brown et al., "Slavery and the University of Florida: African Americans, Seminoles and the Origins of Higher Education in Florida." *Alpata: A Journal of History* XVI (Winter 2021): 15.

16 David Sowell, "Racial Patterns of Labor in Postbellum Florida: Gainesville, 1870-1900," *The Florida Historical Quarterly* 63, no. 4 (1985): 433.

schools that were consolidated into present-day UF in 1905 under the Buckman Act.¹⁷ One of these schools was the State Seminary East of the Suwannee—commonly referred to as the East Florida Seminary—which moved to Gainesville from Ocala in 1866.¹⁸ The notion that the University of Florida, and its predecessors, have connections to slavery is not novel. Prior to the Civil War, when the Seminary was still seated in Ocala, slavery was a fundamental aspect of both the culture and financing of the school. As Ahmad Brown, Javier Ecosta-Garvia, Gabrielle Paul, and Morgan Peltier contend in their 2021 article “Slavery and the University of Florida: African Americans, Seminoles, and the Origins of Higher Education in Florida,” the East Florida Seminary School in Ocala had “deep economic, social, and racial ties to slavery.”¹⁹ Many of the East Florida Seminary’s students, teachers, and board members came from wealthy slave-owning families. At the outbreak of the Civil War, most of the teachers and the “entire 1861 graduating class of seminary boys” joined the War on the side of the Confederacy.²⁰ Slavery and the Confederacy were indisputably connected to the Ocala East Florida Seminary.

Yet, the connection between the East Florida Seminary in Gainesville and forms of neoslavery, like debt peonage and contract labor, remain notably unexplored. This project strives to remedy this by asking: What are the East Florida Seminary ties, if any, to neo-slavery, like debt peonage and contract labor, after the Civil War? How did these forms of neo-slavery impact the East Florida Seminary? Through answering these questions, this project aspires to breathe new life into the frequently forgotten lives of exploited contract laborers like Bill Patterson, Geo, Edward (Edmund) Kelley, William Watts, and William Cromwell and compel the University of Florida to publicly recognize not just their connections to slavery, but their historic ties to neoslavery after the Civil War.

17 Samuel Proctor, “The University of Florida: Its Early Years, 1853-1906” (PhD diss., University of Florida, 1958), 446.

18 Proctor, “The University of Florida: Its Early Years,” 88.

19 Ahmad Brown et al., “Slavery and the University of Florida,” 3.

20 Ahmad Brown et al., “Slavery and the University of Florida,” 16.

Augustus H. Johnson

In the 1860 census, Augustus H. Johnson, a 37-year-old originally from Georgia, recorded himself as being a “farmer” with real estate totaling \$2,000 and a personal value of \$14,000.²¹ During the Civil War, Johnson enlisted in the Confederacy, serving as a private in the 2nd Regiment of the Florida Cavalry.²²

Augustus H. Johnson is the signed party on two contracts preserved at Smathers Library. His first contract dated January 4th, 1868, was signed by three freed people of color: Henry Smith, Ben Smith, and Alex Williams. In the contract, the laborers agreed to “work on the plantation of the said Johnson for one third of all the crops produced” and to “perform all manner of work and labor and duty” whilst Johnson provided them with necessary “provisions.”²³ The laborers further agreed to the deduction of “seventy-five centers per day” from their wages if they were absent for any reason. The contract also explicitly stated that the laborers had to pay for all doctor bills.²⁴ The second contract dated January 3, 1868, contains many of the same terms as the first, including the same share of the crops and rates of deduction for absences. In this freedman’s contract, planter Augustus H. Johnson makes an agreement with Benjamin Williams and his wife, Dolly Williams to do all work “pertaining to a plantation” in exchange for one-third of the crops produced and food rations. These rations included “three and half pounds of bacon [indecipherable] per week” for each laborer.²⁵ Included in the contract are the presumed children of their marriage: Joseph Williams, Lucy Wil-

21 1860 U.S. census, Alachua Co., FL, pop. Sch., p. 30, dwell. 221, fam. 226, A. H. Johnson.

22 National Park Service, “Soldier Details,” The Civil War (U.S. Department of the Interior, 2015), <https://www.nps.gov/civilwar/search-soldiers-detail.htm?soldierId=142A-D5AC-DC7A-DF11-BF36-B8AC6F5D926A>.

23 Johnson contract, January 4, 1868, James David Glunt Collection, Special and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL.

24 Johnson contract, January 4, 1868, James David Glunt Collection.

25 Johnson Contract, January 3, 1868, James David Glunt Collection, Special and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL.

liams, and H. Williams. Below their names is one other name: M. Sham.²⁶ Between the two contracts, Augustus H. Johnson employed nine tenant farmers at his plantation of around 366 acres.²⁷ According to East Florida Seminary (EFS) registers, at least two of Johnson's children, Lillian Augusta Johnson and Edgar Lee Johnson, attended EFS in 1890.²⁸ Augustus H. Johnson was not listed as their guardian, but probate records indicate that as of November 24th, 1880, Johnson had passed.²⁹ Instead, his second wife Florilla N. Johnson is listed as the children's guardian in the register.

Joseph J. Jones

In 1860 census data, Jones listed his occupation as 'farmer' and estimated his real estate value to be \$1,000 dollars.³⁰ Like other plantation owners in the South, Joseph J. Jones enlisted in the Confederacy at the outbreak of the Civil War, becoming a first lieutenant in the 7th Regiment of the Florida Infantry.³¹

In a contract from January 30th, 1867, Joseph J. Jones entered into an agreement with a freed black man named Richard Ribbon. Jones consented to rent Ribbon 140 acres "more or less" for Ribbon to plant "forty-five acres in cotton and ninety-five acres in corn."³² Jones further consented to provide Ribbon with horses and "all the utensils necessary"

²⁶ Johnson Contract, January 3, 1868, James David Glunt Collection.

²⁷ Alachua County Clerk of the Court. Ancient Records: Deed Record H, 291.

²⁸ Record book no. 2, East Florida Seminary Records.

²⁹ Alachua County Clerk of the Court. Ancient Records: Will Book C, 026.

³⁰ 1860 U.S. Census, Alachua County, Florida, population schedule, Micanopy, p. 31, 227, 232, B. W. Powell; NARA microfilm publication M653, roll 106, transcribed by Jim Powell.

³¹ National Park Service, "Soldier Details," The Civil War (U.S. Department of the Interior, 2015), <https://www.nps.gov/civilwar/search-soldiers-detail.htm?soldierId=2A9182D-DC7A-DF11-BF36-B8AC6F5D926A>

³² Jones Contract, January 30, 1867, James David Glunt Collection, Special and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida

for the working of the field.³³ However, Jones's contract plainly stated that the horses could only be used by Ribbon for plantation work and nothing else. In exchange, Jones received two-thirds of the crops Ribbon harvested. Notably, Jones's contract included a clause dictating Ribbon to "keep good order on the premises" and remove any "unruly or disagreeable" guests immediately.³⁴ The contract concludes with asserting that both Jones and Ribbon had an "equal right to the run of the field," meaning that Jones was allowed entry to the property regardless of Ribbon's desires.³⁵

Jones's connections to the East Florida Seminary are less salient than others covered in this paper, but still, like many other elite, white planters in Gainesville, Jones sent his children to the EFS, the preeminent school in Alachua County. In 1893, registers recorded a Hattie Jones from Alachua County, who was 18 at the time, under the guardianship of 'J. J. Jones'.³⁶

Benjamin W. Powell

Benjamin W. Powell was a prominent figure in 19th century Micanopy. His home, built in 1866, still stands in the Micanopy historic district, which is listed on the National Register of Historic Places.³⁷ During the Civil War, Powell enlisted in the Confederacy, rising to the rank of Captain of Company C, First Florida Infantry Regiment.³⁸

On January 24, 1866, Powell entered an agreement with the freed black man Christmas Grant and his wife, Sealey. Sealey Grant was paid a salary of seven dollars a month to "cook, wash, sew, iron, and do general

³³ Jones Contract, James David Glunt Collection.

³⁴ Jones Contract, James David Glunt Collection.

³⁵ Jones Contract, James David Glunt Collection.

³⁶ Record book no. 2, East Florida Seminary Records.

³⁷ National Register of Historic Places, Micanopy Historic District, Micanopy, Alachua County, Florida, ID: 83003512.

³⁸ Benjamin W. Powell, grave marker, Micanopy Historic Cemetery, Micanopy, Alachua County, Florida.

housework” for the Powell family.³⁹ Powell agreed to board Sealey as well. Furthermore, Sealey’s contract demanded that she “be respectful,” “obey all the orders” given to her and agree to be “under his control in the same manner as has been usual [indecipherable] on plantations.”⁴⁰ In including this clause dictating Sealey’s subservience, Powell explicitly stated what other freedmen contracts only implied: the white planters expected their black laborers to behave as deferentially as if they were still enslaved. In the case of lost time “by sickness or otherwise,” fifty cents would be deducted from Sealey’s wages.⁴¹ For “theft, refusal to obey orders, willful neglect of duty, or any other misdemeanor,” Sealey would be immediately dismissed or, ominously, “dealt with accordingly to law.”⁴² Florida’s Constitution of 1865 proposed new legislative measures – commonly referred to as ‘black codes’ – that dictated the lives of black residents. Under the suggested legislation, black workers like Sealey, who potentially violated terms in labor contracts or were otherwise deemed criminal, could be imprisoned, fined, pilloried, or even whipped up to “39 stripes.”⁴³ Although this constitution was ultimately never enacted as it was rejected by the U.S. Congress, its proposed punishments for black workers paint a menacing image for black laborers who were “dealt with” by law enforcement.⁴⁴

Benjamin W. Powell had several children with his wife, Esther Geiger Powell. Two of Powell’s sons attended the East Florida Seminary: Washington Whitfield Powell and Benjamin Hugh Powell.⁴⁵ In the 1889–

1890 EFS registers, B. H. Powell is listed as being in the First Class with his father’s name appearing beside his, listed as Captain B.W. Powell.⁴⁶ In the 1891–1892 registers, Washington Whitfield Powell is recorded as being in the ‘2nd class’ of the school; he was an honor student with one study in First Class.⁴⁷ In the 1902–1903 registers, a Miss Maisie Powell from Alachua County is documented.⁴⁸ As there are numerous other misspellings and inconsistencies with spelling in the EFS records, it is plausible Maisie is a misprint of Mazie. Mazie K. Powell was Benjamin W. Powell’s youngest child, who passed away in September of 1903.⁴⁹

William Hall Stringfellow

Like the Hailes, the Stringfellows were a well-known, wealthy planter family descended from South Carolina. Prior to the Civil War, Dr. William Hall Stringfellow was one of the few planters in Alachua County with “extensive holdings in acreage and slaves.”⁵⁰ Strikingly, an oral history interview with Isaiah Branton in March of 2006 recounts how his great-grandmother, Susie Kendricks, was enslaved by the Stringfellows. As a young child, Kendricks could recall “slaves being whipped on the

39 Powell Contract, January 24, 1866, James David Glunt Collection, Special and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida.

40 Powell Contract, James David Glunt Collection.

41 Powell Contract, James David Glunt Collection.

42 Powell Contract, James David Glunt Collection.

43 Florida Constitutional Convention (1865), *Constitution of the State of Florida*, 1865.1865-11-07. State Archives of Florida, Florida Memory. <<https://www.floridamemory.com/items/show/189093>>, accessed 5 March 2023.

44 Powell Contract, James David Glunt Collection

45 Record book no. 2, East Florida Seminary Records.

46 EFS Student Register 1889 – 1890, East Florida Seminary Records, Special and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida.

47 EFS Student Register 1891-1892, East Florida Seminary Records, Special and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida.

48 EFS Student Registers 1902 – 1903, East Florida Seminary Records, Special and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida.

49 Mazie K. Powell, grave marker, Micanopy Historic Cemetery, Micanopy, Alachua County, Florida.

50 Julia Floyd Smith, *Slavery and Plantation Growth in Antebellum Florida, 1821-1860* (Gainesville, FL: Library Press@UF, 2017), 124.

Stringfellow Plantation.”⁵¹ In this same interview, Branton also noted that Susie’s mother, Eliza Kendricks, who was formerly enslaved by the Stringfellows, worked as a servant for the Stringfellows and then the Dudleys, the then owners of the historic Dudley Farm in Newberry, after emancipation.⁵² Although it is impossible to determine without records, it is entirely feasible that Eliza Kendricks had a contract akin to Sealey Grant’s with the Powell family that was simply not preserved.

The contract between W. H. Stringfellow and four tenant farmers, dated to June 13, 1866, is harder to decipher due to the original document’s deteriorated condition. From what is decipherable, the Stringfellow contract appeared to be like other sharecropping contracts with Stringfellow agreeing to rent out “one hundred and thirty acres of land” to the tenant farmers.⁵³ Certain stipulations regarding the usage and care of Stringfellow’s horses and mules for the cultivation of crops were also included.

Remarkably, the contract also stated that “honor and honest fair [indecipherable] will must be practiced,” seemingly in reference to Stringfellow’s expectations for the freedmen’s work.⁵⁴ The notion that Stringfellow, a white planter using a system of labor that was innately unjust, notoriously corrupt, and built upon the continued subjugation of black workers, would contractually demand honor and honesty from his workers is a stunning display of hypocrisy. Tears and blotches render the last page of the Stringfellow contract nearly unintelligible, but from the four names of the contract laborers signed, the surnames Taylor, Parnell, and Cason are legible, as pictured below (See Fig. 1).⁵⁵

The Stringfellow family was actively involved with the East Flor-

ida Seminary and its alumni association. Three of Dr. W. H. Stringfellow’s grandchildren attended the East Florida Seminary in Gainesville: William Alexander Stringfellow, Marion Glenn Stringfellow, and Marguerite Stringfellow.⁵⁶ A Miss Claire Stringfellow from Alachua County was also recorded in the freshman class of the 1902–1903 EFS registers, but I was unable to determine her precise relationship to W. H. Stringfel-



Figure 1: Final page of the Stringfellow Contract (1866).

low.⁵⁷ Notably, W. H. Stringfellow’s son, Robert Lee (listed in records as R. L.) Stringfellow, and his wife were part of the reception committee for numerous events held by the Elève association, the alumni group for EFS, from annual balls to Thanksgiving Day banquets.⁵⁸

When the East Florida Seminary Principal Edwin P. Cater died in

51 Isaiah Branton, interview by Ann Smith, March 2, 2006, in Gainesville, Florida, transcript, Matheson Museum Inc. Oral History Program, Gainesville, FL, available online at http://ufdcimages.uflib.ufl.edu/MH/00/00/17/59/00001/MH00001759_00001.pdf

52 Branton, interview by Ann Smith.

53 Stringfellow Contract, June 13, 1866, James David Glunt Collection, Special and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida.

54 Stringfellow Contract, James David Glunt Collection.

55 Stringfellow Contract, James David Glunt Collection

56 Record book no. 2, East Florida Seminary Records.

57 EFS Student Registers 1902 – 1903, East Florida Seminary Records.

58 Elève Association, Box: 1, East Florida Seminary Records, Series 164. Special and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL.

1899 after a brief illness, R. L. Stringfellow acted as one of the pallbearers.⁵⁹ That same year the East Florida Seminary's board purchased, along with several other nearby properties, the "adjoining Stringfellow property for \$1,500" on which EFS planned to construct a women's dormitory.⁶⁰ In 1905 during the debate over where the University of Florida would be placed, J. D. Stringfellow, who was likely Joseph Dogan Stringfellow, the eldest son of W. H. Stringfellow, was one of fourteen Gainesville locals who collectively "submitted a bid of \$30,000...for the property of the East Florida Seminary."⁶¹ The Stringfellow's ties to the East Florida Seminary in Gainesville were indisputably deep.

Thomas and John Haile

Likewise, the Hailes' ties to the East Florida Seminary are robust. Three of Thomas Haile's children attended the East Florida Seminary: Sydney Haile, who graduated in 1887, Evans Haile, and Walter Kennedy Haile.⁶² After graduating, Evans Haile would become a prominent member of the alumni group, the Elève association, and even sat on its first board of directors.⁶³ Interestingly, there is even writing on the walls of the preserved Haile homestead made by EFS students around 1903.⁶⁴ Although it is not evident as to why these students were at the Haile homestead, it is feasible that the EFS students or alumni may have been visiting their former classmates or attending one of Evans Haile's notorious parties. Thomas Haile's granddaughter, Bessie Serena Haile, likewise attended EFS and

graduated in 1894.⁶⁵

Thomas Haile's brother John Haile, whose son may have attended EFS despite his name not appearing in accessible records, had a cotton plantation of 960 acres, called San Felasco. According to the Alachua County tax roll, prior to the Civil War in 1860, John Haile owned sixty-three enslaved people.⁶⁶ After the passage of the 13th amendment, John Haile employed twenty-two contract laborers at the San Felasco Plantation, including Alax Turner, William Fisher, and Claybourne Dubose.⁶⁷

In his 1968 article, historian Edward Eckert drew from the 1873 personal ledger of John Haile to illustrate how planters used disreputable and corrupt means of bookkeeping to keep their laborers in a perpetual state of debt, virtually chained to the plantation. If at the end of a season, John Haile owed a laborer money, "Haile then found new debts which would ensure that his account would balance to the penny."⁶⁸ Unfortunately, only the excerpts included by Eckert are currently available. When I attempted to locate John Haile's ledger at Smathers, its last known location, I learned that the ledger was unaccounted for, having mysteriously vanished between 1968 and 1975. Still, Eckert's coverage of Haile's journal painted a vivid image of the exploitative nature of contract labor and the corrupt means by which planters kept their workers in permanent debt.

Conclusion

In recent years, with the rise of activist groups like Black Lives Matter, the history of the University of Florida has come under renewed scrutiny. In the Fall of 2021, drawing on the foundational works of previous historians like Samuel Proctor, students Ahmad Brown, Javier Ecosta-Garvia, Gabrielle Paul, and Morgan Peltier published an article titled "Slavery and the University of Florida: African Americans, Semi-

59 Cater obituary, 1899, Box: 1, East Florida Seminary Records, Series 164. Special and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida.

60 Proctor, "The University of Florida: Its Early Years, 1853-1906", 111.

61 Proctor, "The University of Florida: Its Early Years, 1853-1906", 504

62 Record book no. 2, East Florida Seminary Records.

63 Elève Association, Box: 1, East Florida Seminary Records, Series 164. Special and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida

64 Kirkman and McCarthy, The Historic Haile Homestead at Kanapaha Plantation, 93.

65 EFS Graduates 1903-04 Catalogue, Box: 1, East Florida Seminary Records, Series 164. Special and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida.

66 Smith, *Slavery and Plantation Growth in Antebellum Florida*, 1821 - 1860, 214.

67 Eckert, "Contract Labor in Florida during Reconstruction," 44-46.

68 Eckert, "Contract Labor in Florida during Reconstruction," 47.

nole and the Origins of Higher Education in Florida” in the UF History Department’s journal *Alpata* that analyzed the Ocala East Florida Seminary’s direct connections to slavery and the displacement, and genocide, of indigenous peoples. These contemporary efforts by history students to unearth the deeply troubling aspects of the history of the University of Florida and bring them to light have sparked a reckoning upon which this work builds. Likewise, as the authors of “Slavery and the University of Florida” contended that the University of Florida’s connections to slavery and the displacement and genocide of Native Americans constituted a “history that is not well known and needs to be acknowledged,” so too are the university’s connections to neo-slavery in the postbellum South.⁶⁹

The five examples of parents or grandparents I examined in this paper are from only a small selection (roughly 40) of preserved freedmen contracts. Considering that the agricultural sector continued to be prevalent in Gainesville into the 20th century with “one-third of the town’s labor force” directly linked to agriculture in 1870 and about ten percent in 1880, and the widespread use of contract labor in the South, there are likely dozens, if not hundreds, of unaccounted freedmen contracts for Alachua County alone.⁷⁰ Taking into account the prevalence of agriculture in Alachua County’s economy in the 19th century and the middle to upper-class socioeconomic standing of many of the EFS students, the selected examples I addressed are likely representative of a far larger number of families connected with the Seminary who engaged in the contract labor system. Therefore, the continued success of the East Florida Seminary, a direct precursor to the University of Florida, in the Reconstruction and postReconstruction years, can be at least partially attributed to the continued exploitation of black labor in forms of neo-slavery.

It is important to note that the research this work accomplished is only a starting point. A more in-depth analysis is necessary to truly determine the extent and depth of the connections between contract labor, debt peonage, or other forms of neo-slavery and the University of Florida. Further research, specifically, is needed in cross referencing names on freedmen contracts to teachers and board members of the EFS.

⁶⁹ Ahmad Brown et al., “Slavery and the University of Florida,” 31.

⁷⁰ Sowell, “Racial Patterns of Labor in Postbellum Florida,” 437.

For example, J. C. Gardner, appointed by Governor Walker as a member of the first board of trustees of the EFS after its move to Gainesville, was the judge whose office filed most of the freedmen contracts now preserved at Smathers Library. His signature appears on most of the contracts, alongside both the overseers and contract laborers.⁷¹ Another trustee on this board, J. M. Sparkman, who was likely James M. Sparkman, was most likely related to Wade H. Sparkman, listed as an overseer on the freedmen contract dated to March 23, 1868.⁷² These are connections that an exceptionally limited precursory search have produced; a thorough investigation will undoubtedly show that many of those involved in the EFS, from teachers to board members to alumni, have comparable connections to neo-slavery in the postbellum South.

⁷¹ Proctor, “The University of Florida: Its Early Years, 1853–1906,” 91.

⁷² Sparkman Contract, March 23, 1868, James David Glunt Collection, Special and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida.

‘Nobody was prepared for a 40-day protest:’ The Anti-Apartheid Movement in Gainesville and at the University of Florida, 1982-1992.

MITCHY REID

ABSTRACT

On April 24, 1985, over 200 Gainesville residents protested The University of Florida’s (UF) investment in South African Apartheid. This protest was organized by veterans of Gainesville’s Civil Rights Movement but would eventually morph into a 40-day-and-night occupation of the front steps of Tigert Hall led by a younger and less established group of organizers. The occupation failed in forcing UF to fully divest from firms operating in South Africa, but it did catalyze UF and Gainesville’s Anti-Apartheid Movement which would continue organizing until 1992. In consulting newspaper archives, primarily from *The Alligator*, conducting interviews with participants in the Movement, and analyzing archival Florida Foundation records and the President Criser Collection within the University of Florida Archives, this essay examines the causes and events of the Anti-Apartheid Movement in Gainesville and how it fits into a broader history of political organizing in Gainesville and at the University of Florida.

On April 24, 1985, over 200 Gainesville residents were led by established Civil Rights leaders in protest against the University of Florida’s investment in businesses that operated in Apartheid South Africa.¹ The protest originally planned to gather in UF’s Plaza of the Americas and then march a half-mile to Emerson Hall where the University of Florida Foundation offices were located; however, the protest eventually turned its sights on President Marshall Criser’s office at Tigert Hall. Once Criser refused to meet with the leaders of the demonstration, the march evolved into an occupation of the front steps of Tigert Hall

which blocked the front entrances and claimed the building as “Mandela Hall.”² This occupation ultimately failed to secure a full repeal of the Florida Foundation’s investment in South Africa, but it did catalyze the creation of the UF chapter of the Student Coalition Against Apartheid and Racism (SCAAR) which would lead the Anti-Apartheid Movement at UF through 1992.

The demonstration, which was initially organized by Civil Rights veterans, aligns with the national trend. Nationwide, the Anti-Apartheid Movement was an internationalist extension of the struggle for Black American rights.³ What is unexpected though is how the protest shifted away from a Civil Rights foundation and towards a mindset of international solidarity. Very rarely is such a shift in a movement so evident as it was with the Mandela Hall Occupation.

Through examining Gainesville’s Anti-Apartheid Movement, a generally forgotten period of Gainesville’s history can be remembered. The Movement also bridged an era of political organizing in Gainesville grounded in the Civil Rights tradition into a new era motivated by an internationalist sentiment to see America act towards progressive change in the world, marking it as both an outlier in the national Movement against Apartheid and a foundational era in the political history of Gainesville and its noteworthy political movements.

The Mandela Hall Occupation

When members of UF’s College Democrats, Black Graduate Student Organization, and Community Prison Action Group led a rally on April 24, 1985 against 1.6 million dollars in University funds invested in companies that operated in South Africa, they had planned to take the rallied group a half-mile from UF’s Plaza of the Americas to Emerson Hall and demand a meeting with leaders of the University of Florida Founda-

2 Throughout this paper I will refer to this occupation as “The Mandela Hall Occupation” because it is what its participants called it; Pete Self (twelfth-year grad student and longtime organizer), Interview by Mitchy Reid. June 10, 2022. Transcript in possession of the Author.

3 Janice Love, *The U.S. Anti-Apartheid Movement: Local Activism in Global Politics*. New York: Praeger, 1985.

1 Juan C. Andrade and Cory Jo Lancaster, “Apartheid Fight Hits; Tigert Locks Up,” *Independent Florida Alligator* (Gainesville, FL), April 25, 1985.

tion, the organization that officially handled the investment of the University's endowment.⁴ They followed this plan and, under the watch of the University of Florida Police Department (UFPD), took the protest of over 200 people to Emerson Hall where the organizations gave speeches and collected signatures for petitions to show local representatives the popularity of divestment, however, not everyone agreed with the civility of this plan.

A small group among the crowd, including Paul and Emmett Donnelly who, three years prior, were suspended from the P.K. Yonge Laboratory School for publishing an underground newsletter criticizing the school's administration, felt that the current protest was not doing enough to capture the attention of UF's administration.⁵ This group sent a few of their own to take up space on the front steps of Tigert Hall while the rest stayed at Emerson Hall to lead the group to Tigert. Once the group at Tigert Hall had been revealed to the larger protest at Emerson Hall and to UFPD, the protest shifted its vision towards Tigert. During the march to Tigert, UFPD surrounded the area and UF student affairs kept watch of the protest. Both were closely monitoring the protest for any escalations or disruptions to classes that could be used to justify breaking up the demonstration. The protest arrived at Tigert Hall and while chants of "UF Divest" rang out, the core leaders demanded a meeting with President Criser. In response to Criser's refusal to meet, 40 protestors slept through the night outside of Tigert Hall.

The next day, on the 25th of April, the protestors began a new day of action and gave UFPD the provocation they were looking for when an unidentified individual chained twelfth-year graduate student and long

time organizer Pete Self to the front doors of Tigert Hall.⁶ Seizing upon this opportunity, Student Affairs Vice President Art Sandeen ordered the dispersion of the arrests of the protestors. Twenty-seven students and faculty who would be dubbed the "UF 27" were arrested for trespassing.⁷ However, these arrests did not end the protests. While Paul Donnelly and Judith Brown, an incredibly influential Women's Rights and Civil Rights organizer, organized legal defenses for those arrested, the remaining protestors solidified their organization as the Coalition for UF Divestment from South Africa and officially stated their six demands.⁸

While the University administration turned their heads to the demands of the protest, the City of Gainesville embraced the demonstrators. Over the next three weeks, Gainesville's mayor/commissioner Gary Corden announced that the city would examine the prospect of divesting from firms operating in South Africa, the widely popular Krishna Lunch group moved from their normal post on UF's Plaza of the Americas to the steps of Tigert Hall to provide food to the demonstrators, and the Coalition's daily rallies drew crowds that garnered significant media

6 The individual was unnamed by UFPD and none of my interview subjects recall who it was either; "Correspondence from President Marshall Criser to Gerald Schaffer," August 8, 1985, Box 95, Administrative Policy Records of the University of Florida Office of the President (Marshall M. Criser, Jr.) Series P19, George A. Smathers Libraries, Gainesville, Florida.

7 "Taking It To The Streets," *Independent Florida Alligator* (Gainesville, FL), April 26, 1985.

8 The Coalition demanded that the Florida Foundation publicly release information on their investments in Apartheid, UF completely divest from firms doing business in South Africa by 1987, President Criser publicly state UF's position on divestment, amnesty be granted to the demonstrators who were already arrested, a meeting occur between students and UFPD to discuss arrest procedures, divestment be made a top priority for the school, and that UF recruit refugees from South Africa to study and teach at UF; Michael Koretzky, "Protestors promise orderly rally; Criser won't show," *Independent Florida Alligator* (Gainesville, FL), April 29, 1982; Jenny Brown, Interview by Mitchy Reid. December 3, 2021, transcript in possession of the author.

4 Paul Roehrig, "Night at Tigert changes reporter's view," *Independent Florida Alligator* (Gainesville, FL), May 28, 1985.

5 Philip Kuntz, "Free press battle flares at P.K. Yonge School," *Independent Florida Alligator* (Gainesville, FL), February 2, 1982.; Emmett Donnelly, Interview by Mitchy Reid. February 2, 2022. Transcript in possession of the Author.

coverage.⁹ Unfortunately, the public reception was not all positive. UF students and Gainesville residents that opposed divestment or merely didn't like such a public demonstration assaulted the demonstrators and vandalized protest signs with increasing frequency. This included the kidnapping and sexual assault of one female protestor by two unidentified men and an attempt to run over the occupiers with a Ford Mustang.¹⁰ Public support for the protestors started to wane as well. After Corden was hit with a pie over what was presumed to be his support for divestment, public officials and figures were hesitant to lend public support to the Mandela Hall Occupation. Even though the pie thrower later clarified that he struck Corden because of the mayor's support for development in Southeast Gainesville, the memory of the mayor being "pied" stuck with much of Gainesville's population even as the UF 27 avoided jail time.¹¹

As the occupation grew more difficult, the Coalition grew more organized and became the most dedicated of Gainesville's Anti-Apartheid Movement and were left to chart a course forward. This dedicated group adopted the new name Student Coalition Against Apartheid and Racism (SCAAR) and held nightly meetings on the steps to discuss strategy going forward and topics for upcoming rallies.¹² The Coalition never elected an official leader, but participants and observers considered Pete Self as the occupation's leading figure.¹³ The organization of the occupation and the hostility towards it grew side by side until May 26, 1985 when a UF senior tore down Anti-Apartheid signs and assaulted two occupiers. Two days later, UFPD confiscated dozens

of Anti-Apartheid signs and boxes of SCAAR literature.¹⁴ The opposition became overwhelming for the occupiers, and Criser still refused to concede to demands for divestment. On June 3rd, 1985, the Mandela Hall Occupation concluded when the 30 remaining SCAAR members voted to concede. Although the Mandela Hall Occupation ended, this was only the beginning of what SCAAR members called an "eternal occupation" through their future organizing for divestment.¹⁵

It is not surprising that the protest was initially planned by organizations that advocated primarily for Black equality at UF since the Movement was defined by the inspiration it drew from the Civil Rights Movement and its desire to extend the gains won for Black Americans to Black South Africans.¹⁶ The Movement in Gainesville up to this point was in its infancy but similarly drew inspiration from the struggle for Black American rights. It could also have been foreseen that the protest erupted into the Mandela Hall Occupation through the injection of internationalist solidarity. Previous popular movements at UF directed campus consciousness towards international struggle. Most notably, the Anti-War Movement led by Scott Camil generated huge public power against American military actions in Southeast Asia.¹⁷ The Donnelly brothers, in the newsletter that got them suspended from the P.K. Yonge School, frequently referenced international movements and encouraged solidarity from students. When kickstarting the Mandela Hall Occupation, the Donnellys internationalism-minded group amongst the protest shifted the Movement in Gainesville into that internationalist focus and

9 Michael Koretzky, "Mayor says city could divest, answered with pie," *Independent Florida Alligator* (Gainesville, FL), May 16, 1985; Michael Koretzky, "Protestors pack it in," *Independent Florida Alligator* (Gainesville, FL), June 4, 1985.

10 Pete Self, interview by Mitchy Reid, June 10, 2022. Transcript in possession of the Author

11 "Pie thrower assails critics, defends his actions," *Independent Florida Alligator* (Gainesville, FL), May 28, 1985.

12 Paul Roehrig, "Night at Tigert changes reporter's view," *Independent Florida Alligator* (Gainesville, FL), May 28, 1985.

13 Paul Donnelly, interview by Mitchy Reid, February 2, 2022

14 Michael Koretzky, "Days' events take toll on protestors," *Independent Florida Alligator* (Gainesville, FL), May 30, 1985.

15 Michael Koretzky, "Protestors pack it in," *Independent Florida Alligator* (Gainesville, FL), June 4, 1985.

16 William Minter and Sylvia Hill. "Anti-apartheid solidarity in United States-South Africa relations: From the margins to the mainstream," *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, Volume 3, International Solidarity, Part II

17 Michael Thomas, "Southern Protests: Scott Camil and the Anti-War Movement at the University of Florida, 1969-1975," (undergraduate thesis, University of Florida, 2013).

broke the national trend.

SCAAR Carries On

The Mandela Hall Occupation failed to secure divestment at UF, but it galvanized and transformed the Anti-Apartheid Movement. The events of those 40 days had shifted Gainesville's Anti-Apartheid Movement from a fledgling extension of the Civil Rights Movement that contained strains of the radical student movements into a coalition led by those radical and mobilized students at UF. This new leadership could dedicate more time to the Movement and were willing to be more direct in their confrontation with the university's administration, as is typically seen among student organizers.¹⁸ Because of these shifts, the Movement became more active and contentious toward university policymakers, but this contention did not always lead to results.

Following the conclusion of the occupation, SCAAR was locked into a continuous cycle of publicly demonstrating to force President Criser and the Florida Foundation to meet, only for the meetings to never generate anything substantial, which would lead to more demonstrations to get another meeting.¹⁹ This cycle carried on for four months until SCAAR entered a public meeting with the Florida Board of Regents—the board ultimately in charge of Florida's public universities. On October 24, 1985, at the Reitz Student Union, SCAAR converged with Anti-Apartheid leaders from Florida State University, Florida A&M University, and the University of North Florida to give a combined presentation with the goal of convincing the board to move towards divesting Florida public universities' endowments from companies operating in South Africa.²⁰ This meeting did not yield the desired policy results. Board members claimed they had no control over individual university matters. However, because of the sympathies felt by the board members and the board's close ties to

the leadership of UF, many members put pressure on President Criser to meet with SCAAR in good faith.²¹

This seemingly good-faith meeting came on November 16th, 1985, when 20 members of SCAAR met with the chairperson of the Finance Committee of the Florida Foundation, Bill Emerson. SCAAR received a "qualified yes" from the Finance Committee on creating a joint organization between SCAAR members and Finance Committee members. Unfortunately, this committee would never materialize because of what Emerson claimed was the "impracticality" of bringing all 42 foundation members together to discuss divestment.²² Social pressures at UF had long been dissipated by layers of committees and procedures, and the Anti-Apartheid Movement was the latest victim. SCAAR would continue to lose energy in the university's bureaucracy which brought them to take the fight for divestment back to where the Movement had been reinvigorated initially: Tigert Hall.

As Emmett Donnelly remarked looking back on the Mandela Hall occupation, "Nobody was prepared for a 40-day protest," and he was correct.²³ Nobody, including the protestors, knew that the initial protest would end up at Tigert Hall, nor did they know the priests would endure for 40 days. But on February 5th, 1986, everyone was aware of SCAAR's plan to hold a sit-in on the steps of Tigert Hall until Criser and the Florida Foundation revived the discussions about divestment. SCAAR's intention was even published in the school paper two days prior, so when over 250 protestors once again arrived at Tigert Hall and 5 members of SCAAR blocked the front door, UFPD did just what they had done before.

18 Teresa Agrillo, *STATEMENTS BY STUDENT REPRESENTATIVES IN THE UNITED STATES ON ACTIONS AGAINST APARTHEID*, June 27, 1986

19 Jenny Brown, Interview by Mitchy Reid. December 3, 2021. Transcript in possession of the author.

20 Jim Hagy, "Regents to hear Apartheid complaints," *Independent Florida Alligator* (Gainesville, FL), October 24, 1985.

21 Because UF was the foremost producer of politicians and administrators in Florida at the time, most members of the Board of Regents were alumni of and had ties to UF. "Statement from Chancellor Charles B. Reed," December 20, 1985, Box 95, Administrative Policy Records of the University of Florida Office of the President (Marshall M. Criser, Jr.) Series P19, George A. Smathers Libraries, Gainesville, Florida.

22 "Letter from Richard T. Smith to Teresa Agrillo" November 27, 1985, Box 95, Administrative Policy Records of the University of Florida Office of the President (Marshall M. Criser, Jr.) Series P19, George A. Smathers Libraries, Gainesville, Florida.

23 Emmett Donnelly, Interview by Mitchy Reid. February 2, 2022. Transcript in possession of the Author.

Only now, UFPD moved with more urgency afforded to them by campus rules enacted after the Mandela Hall Occupation to shut down extended demonstrations on campus.²⁴ The five door blockers were arrested and UF administration again argued that bringing the foundation together for meetings regarding divestment was too impractical. But SCAAR again demonstrated that they had learned over the last year and the lull that occurred following the initial Mandela Hall occupation would not be repeated.

Just two weeks after these five arrests, three more members blocked the front doors to Emerson Hall as a part of a protest at the Florida Foundation Headquarters. Again, the Florida Foundation insisted that SCAAR's desired meetings were impractical, and again, UFPD broke up the protest. This time only one protester was arrested, Michelle Drifka, who said in reference to her arrest, "It's only a night. Nelson Mandela has been in jail for twenty years."²⁵ To those in SCAAR, it seemed like the Florida Foundation was an invulnerable target.²⁶

The Anti-Apartheid Movement in Gainesville, now firmly synonymous with SCAAR, experienced both the pros and cons of being a student Movement. The Movement was often successful and was able to warrant a response from UF's administration because so many members of the Movement were students and faculty. But because so many members of the Movement were tied to the University of Florida, UF's administration could exercise a great deal of punitive power over the Movement which the administration would soon exert.

24 Colin Whitworth, "SCAAR plans sit-in at Tigert," *Independent Florida Alligator* (Gainesville, FL), February 3, 1986; Whitworth, Colin "SCAAR asks for dialogue," *Independent Florida Alligator* (Gainesville, FL), February 5, 1986; Whitworth, Colin "Five students arrested at Tigert apartheid fight," *Independent Florida Alligator* (Gainesville, FL), February 6, 1986.; Giles, Kathy "UF camp-out rule draws fire," *Independent Florida Alligator* (Gainesville, FL), February 24, 1986

25 Colin Whitworth, "Anti-Apartheid protestor jailed," *Independent Florida Alligator* (Gainesville, FL), February 24, 1986.

26 Pete Self, interview by Mitchy Reid, June 10, 2022, Transcript in possession of the Author.

Gainesville's Anti-Apartheid Movement

The leadership of the University of Florida had successfully stalled the Anti-Apartheid Movement since the Mandela Hall Occupation, but the Movement still had a strong presence on campus, especially in the Philosophy department. Additionally, UF had enacted multiple "anticamping" ordinances after the Mandela Hall occupation that were publicly presented as steps forward for public safety but privately seen as a way to prevent another 40-day protest.²⁷ But in an era where the student body was developing a reputation across the country for its activist nature and high rates of alcohol poisoning, a reputation the administration wanted to avoid, merely preventing the spread of the Anti-Apartheid Movement was not enough.

To take back control of campus, UF's administration began their project to shift campus culture with the newest students. During the summer of 1984, UF began its inaugural "Preview Program."²⁸ Although it is now standard, this program originally started as an orientation where incoming students received campus tours and lectures regarding the dangers of alcohol. Incoming students also received messages directly from the administration, often directly from President Criser's office, regarding the university's positions on pertinent social issues. These statements, however, were frequently misleading or omitted key details, and at the start of the 1986 Fall semester, the administration included a statement it had previously released publicly explaining its position on divestment from South Africa.²⁹ This statement claimed that UF's administration had recommended the Florida Foundation only invest in firms that do

27 Kathy Giles, "UF camp-out rule draws fire," *Independent Florida Alligator* (Gainesville, FL), February 24, 1986.

28 Social Climate on Campus," August 28, 1985, Box 95, Administrative Policy Records of the University of Florida Office of the President (Marshall M. Criser, Jr.) Series P19, George A. Smathers Libraries, Gainesville, Florida.

29 "Memo to Provost Robert Bryan and Vice President Smith," December 20, 1985, Box 95, Administrative Policy Records of the University of Florida Office of the President (Marshall M. Criser, Jr.) Series P19, George A. Smathers Libraries, Gainesville, Florida

business in South Africa and adhere to the Sullivan Principles.³⁰

While many Anti-Apartheid activists would argue that simply following the Sullivan Principles wasn't enough to affect change in South Africa, the real issue of the statement was that there was no tangible evidence to prove that the Florida Foundation was following these recommendations.³¹ For years, UF and the Florida Foundation had been following a pattern of action: receive public pressure to divest, announce they would move investments to companies following the Sullivan Principles, enjoy the good publicity that came from the announcement, and then fail to deliver on the announcement. This cycle had repeatedly worn down the Anti-Apartheid Movement and now was being used to preemptively placate the student body. This tactic, combined with the greater crackdown on protests, stifled the growth of SCAAR and the Movement. Both groups were forced to shift from fighting for divestment to fighting for its own existence because the administration was not the only group upset with the radical politics on the University of Florida campus.

Members of the UF Student Government (UFSG) also took note of the political developments on campus and sought to hamper the radical reputation of the student body. So, in the Spring of 1986, when UFSG oversaw the distribution of 4 million dollars towards student organizations for the next year, they "zero-funded" SCAAR. SCAAR was one of many organizations that stopped receiving student government funding because, as UFSG claimed, they were a political organization.³² Organizations like the National Organization for Women (NOW) and

Campus Organized Against Rape (COAR) initially were zero-funded because of their political status, but those decisions were overturned after student outcry and the decision to bar their funding was repealed. SCAAR fought to regain their funding but lost and did not have access to their previous resources.³³

In addition to SCAAR's punishment, the Philosophy Department at UF was also significantly impacted. Since the department hosted active members of the Movement like Professor Tom Auxter, who was also President of UF's faculty union, philosophy classes were put under closer watch by the university. An administrator was also hand-picked by Criser to serve as dean of the college with the intent of purging the department of its radical faculty.³⁴ Certain classes perceived to be radical were canceled, such as the graduate course taught by Pete Self, that involved teaching at nearby prisons.³⁵ Even outside of the administration, philosophy professors that invited SCAAR members to speak to classes or engaged with the Movement were labeled Marxists and "lunatics."³⁶ The persecution of the Philosophy Department came to a head on March 23, 1987, when UF philosophy professors, Tom Auxter, Tom Simon, and Richard Haynes announced a lawsuit against President Criser and alleged that the University was acting on an agenda designed to punish the philosophy department for its support of SCAAR and divestment.³⁷

These attacks on SCAAR and the philosophy department persisted all while SCAAR fought to educate and organize the student body around divestment. With the UF administration able to directly convince the student body that divestment had already occurred, and with no way

30 The Sullivan Principles were published in 1977 as a series of goals for companies operating in South Africa. The principles were centered around ensuring that companies did not practice discrimination in the workplace. Many Anti-Apartheid activists, however, felt that sticking to these principles gave companies a way to avoid public pressure while still operating in South Africa. Janice Love, *The U.S. Anti-Apartheid Movement: Local Activism in Global Politics*. New York: Praeger, 1985.

31 Michael Podolosky, "Foundation holdings remain unchanged," *Independent Florida Alligator* (Gainesville, FL), February 7, 1987.

32 Sharon Kennedy, "SCAAR denied funding request by SG," *Independent Florida Alligator* (Gainesville, FL), April 9, 1986.

33 Sharon Kennedy, "SG budget OK'd, SCAAR gets 0," *Independent Florida Alligator* (Gainesville, FL), April 9, 1986.

34 Joe Newman, "Philosophy profs file lawsuit against Criser, Regents," *Independent Florida Alligator* (Gainesville, FL), March 24, 1987.

35 Brad Buck, "UF cancels class but jail program continues," *Independent Florida Alligator* (Gainesville, FL), September 8, 1986.

36 Wallace Armes, "Weinstein's views are lunatic, not liberal," *Independent Florida Alligator* (Gainesville, FL), April 9, 1987.

37 Joe Newman, "Philosophy profs file lawsuit against Criser, Regents," *Independent Florida Alligator* (Gainesville, FL), March 24, 1987.

to access the Florida Foundation portfolios, this fight was near impossible. As a result, SCAAR was forced to pivot away from the losing battle against the Florida Foundation.³⁸ Unfortunately, there was no target as clear as the Florida Foundation for SCAAR to organize against. When SCAAR held a rally on September 3, 1986, it was seen as largely aimless because of the disparate messages SCAAR promoted. SCAAR smashed IBM typewriters, washed UF's "dirty laundry" by rinsing sheets representing SCAAR's causes, and gave speeches against Reagan's "Star Wars" program, America's investments in Apartheid, and the university's ROTC program.³⁹

The aimless nature of SCAAR's September 3rd demonstration mirrored the lack of direction that SCAAR was experiencing. With the fight against the Florida Foundation stalled, SCAAR fought other systems of racism but could not focus their efforts on any target as vast and as local as the Florida Foundation and Apartheid. Without this unifying target, SCAAR's recruitment slowed and the organization lost the membership numbers that allowed it to carry significant public pressure.⁴⁰ In early 1987, shortly before the attacks on the philosophy department were at their peak, Gainesville had a new mayor that was less supportive of the Anti-Apartheid Movement. Additionally, the push from conservative groups on campus to label SCAAR as a solely Marxist organization had succeeded in making SCAAR an unattractive group with whom to be associated.⁴¹

The University's and local conservative organizations' attacks on SCAAR created a culture where the student body broadly supported divestment but was not willing to organize to force divestment. This was the culture that the university administration sought to create on campus around all movements, and they had built this culture on campus by the

end of 1987's fall semester. SCAAR would move on from fighting for divestiture following that semester and would lead anticapitalist reading groups, seminars about the African National Congress, and counter-demonstrations against the Ku Klux Klan. However, they would never regain the mass support that they had during the fight for divestiture.

Regardless of SCAAR's failings after the fight for divestment, they did succeed in winning a policy of divestment from the Florida Foundation. The victory of divestment is anticlimactic in this narrative because the decision was made by the Florida Foundation entirely behind closed doors absent any representatives from SCAAR or any other student organization. In fact, the decision was made in November of 1987, and announced to Black student organizations on February 4, 1988. This was done explicitly because, as Gainesville organizer Jenny Brown would argue, "the foundation did not want to appear to be bending to student pressure."⁴² President Criser had publicly credited the civility of Students for Divestment in South Africa, a student group that sought a more civilized approach to the Movement, but faced the same obstacles that SCAAR encountered. Criser also credited UF's Black Student Union (BSU), which at this time was well removed from its aggressive leadership of 1971's Black Thursday demonstration. However, Criser's records suggest that SCAAR's actions were more of a significant driver towards UF's decision to divest than more cooperative student organizations like Students for a Democratic South Africa or the BSU.⁴³ As Jenny Brown put it upon reflection on this era, "they [UF administration] don't want you to know that protesting works."⁴⁴ After dozens of arrests, beatings, university punishments, and countless social ridicule, SCAAR had won but UF would refuse to give them credit.

38 Jenny Brown, interview by Mitchy Reid, December 3, 2021, Transcript in possession of the author.

39 Ron Kozlowski, "SCAAR holds typewriter smash, wash rally," *Independent Florida Alligator* (Gainesville, FL), September 4, 1986.

40 Joe Newman, "SCAAR's impact analyzed," *Independent Florida Alligator* (Gainesville, FL), January 12, 1987.

41 Newman, "SCAAR's impact analyzed."

42 Jenny Brown, interview by Mitchy Reid, December 3, 2021, Transcript in Possession of the author.

43 "Memo announcing divestment decision" August 18, 1987, Box 95, Administrative Policy Records of the University of Florida Office of the President (Marshall M. Criser, Jr.) Series P19, George A. Smathers Libraries, Gainesville, Florida.

44 Jenny Brown, interview by Mitchy Reid, December 3, 2021, Transcript in Possession of the author.

Conclusion

The legacy of SCAAR and the Anti-Apartheid Movement is a history worth studying. The Mandela Hall Occupation represented a bridge from an era of organizing in Gainesville defined by its Civil Rights foundation into an era defined by its internationalist sentiment. This sentiment was inspired by the United States' entrenched role as the global superpower and the AntiApartheid Movement was instrumental in creating the language and resistance to the power structures emerging in the United States that facilitated its role as the global hegemon. The language and tactics created by University of Florida students and Black organizers in the AntiApartheid Movement was created to tie the oppression of racial minorities in the United States to populations abroad in popular discourse.⁴⁵ Contemporary organizations that focus on international solidarity draw heavily on that language today. In the same vein, domestic movements like The Boycott, Divest, and Sanction (BDS) Movement and the contemporary Abolitionist Movement can even trace their origins to the movement for divestment from South Africa as their work to change America's role in the world also uses much of the same language pioneered by the Anti-Apartheid Movement. Organizations and movements like these represent an ever-present internationalism whose origins in Gainesville can be traced back to the Mandela Hall Occupation. The legacy of the Anti-Apartheid Movement is also felt outside of today's organizations and within individuals on the University of Florida campus and in Gainesville today.

Professors Auxter, Simon, and Haynes succeeded in preventing the dissolution of the Philosophy Department, and Professor Auxter even still teaches at UF.⁴⁶ Pete Self would continue his studies at UF and would be arrested publicly once again after refusing to stop flyering for SCAAR at a Reggae Festival on campus in 1991.⁴⁷ And notably, Paul

Donnelly would become a labor lawyer in Florida and would serve as co-counsel for UF professors that sued the university over freedom of speech infringements in 2022.⁴⁸ The Anti-Apartheid Movement in Gainesville is noteworthy because of its defiance of the trends of the national Movement, how it laid the groundwork for contemporary racial justice movements that followed, and because it ultimately won divestment, even if the University of Florida will not admit it.

45 Pete Self, interview by Mitchy Reid, June 10, 2022, Transcript in possession of the Author.

46 Tom Auxter, interview by Marna Weston, March 1, 2009.

47 Jenny Brown, interview by Mitchy Reid, December 3, 2021, Transcript in possession of the author.

48 Emmett Donnelly, interview by Mitchy Reid, February 2, 2022, Transcript in possession of the author

WORLD WAR II and ITS SURROUNDINGS

Bosnia's Place in Nazi Ideology: The 13th Waffen Mountain Division of the SS Handschar

LEJS KRIVIC

ABSTRACT

During the Second World War, the people of Bosnia found themselves divided. Having been conquered by the Germans, the three main ethnic groups of the region, the Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats, were grouped along the strict racial hierarchy of the Nazi party. However, while the Nazis were able to categorize the Serbs and Croats fairly easily, the Bosniaks fell into an ideological gray area. Using the experiences of the 13th Waffen SS Division, this paper will seek to identify how the Germans initially viewed the Bosniaks, as well as how pragmatism ultimately forced them to break with ideology.

It is generally well understood that Nazi ideology centered on the racial superiority of the Aryan race, with Hitler creating a hierarchy based on this belief. What may be surprising, however, is that the concept of Aryanism could be flexible. As Germany expanded, the new peoples that fell under its rule were often defined as Aryan or non-Aryan based on convenience, especially when the war turned in favor of the Allies. The Axis invasion and subsequent occupation of Yugoslavia provides an excellent example of this dynamic. The three main ethnic groups that constituted the nation: The Croats, Serbs, and Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), despite having similar cultures, speaking essentially the same language, and being nearly indistinguishable from one another in terms of appearance, were treated differently by the Germans and their allies. While the Croats were allowed to establish their own government and administration, albeit as a puppet regime under the Nazis, Serbs were treated as an “inferior race” subject to persecution, with some even being sent to one of the many Croatian-run concentration camps established in

the region.¹ Bosniaks, on the other hand, were allowed (or in many cases “encouraged”) to enlist directly into the Waffen-SS, the military wing of the Nazi party.²

This is especially significant considering that, up until this point, the Waffen-SS had been made up of entirely Germanic troops (German, Scandinavian, Dutch, etc.). Although the Germans would go on to raise other non-Germanic Waffen-SS divisions down the road, such as the Italian 29th and French 33rd Waffen Grenadier Divisions, the Bosniak 13th Waffen Mountain Division, also known as the Handschar Division, was the first of its kind.³ This decision by the Germans brings with it some questions: How did the Germans reconcile their concepts of German superiority with the utilization of non-Germanic soldiers within their ranks, why were Bosniaks the first, and how exactly did they fit into the Nazi racial hierarchy?

The Invasion of Yugoslavia

The Axis occupation of Yugoslavia came as a result of the failed 1940 Italian invasion of Greece. With Mussolini's forces having been pushed back to Albania, Allied troops had begun landing in Greece to support its defense, and as time progressed, larger and larger numbers of British and Commonwealth forces began to arrive. With the prospect of an Allied victory in Greece, Hitler ultimately decided to bolster the front with German troops to halt the influx of Allied troops and bring a swift end to the conflict.⁴ However, there was no direct land connection between the front and Germany with Yugoslavia, a neutral nation at the time, standing in the way.

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- 1 Paul Hehn, *The German Struggle Against Yugoslav Guerrillas in World War II: German Counter-Insurgency in Yugoslavia, 1941-1943*, (Boulder: East European Quarterly, 1979)
 - 2 George Lepre, *Himmler's Bosnian Division: The Waffen-SS Handschar Division, 1943-1945*, (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 2004).
 - 3 Leonidas Samouilidis, “The Waffen; The Elite Group During the Second World War,” *Greek-American Review* 57, no. 693 (2006): 25.
 - 4 Jozo Tomasevich, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: Occupation and Collaboration*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001).

Initially, the Germans attempted to solve this issue by pressuring the Yugoslav government into joining the Tripartite Pact, effectively turning it into an Axis power, and giving their troops access to the country. This effort initially succeeded, with Yugoslavia joining the pact in March of 1941. However, anti-German military commanders orchestrated a coup several days later, installing a new government, and removing Yugoslavia from the Pact.⁵ With this development, the Germans resorted to military action. Consequently, they launched a multipronged invasion in April that decimated the unprepared and under-equipped Yugoslav military, and led to the country being completely occupied in a matter of weeks.⁶



Figure 1: The Axis lines of advance during their invasion of Yugoslavia and subsequent push into Greece; Invasion of the Balkans, April 1941, map, US Holocaust Memorial Museum.

Reorganization and Occupation of Yugoslavia

With the invasion over, the Axis powers carved up the lands of former Yugoslavia, with Italy, Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria all either directly annexing territory, or establishing protectorates and military

⁵ Tomasevich, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia*.

⁶ Tomasevich, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia*.

occupation zones. They also established a puppet state, the Nezavisna Država Hrvatska (Independent State of Croatia or NDH), which controlled most of modern-day Croatia and Bosnia under the fascist Croat Ustasha party.⁷



Figure 2: The Axis occupation of Yugoslavia; Jozo Tomasevich, Map 3: Partition of 1941, 1975, map, Stanford University Press

There were also the Chetniks, a predominantly Serb paramilitary force organized from the remnants of the Yugoslav army. Although they were hostile to the Axis in the early days of the occupation, the Chetniks increasingly began working alongside them as time progressed, seeing collaboration as the best way to further Serb interests in the region.⁸

Although the Germans viewed the Serbs as an “inferior race,”

⁷ Tomasevich, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia*.

⁸ Tomasevich, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia*.

they became more and more willing to work with them to combat the rise of partisan activity in Yugoslavia.⁹ Josip Broz Tito, leader of the Yugoslav communist party, managed to organize an underground resistance movement known simply as the Partisans (later the Narodnooslobodilačka Vojska or National Liberation Army), fighting a guerilla war against the Axis following Yugoslavia's capitulation. While this movement was initially disorganized, consisting mostly of small groups scattered along the Yugoslav countryside, their command became more and more centralized as time progressed. The Partisans eventually launched offensives that occupied large swaths of Yugoslavia, including some large urban centers.¹⁰ The Bosniaks, both figuratively and literally, found themselves in the middle of all of this, with German, Croatian, Chetnik, and Partisan troops all being active in and around Bosnia.¹¹ tracing their roots to the Goths, a Germanic tribe that originated in Scandinavia.¹² Pavelic argued that Croats were pure Aryans, elevating them from an "inferior race" to one that was on par with Germans within the Nazi racial hierarchy.

Likewise, the Croatian state had a unique view on Bosniaks, seeing them not as a separate ethnicity, but rather as a religious minority within the Croat populace. They argued that before the expansion of the Ottoman Empire into the Balkans, Bosniaks had not existed, and that those that considered themselves as Bosniak were simply Croats whose ancestors had converted to Islam under Ottoman rule. As one Croatian official stated: Bosniaks were "a living branch of the Croat tree" with "the pure blood of [Croat] ancestors, being descendants of the Croatian tribe."¹³ In other words, they argued that Bosniaks should also be considered Aryan, as religion was the only thing that separated them from

Croats.

Whether Pavelic and the majority of the Ustasha leadership actually believed these claims about the Bosniaks is up for debate; Pavelic once privately said that should the Bosniaks not cooperate with the Ustasha, they could "go to Asia" for all he cared.¹⁴ In all reality, it was just as likely that this rhetoric was simply a means through which to secure a territorial claim over Bosnia following the Axis invasion. As for their claims on Croat-Aryan kinship, the Ustasha likely held this official stance for the similarly pragmatic goal of better aligning Croatia to the Axis, and better securing their chances of having any kind of power in the region once the dust settled.

However, what matters is that the Germans seemed willing enough to accept these claims, as they otherwise would not have tolerated an independent state of "undesirables" operating within their sphere of influence. Conversely, most of Serbia was placed under direct German military occupation, with little in the way of any kind of civilian administration.¹⁵ This also explains why Bosnia was integrated into the Croatian state (along with the fact that Croatia already had a budding fascist party while Bosnia did not), but it does not, however, explain why the Handschar Division was formed.

9 Tomasevich, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia*.

10 Hehn, *The German Struggle Against Yugoslav Guerrillas in World War II*.

11 Tomasevich, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia*.

12 Zija Sulejmanpaši, 13. SS Divizija "Handžar": *Istine I Laži*, (Zagreb: Kulturno Društvo Bošnjaka Hrvatske Preporod, 2000).

13 Zlatko Hasanbegovic, Letter from Ademaga Mešić to Archbishop Ivan Šarić, in *Iz korespondencije Ademage Mešića uoci uspostave Banovine Hrvatske. Pismo Društva bosansko-hercegovačkih Hrvata u Zagrebu reis-ul-ulemi Fehimu Spahi i vrhbosanskom nadbiskupu Ivanu Šariću iz svibnja 1939*, (Zagreb, Croatia: Croatian Institute of History, 2007).

14 Zlatko Hasanbegovic, Letter from Josip Galovac to Niki Ljubicić, July 24, 1938, in *Iz korespondencije Ademage Mešića uoci uspostave Banovine Hrvatske. Pismo Društva bosansko-hercegovačkih Hrvata u Zagrebu reis-ul-ulemi Fehimu Spahi i vrhbosanskom nadbiskupu Ivanu Šariću iz svibnja 1939*, (Zagreb, Croatia: Croatian Institute of History, 2007).

15 Hehn, *The German Struggle Against Yugoslav Guerrillas in World War II*.



Figure 3: Poglavnik Ante Pavelić (left) pictured entering a mosque with Bosniak Imam Ali Aganović (right); Imam Ali Aganović ulazi u Poglavnikovu džamiju u sa Pavelićem. Iza njega je Ibrahim efendija Proho, August 18, 1944, photograph, Wikimedia Commons.

Forming an entirely Bosniak unit under direct German command hints that although the Germans accepted the Ustasha ideology on an official level, the reality of the situation in Bosnia meant that the Bosniaks had to be categorized separately from the Croats. The vast majority of Bosniaks, despite Croatian propaganda, still considered themselves to be a separate people with a unique Bosnian culture and identity. Although most were not openly hostile towards the Ustasha, they saw the Croatian state as a preferable alternative to Serb or German domination. By the same token, most did not openly support the Ustasha either, viewing them as more of an occupying force (albeit a fairly benevolent one) than as liberators.¹⁶ As such, the Ustasha received little support, political or otherwise, from the general Bosniak populace. This created a situation where few Bosniaks were willing to join any military formation operated by the Croatian state, insisting against assimilation with the Croats.¹⁷

16 David Motadel, *Islam and Nazi Germany's War*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017).

17 Lepre, *Himmler's Bosnian Division*.

This tension could be seen in the Handschar Division itself, with Bosniak and Croat troops having cold attitudes towards one another. One report noted that instances of desertion within the division only occurred in units where Croatian officers were present, or in units with a significant number of Croatian soldiers attached to them.¹⁸ This issue would even prompt the division's commander to turn back Croatian troops sent to replace the unit's losses, only accepting Bosniaks or Germans (and to a lesser extent, some Muslim Albanians) to bolster the Handschar's numbers.¹⁹

The Need for More Manpower

While the Germans were initially willing to go along with the Ustasha's approach to the Bosniaks, by the end of 1942, it became apparent to the Germans that the situation in Yugoslavia had not improved. The Croats and Chetniks had not only failed to crush the Partisans, but they had also been unable to contain them. Partisan numbers had swelled to include around 135,000 men, nearly double what they had been in the previous year.²⁰ Likewise, the Partisans were becoming better organized, officially unifying under a single command, and forming full-fledged combat divisions. They had even managed to create a small air force using a handful of stolen Croatian biplanes, catching Axis troops by surprise in a number of bombing raids.²¹ The Germans knew that without reinforcement, the Partisans would likely continue to grow in strength and further undermine their operations in the region.

18 Report from Major General Karl-Gustav Sauberzweig to Lieutenant General Gottlob Berger, 16 April 1944, record group 242, microcopy T-175, roll 70, ff2586921, The National Archives, Washington, D.C., Translation from: George Lepre, *Himmler's Bosnian Division: The Waffen-SS Handschar Division, 1943-1945*, (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 2004).

19 Sulejmanpaši, 13. SS Divizija "Handžar."

20 Hehn, *The German Struggle Against Yugoslav Guerrillas in World War II*.

21 Hehn.



Figure 4: Territory held by the Partisans by September of 1944; 1944 Yugoslavia Liberated Territories, 1945, map, Bojovnik.

The issue was that Germany could not afford to reassign German units to the Balkans. By this point, the tide was beginning to turn on the Eastern Front, with the Wehrmacht having been halted at the gates of Moscow and the new German offensive in the southern sector of the front being blunted by the disastrous encirclement of the 6th Army in Stalingrad.²² The war with the Soviet Union was now the focus of the German war machine, with whatever reserves they had left being sent to stem the tide of the Red Army. However, this left German command in Yugoslavia with little hope of receiving anything in the way of reinforcement.

Croat and Serb Unreliability

This situation in Yugoslavia was compounded by the overall German dissatisfaction with the quality and performance of most of the forces that they raised or otherwise allied within Bosnia. Looking first at the Croatian troops, commanders repeatedly expressed concern with their fighting alongside German troops and considered them largely ineffective in combating Tito's Partisans. The Croatian regular army, the Domobranstvo (Home Guard), despite outnumbering the Partisans by some 50-100,000, were described in one report by German Major General Ernst Fick as having little to no actual value in combat, with him considering the senior leadership of these units unreliable at best. He would go on to say that the entirety of the Home Guard was plagued by defection and desertion, along with more serious examples of misconduct, ranging from bribery and the selling of equipment on the black market, to blatant treason and sabotage.²³

The Ustasha party troops, who were supposed to be the best that Croatia had to offer were little better, described by Fick as being "undisciplined, poorly trained, combative, and unreliable in combat." Likewise, these troops often undermined German interests through their brutality. The Ustasha pursued an aggressive policy of ethnic cleansing against civilian Serb populations in the region, with Germans estimating that upwards of 6-700,000 civilians had been killed as per the Ustasha's "Balkan Methods," which were considered barbaric by even the SS's standards.²⁴

These methods were attributed to a rise in Partisan activity in the area, with more and more people flocking to their banner to escape persecution. This treatment likewise served to alienate those Serbs already fighting with the Germans, and would go on to encourage many Serbs to commit their own retaliatory atrocities against Croat and Bosniak populations, further complicating German efforts to pacify the region.

²³ Report from Major General Ernst Fick to Heinrich Himmler, 3 March 1944, record group 242, microcopy T-175, roll 70, ff2586888, The National Archives, Washington, D.C.

²⁴ Report from Major General Ernst Fick to Heinrich Himmler.

²² Antony Beevor, *Stalingrad*, (New York: Penguin Books, 1999).

This may help to partially explain the German dissatisfaction with the Chetniks' combat effectiveness. One main issue that they found was that the Chetniks were oftentimes just as likely to fight the Croats as they were the Partisans, hampering German operational cohesion, and causing further chaos in the already chaotic Bosnian mountainside.



Figure 5: Serb children being led to a Croatian concentration camp, many of which were designed to house children exclusively; *A Group of Children Wait in Line at an Unidentified Concentration Camp [Possibly Sisak] in Croatia, 1942*, photograph, US Holocaust Memorial Museum.

Even more concerning for the Germans was that Chetnik loyalties were questionable, with their alliance being one of necessity rather than allegiance. Most were still loyal to the Yugoslav King, whom the Germans had forced into exile following their initial invasion. Fick explained in one report that some Chetniks had even admitted that they would likely turn against the Germans should British or American troops land in Yugoslavia. These concerns with both the Croatian and Serb troops were so serious that many pushed for their outright disbandment. For instance, that same report included a comment from German Colonel Otto Bayer, a direct subordinate of Fick's, who argued that the freed-up men would be more useful as laborers for the German war machine than

fighters.²⁵

Creation of the Handschar

With their grip on Yugoslavia slipping and the deteriorating situation on the Eastern Front, the Germans decided that a more pragmatic course of action was required in Bosnia. Ignoring the protests of Croatian government officials, the Germans began exploring the possibility of raising an all Bosniak force. However, it was clear to them that they could not allow this force to be trained and operated by the Ustasha. In the Germans' eyes, they had already failed to properly field volunteer Croat troops as an effective fighting force, and so the prospect of allowing them to organize a force of Bosniaks, whose population was indifferent at best to the Ustasha regime, was quickly dismissed. Instead, the Germans decided that if such a force was to be raised, it would need to be trained, organized, and commanded as a part of the German military.²⁶

With this in mind, the Germans began drawing up plans for a new Waffen-SS division by the start of 1943. Incorporating Bosniaks into the Waffen-SS seemed the most logical choice when compared to creating an entirely new organization for Bosniaks. The Waffen-SS already had experience in creating units made up of mostly foreign troops, with the 11th SS Volunteer Panzergrenadier Division Nordland, as an example, having been raised using men from Denmark and Norway.²⁷ That being said, the Handschar would be the first to incorporate non-Germanic troops (although the Germans considered Bosniaks to be Aryans, most considered them too far removed from their Germanic ancestry to be considered such culturally). A likely reason for this was that many Nazi officials, including Heinrich Himmler, had been impressed with the performance of Bosniak troops under the Austro-Hungarian Empire during the First World War and believed that their success could be replicated.²⁸ Likewise, the especially tumultuous situation in Yugoslavia expedited its creation over other non-Germanic units being considered, such as what would become the Ukrainian 14th Waffen Grenadier Division

²⁵ Report from Major General Ernst Fick to Heinrich Himmler.

²⁶ Motadel, *Islam and Nazi Germany's War*.

²⁷ Samouilidis, "The Waffen," 25.

²⁸ Motadel, *Islam and Nazi Germany's War*.

Galicja.²⁹



Figure 6: A Bosniak soldier reading a pamphlet titled “Islam and Judaism,” which was distributed among the men of the Handschar; *Waffen-SS, 13. Gebirgs-Div. “Handschar,”* June 21, 1943, photograph, Bundesarchiv.

Combat Operations

When the Handschar Division finally completed its training in early 1944, it was almost immediately deployed to northeastern Bosnia in support of anti-partisan operations under the 5th SS Mountain Corps. Primarily fighting elements of the Partisan 3rd Corps, the division first saw action as part of Operation Wegweiser in March of that year, clearing Partisan positions in and around the Croatian-Serbian border to improve the security of the vital Zagreb-Belgrade railway.³⁰ It would

continue to fight under the 5th SS Mountain Corps into early September, participating in a number of important engagements, including Operation Heiderose, Operation Vollmond, and Operation Maibaum.³¹

However, with the Red Army having reached Serbia by the end of that month, elements of the Handschar were hastily reassigned to the 9th SS Mountain Corps in an attempt to plug gaps forming in the German line. That being said, months of near constant fighting had seen the combat effectiveness of the division greatly diminished, and following operations against the Soviets, only about half of its original 17,000 men remained.³² By November of 1944, the entirety of the 9th SS Mountain Corps was disbanded, with the remnants of the Handschar being attached to the 68th Army Corps, who would find itself in a fighting withdrawal against relentless Soviet and Partisan attacks. The division, which only consisted of a few thousand men by this point, would see its last action in the Austrian Alps, holding a thinly manned line south of Vienna before eventually surrendering to British forces approaching from Italy.³³

Effectiveness and Impact

Despite its unceremonious end and lackluster performance against the Soviets, the German high command considered the division to be an overall success in its intended role. It had never been designed to fight against the mechanized and armored forces of a nation like the Soviet Union, as it was too lightly armed to offer any meaningful resistance. Instead, it was formed to defeat dispersed groups of partisan fighters, who were mostly equipped with small arms and the occasional artillery piece.³⁴ As such, German commanders did not blame the Bosniaks for being unable to halt the Soviet advance (with the division likewise only making up a small portion of the larger German defensive force) and instead praised it for its effectiveness against the Partisans. Lieutenant General Arthur Phelps, commander of the 5th SS Mountain Corps, of which the division was a part, commented, “Regarding the 13th

31 Hehn, *The German Struggle Against Yugoslav Guerrillas in World War II*.

32 Tomasevich, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia*.

33 Lepre.

34 Sulejmanpaši, *13. SS Divizija “Handžar”*.

29 Samouilidis, 25

30 Lepre, *Himmler's Bosnian Division*.

Division, I can only report that it has performed flawlessly, and it can be expected that it will continue to do so.” He would continue to explain that even the Croatian government, which met the unit’s creation with skepticism, had given it “its stamp of approval” (though they had no real say in the matter).³⁵ The division’s commander, Major General Karl-Gustav Sauberzweig, held the unit in similar esteem, saying on one occasion that the soldiers had “performed deeds that are truly of great bravery,” and that the enemy units sent against them had been shattered. With the unit having been awarded around 80 iron crosses for this single action alone, Sauberzweig even goes on to suggest that the Partisans had made it a policy to avoid engagements with the Handschar in the future, being fearful of their ferocity in battle.³⁶



Figure 7: Major General Karl-Gustav Sauberzweig, commander of the Handschar Division, pictured wearing a Handschar fez rather than the standard SS officer’s cap (as seen with the officer behind him); Werner Mielke, *The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem with Bosnian volunteers of the Waffen-SS*, November 1943, photograph, National Archives.

Himmler’s plan for Bosnia reflects the overall positive attitudes

35 Report from Lieutenant General Arthur Phelps to Heinrich Himmler, 7 May 1944, record group 242, microcopy T-175, roll 70, ff2586899, The National Archives, Washington, D.C., Translation from: George Lepre, *Himmler’s Bosnian Division: The Waffen-SS Handschar Division, 1943-1945*, (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 2004)

36 Report from Major General Karl-Gustav Sauberzweig to Lieutenant General Gottlob Berger.

of the Germans towards the Handschar, as well as illustrates their high level of proficiency when compared to the Croatians or Chetniks; around the same time that Himmler was considering Colonel Bayer’s proposal to dismantle the Croatian and Chetnik forces, he was also drawing up plans for the establishment of an entire Bosnian Mountain Waffen-SS Corps. This called for the creation of a second Bosniak division, the 23rd Waffen Mountain Division Kama, which would, in theory, double the number of Bosniak troops serving within the Waffen-SS.³⁷

With this change in perception, the German high command began to take a more vested interest in the well-being of the Bosniak populace. The Germans had previously known about the atrocities committed against Bosniak civilians, even committing some themselves, but had done little to stop them for fear of alienating their Serb and Croat allies. Even Sauberzweig noted this upon a tour of Bosnia, saying, “The fields lay uncultivated, the villages burned out and destroyed. The few remaining inhabitants live in cellars or underground shelters. Misery reigns in the refugee camps as I’ve never before seen in my life.”³⁸

With this policy shift, however, the Germans (along with the Ustasha under their orders) began protecting Bosniak population centers, and even holding some of those responsible for atrocities accountable. After the Košutica Massacre, which had seen the execution of 68 Bosniak civilians by German troops as a reprisal for partisan actions, the German commander responsible was court-martialed, dismissed from the SS, and sentenced to eight years in prison.³⁹ This policy shift suggests that while the Germans may have initially viewed the Bosniaks as foreigners for all intents and purposes, they now saw them in a more favorable light, being

37 Letter from Heinrich Himmler to Lieutenant General Arthur Phelps, 10 May 1944, record group 242, microcopy T-175, roll 70, ff2586895, The National Archives, Washington, D.C.

38 Letter from Major General Karl-Gustav Sauberzweig to his troops, 25 February 1944, record group 242, microcopy T-175, roll 70, ff2586962, The National Archives, Washington, D.C. Translation from: Lepre, George, *Himmler’s Bosnian Division: The Waffen-SS Handschar Division, 1943-1945*, (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 2004).

39 Lepre, *Himmler’s Bosnian Division*

worthy of their protection.

Conclusion

The use of Bosniaks within the German ranks was largely justified by the ideological concepts of the Ustasha, which the Germans chose to accept. Although they were not German, the belief that Bosniaks still possessed Aryan blood was sufficient for Nazi officials to officially place them on par with Germans on the Nazi racial hierarchy. However, while this was the official stance of the German state, Bosniaks were still viewed by most within German command as outsiders, with their cultural, religious, and linguistic differences being too obvious to ignore, and with the unit only being raised when manpower was becoming an issue for the Germans later in the war. It was ultimately the Handschar's prowess in battle that managed to win over the minds of both their direct commanders, as well as the German high command, with steps being taken by the Germans to ensure the protection of the Bosniak people in Yugoslavia as the war progressed. This demonstrated that by the late stages of the war, the Nazi leadership truly considered Bosniaks to be fellow members of the "master race," although with the war ending so quickly afterwards, it is difficult to tell whether the general German populace shared these views.

Cordell Hull and American Justice During World War II

SONNY RUSSANO

ABSTRACT

The Nuremberg Trials were the first of their kind: an international military tribunal that had the ability to try heads of state for crimes including perpetrating warfare and genocide. The road to the Nuremberg Trials was a peregrination, with each of the four nations prosecuting the 22 war criminals serving various roles in its development. The United States' role in the trials' development centered almost completely around the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, and the United States State Department until 1943. This paper describes Hull's involvement in the determination of the United States' idea of justice as it pertained to the nascent idea of international law and how his influences ebbed, flowed, and eventually came to an unceremonious end.

In early May 1945, World War II was drawing to a close. With Adolf Hitler dead and the Third Reich on the verge of capitulation, the soon-to-be victors were steeped in deliberations in San Francisco to establish the United Nations, an international peace organization championed by former United States Secretary of State Cordell Hull. While fifty national delegations crafted the Charter of the United Nations, the foreign ministers of the Big Three alliance (the United States, United Kingdom, and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) took advantage of the circumstances to meet and discuss a controversial subject: the prosecution of war criminals.¹

The United States had had a tenuous relationship with the international community since the end of World War I, oscillating between self-isolation and attempting to lay the foundation for international law. By the end of the impromptu San Francisco meeting, the United States had commandeered the discourse on war crimes and was positioned to lead the way in establishing the Nuremberg Trials, officially known as

the International Military Tribunal (IMT). The IMT saw twenty-two German war criminals prosecuted in late 1945 under international jurisdiction and was the first international trial with the ability to convict heads of state for perpetrating aggressive warfare. Although the IMT was established and proceeded under the Big Three and France, the United States was disproportionately influential in its creation.

The functions of the institutions within the United States government changed concurrently with the nation's role in international law from 1928 to 1945. The Department of State experienced one of the more dramatic changes in 1928 when Secretary of State Frank Kellogg co-authored one of the first pieces of international legislation outlawing war in the Kellogg-Briand Pact. By May 1945, the Secretary of State had almost no role in formulating or presenting the American plan for the IMT in San Francisco. Instead, the most important American at the meeting was the White House counsel, Samuel Rosenman.² The State Department's role in the establishment of the IMT diminished over the course of the United States' involvement in its planning due to a change in the way the United States government understood justice. This paper will argue that, while in tandem in the decade between 1933 and 1943, the United States government eventually outgrew Cordell Hull's ideas of a just international society and of how to ensure justice in international politics.

A Treaty of 'Moral Suasion'

World War I's 40 million casualties changed the global perspective on international law and spurred the League of Nations, the first attempt at an international peace organization, to seek out a method for permanent peace. Although the United States was not a member of the League, future Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson noted the "repeated efforts... made to eliminate aggressive war as a legal national undertaking" by means of multiple League of Nations resolutions.³ The discourse culminated in a 1928 meeting in Paris between French foreign minister Aristide Briand and Secretary of State Frank Kellogg in which the two

2 Telford Taylor, *The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir*, 1st ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 50.

3 Henry L. Stimson, "The Nuremberg Trial: Landmark in Law," *Foreign Affairs* 25, no. 2 (1947), 182.

1 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, Volume III*, European Advisory Commission, Austria, Germany, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), Document 878.

negotiated a treaty with the lofty goal to outlaw warfare in all cases except self-defense.⁴ Once it was ratified in July 1929 with signatures from 63 national delegations, the United States'—namely the Department of State's—idea of how to approach aggressive war and justice in general at the international level became outlined by the Kellogg-Briand Pact. For much of the next decade, most American statements about international justice and war made mention of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Many of these statements were drafted in part by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's Secretary of State, Cordell Hull.

Cordell Hull details his role in developing the United States' idea of justice in his memoir, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*. Published in 1948, it contains many of the Secretary of State's opinions and experiences of the events that influenced American foreign policy. Throughout the course of *The Memoirs*, Hull and his staff used countless documents and correspondence to help maintain the accuracy of the work.⁵ There are, however, certain aspects of the work that hold meanings lost to history, such as biases that are hard to detect due to unspoken generalities at the time that are now lost to our understanding of society. For instance, Hull was widely recognized, at least within the administration, to have been Roosevelt's successor if he had not taken on a third term.⁶ At one point, Roosevelt even offered to elevate Hull to the vice-presidency, which he declined.⁷ Hull's blocked path to the presidency could have affected decisions at the time or the way he reconstructed events as he wrote his memoir. Understanding that *The Memoirs* was not written in a political vacuum is imperative to contextualizing the information Hull gave in his work. Contemporary reviews of the book confirm that Hull, for the most part, did not exaggerate his role in the State Department.⁸ He was

the dominant figure of the department, and, for most of the scope of this project, Hull's ideas were the State Department's policy.

Hull's relationship with the Kellogg-Briand Pact had an indispensable effect on the State Department's policy regarding international justice. At the time the treaty was signed, then Congressman Hull, supported the treaty but interpreted it as nothing more than "a matter of moral suasion," unequipped to act as an instrument "that purported to offer an agency for peace" due to the unenforceable nature of the treaty's two articles.⁹ Heading into his eleven-year tenure as Secretary of State in 1933, Hull saw a global threat to peace in the future Axis powers—Germany, Italy, and Japan—and circled back to his opinion of the treaty, believing that the Axis leaders "were not to be stopped by [the] moral suasion" on which the Kellogg-Briand Pact drew its limited authority.¹⁰ With his initial thoughts confirmed by Hitler's rise to power and continued Japanese aggression in 1933, Hull resolved not to invoke the treaty when it came to setting foreign policy: he "brought [the Kellogg-Briand Pact] out and emphasized it but never depended on it too much."¹¹ This opinion set the tone for State Department policy throughout the interwar period, which the American government, in turn, adopted as part of its isolationist policy. The State Department's ideas narrowed the interpretation of the treaty, thus justifying the nation's reluctance to invoke it in instances of aggressive warfare for the sake of nonintervention in foreign conflict. Roosevelt adopted Hull's perspective on the Kellogg-Briand Pact as a political justification for isolation, although the popularity of isolation among the general public may have played into this decision more than the true desires of the administration.

During the interwar period, the public and the Roosevelt administration positioned themselves on opposite sides of the isolationist debate. The popular sentiment for isolationism forced Roosevelt to advance and adhere to isolationist policies, including Hull's interpretation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, in his first three presidential campaigns. Hull still attempted to increase America's influence on international politics, but

4 Frank Kellogg and Aristide Briand, "Kellogg-Briand Pact 1928," In *United States Statutes at Large*, 46 part 2:2343, 1928.

5 Stanley J. Folmsbee, "Review: *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, 2 vols.," *Tennessee Historical Quarterly* 8, no. 1 (1949): 86–88.

6 Samuel Flagg Bemis, "The Memoirs of Cordell Hull," *The Journal of Modern History* 21, no. 4 (1949): 317–20.

7 Folmsbee, *Tennessee Historical Quarterly* 8, no. 1 (1949): 86–88.

8 R. K. Gooch, *Virginia Law Review* 34, no. 7 (1948): 861–63.

9 Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, 128.

10 Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, 128.

11 Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* 128.

his strategy failed as tensions rose in Europe. In the months before the outbreak of the Second Italo-Ethiopian War in October 1935, Hull made a statement to clarify the United States' attitude towards the Kellogg-Briand Pact, lightly toeing the line between maintaining the popular notion of isolationism while also trying to steer the direction of international justice. In his statement, Hull announced rather apodictically that "the pact was 'no less binding now than when it was entered into by the sixty-three nations that are parties to it.'"¹² The lack of a strong message enforcing the treaty from the State Department — whether allayed by Hull's apprehension to depend on the pact too heavily, the public's steadfast isolationism, or both — helped lead to the second major outbreak in hostilities since the Pact's signing.¹³ Shortly after Italian dictator Benito Mussolini began his assault on Ethiopia, the British appealed to the United States to invoke the Kellogg-Briand Pact to denounce the conflict.¹⁴ Hull relayed the request to Roosevelt, who quipped that invoking the treaty would be "somewhat farfetched after the horse is out of the stable."¹⁵ Although this was an opportunity that could have established the Kellogg-Briand Pact's legitimacy and the United States as an international authority, Roosevelt's sardonic response to the British petition laid to rest any rumors of American involvement. This exchange also revealed that neither the State Department nor Roosevelt himself thought of the Kellogg-Briand Pact as having any jurisdiction over perpetrators of aggressive war after the outbreak of hostilities; they recognized the treaty as a solely preventative measure to war, not a method to prosecuting its perpetrators. Until the end of the interwar period, Cordell Hull's beliefs and, subsequently, the State Department's policy served as the United States' foreign policy regarding intervention in cases of aggressive warfare.

The End of Neutrality

The horse was most decidedly out of the stable on September 1, 1939, when Nazi Germany invaded Poland. Two days later, in response to the British and French declaration of war on Germany, Roosevelt and the State Department collaborated on an address reassuring the world "that the influence of America should be consistent in seeking for humanity a final peace which will eliminate... the continued use of force between nations" despite a concluding promise that "every effort of [the American] government will be directed towards" neutrality.¹⁶ An admission of the government's sentiment is found in the juxtaposed strength of the two statements' language: the first is a weakly worded appeal to what America's influence should be, while the second is a powerful assurance of what the American government *will do*. The address, co-authored by the State Department—most likely with a heavy hand from Hull—demonstrated that United States foreign policy would favor isolationism over taking any authoritative stances on the international stage, such as invoking or even mentioning the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Even after the breakout of war in Europe, the United States followed Hull's view of the treaty and continued to support the Neutrality Act — a series of laws passed in the 1930s intended to maintain isolationism.¹⁷

American officials, in fact, had by and large acquiesced to the official policy of isolationism and had therefore abandoned any major qualms about the culpability of belligerents according to the treaty. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson recounted the most pressing questions about the war in Europe, none of which concerned the prosecution of those guilty of violating international law:

We did not ask ourselves... what punishment, if any, Hitler and his chief assistants deserved, we asked... How do we avoid war, and how do we keep this wickedness from overwhelming us? These seemed

¹² Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, 421.

¹³ The first conflict was the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, to which then Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson drafted the Stimson Doctrine in response instead of invoking the Kellogg-Briand Pact. See Quincy Wright, "The Stimson Note of January 7, 1932," *The American Journal of International Law* 26, no. 2 (1932): 342–48.

¹⁴ Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, 322.

¹⁵ Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, 421.

¹⁶ "On the European War," *Fireside Chat* (Washington, D.C., September 3, 1939), National Archives.

¹⁷ For information on the Neutrality Act, see Guerra Everett, "The Neutrality Act of 1939," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 211 (1940): 95–101, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1022516>

larger questions to us than the guilt or innocence of individuals.¹⁸

At this time, notably an election year, the administration no longer tried balancing isolationism and establishing overseas influence: their immediate goal was to stay out of the war.¹⁹

While the United States ignored the Kellogg-Briand Pact and any strong statements regarding aggressive war, reports of atrocities in Europe began to reach the American government. According to Telford Taylor, future counsel to the United States at the Nuremberg Trials, “Early in 1940 the United States Embassy in Berlin transmitted news of the wholesale deportation of German Jews to Poland.”²⁰ Similar reports throughout 1940 and 1941 brought international pressure on the government to adopt an interventionist strategy and take the lead in international politics once again.²¹ Before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor brought the United States into the war, American foreign policy in 1941 began to outgrow the increasingly unrealistic policy of isolationism, undoubtedly assisted by the atrocity reports as well as British pleas to intervene.²² The Lend-Lease Act (March 1941) was one of the first measures of American intervention and proposed to lend money and supplies to the United Kingdom whose people were, as Prime Minister Winston Churchill had pleaded, “fighting for [their] lives.”²³ Debate and decision on the bill in the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in early 1941 revealed what United States government personnel thought of international justice and the

role America would assume in determining its future. For example, when Stimson testified in support of the Lend-Lease Act before Congress that January, he deemed that the Kellogg-Briand Pact was “one of the greatest changes in International Law that has ever taken place.”²⁴ To Stimson, the Kellogg-Briand Pact gave the United States not only the authority, but the responsibility to adopt interventionist policies by militarily or financially supporting the United Kingdom. He saw the Lend-Lease Act as a step towards the complete repeal of the Neutrality Act, but Roosevelt’s cabinet was split on the issue. The President had to decide whether American foreign policy would continue to align with Hull and the State Department’s vow to neutrality or align with Stimson’s full-throated support of intervention with the Kellogg-Briand Pact as justification.

This dichotomy turned into a series of cabinet debates in early to mid-1941. On one side of the debate stood Hull, who seemed to be shifting the State Department away from isolationism during the opening months of 1941. In a statement on April 24, the Secretary of State announced that “the Department was working ‘at the task of creating ultimate conditions of peace and justice.’”²⁵ He was most likely referring to the beginning stages of planning the United Nations organization—of which he is considered one of the primary agents—which he would pitch as a stronger basis than the Kellogg-Briand Pact to develop international law and ensure justice was served to the perpetrators of the current war and the atrocities for which they were responsible. This speech made Hull painfully aware of the public’s thoughts on what the United States’ role in international justice should be. In the weeks after his speech, Hull “received 1,700 telegrams and letters, of which... 1,100 opposed further action on our part, [and] a considerable number of them severely [criticized] me for being too warlike.”²⁶ This pushback made it clear that the public was not moving away from isolationism at the same pace as the administration. Hull realized that Congress, too, failed to keep up with the administration, noting that “isolationist sentiment in both the Senate

18 Stimson, “The Nuremberg Trial: Landmark in Law,” 184.

19 “While advocating international cooperation at all times, we were faced with the extremely delicate task of being careful not to present and urge measures in such numbers as to alarm the people and precipitate isolation as an acute political issue in the nation. Had we done so, the Roosevelt Administration would have been thrown out of power bodily as soon as the American public had a chance to go to the polls.” See Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, 176-7.

20 Taylor, *The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials*, 35.

21 Taylor, *The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials*, 35.

22 Erik Larson, *The Splendid and the Vile*, (United States: Random House, 2020) 77-79.

23 Jon Meacham, *Franklin and Winston: An Intimate Portrait of an Epic Friendship* (United States: Random House, 2003), 78-81.

24 Colonel William C. Chanler to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 19 December 1944.

25 Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, 1630.

26 Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, 943.

and the House was still strong” in early 1941.²⁷ With double confirmation that his move towards a peace organization was premature, Hull began to steer the State Department back towards isolationism. Concerning the reliability of Hull’s perspective, it is possible that he wrote this sequence as a means to retrospectively appear pro-intervention until the public forced his hand. This theory does not hold up with the litany of evidence strewn throughout State Department documents that showed he favored intervention but was unable to act accordingly due to public opinion. Thus, from this point until Pearl Harbor, many of Hull’s policy decisions and advisory statements were made to align with isolationist policy, as he had first-hand knowledge of how strongly Americans supported it. Development of an international peace organization would continue but away from the public eye.

Less than a month after Hull’s speech, Stimson and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox announced to the cabinet their support for the repeal of the Neutrality Act. Hull retorted “strongly against these speeches on the grounds that they would stir up public controversy and arouse unnecessary opposition in the Administration.”²⁸ Even though he most likely agreed with them, Hull argued that Stimson and Knox’s idea of America’s role in foreign affairs was not aligned with the public. Although, as evidenced by his April 24 address, he strongly desired to continue advocating for an American hand in the development of international law, Hull was sure that the public was not yet ready to return to the international stage despite the fall of France and the constant petitions from the United Kingdom. Roosevelt ultimately “backed [Hull] up and agreed that the time had not yet come to request the repeal of the [Neutrality] Act.”²⁹ Hull’s April 24 speech and the result of the cabinet debate established his ideas explicitly against intervention but tacitly in support of a global organization as the policy of the United States. Additionally, the debates and speech divided the cabinet into two ideologies about justice. Hull’s speech and opinion demonstrated

the State Department’s desire for an international organization to act as an authority for any sort of international justice, while Stimson’s camp pointed to the Kellogg-Briand Pact as a sufficient source of authority for dispensing justice regardless of the existence of any organization that the State Department thought necessary. To the State Department and the United States government as a whole, if America were to have any role in international justice, it would be much further in the future and within the scope of an international organization, not a treaty with questionable authority.

With the Neutrality Act still in place and the United States backing the State Department’s policy on neutrality, Hull attempted to find ways to advance his personal agenda for an international peace organization within the limits of non-interventionism. In October 1941, the British sent a telegram to the United States questioning whether “existing statute needs modification or whether possibly some entirely new organization should be set up” for the prosecution of war criminals and invited the United States to join the inquiry.³⁰ Hull, almost a year later, declined the offer and made clear in his response that any possible enforcement of international justice would have to be under the purview of an international organization.³¹ If the British did agree to his idea of creating a justice system within the jurisdiction of an international organization, it would achieve Hull’s major foreign policy goal to shift the conversation away from revising existing institutions and international law—such as the Kellogg-Briand Pact—and towards constructing a new world organization. If this came to fruition, Hull would have a firmer foundation on which to construct an American-justice-based system on a global scale.

30 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Volume I, General; The British Commonwealth; the Far East*, Document 35.

31 While isolationist sentiment was no longer pervasive in the American public, it is likely that Hull was reluctant to respond to the British until after his July 23, 1942 speech where he publicly went into more detail about the planning of the international organization. For Hull’s speech see Cordell Hull, “Franklin Roosevelt Administration: Address by Secretary of State Cordell Hull on The War and Human Freedom,” in *Jewish Virtual Library* (Washington, D.C.: Franklin Roosevelt Administration, July 23, 1942).

27 Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, 943.

28 Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, 943.

29 The Neutrality Act was eventually repealed in November 1941. See Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, 943.

That same month, more German atrocity reports spurred Roosevelt and the State Department, in unison with the British, to release an official condemnation of executing hostages on October 25.³² Despite not knowing the legal ground upon which a possible war crimes trial would stand, America's statement warned that "the time will come where [the Germans] shall have to stand in courts of law in the very countries which they are now oppressing and answer for their acts."³³ This statement was the first time the United States mentioned the prosecution of war criminals who committed atrocities rather than perpetrators of aggressive war, but Roosevelt constricted the jurisdiction of the trials to the intra-national level. Nowhere does Roosevelt talk about an international court to prosecute war criminals; to the State Department, there was little, if any, anticipation of the need for a court with international jurisdiction. If there was, it was not enough for Hull to record in his memoirs or to mention the British in State Department correspondence. Despite this omission, the statement was nonetheless a warning to the Axis perpetrators and a reminder of the State Department's imposing role in the United States' view of a postwar international justice system.

Reports First Deemed Incredible

The debate around international justice became publicized with increasing public and international pressure after the United States entered World War II on December 8, 1941, and "reports, at first deemed incredible but soon confirmed, of the mass extermination of Jews, from all occupied counties" began to stream in throughout 1942.³⁴ The international community, hearing these reports, urged the United Kingdom and the United States to take action against war criminals. This manifested in the form of a January 1942 meeting of the eight governments-in-exile, the European nations that Germany had conquered, and Free France. They issued what became known as the Declaration of St. James's and created the alliance known as the Allied Powers, or the United Nations.

One goal of the declaration was to punish "those guilty of or responsible for these crimes, whether they have ordered them, perpetrated them, or participated in them."³⁵ The declaration was the Allies' first statement on war crimes and initiated discussion about the import of the judicial process, though it did not denote aggression as a war crime.³⁶ While it was progress to have a publicized and concerted war goal, its reach on the day of the declaration's signing was limited, as none of the Big Three's representatives signed the declaration.³⁷ The nine governments had taken the first step towards justice for the victims of war crimes. Now, their task was to petition the Big Three to adopt, accept, or at least publicly acknowledge the Declaration of St. James's Palace.

The United States went silent on the declaration and war crimes through most of 1942 despite numerous reputable reports of atrocities. The nation's first public comprehensive statement about postwar matters since the declaration, an address delivered by Hull on July 23, avoided the topic of war crimes. Instead, he used the conditions of the time as additional justification to propose an international organization as the overarching solution to all of the ills the world had faced since the start of the war.³⁸ The speech made it clear that the State Department's focus was less focused upon the principle of justice set out in the declaration, and more so upon a pervasive solution to the problem of war in general. Hull saw the problems as the result of a lack of order and accountability on the international level, something that his desired organization would solve. Rather than talk about a direct response to the atrocities, he pushed for a generalized solution that would perpetuate after this war's criminals were prosecuted. He did briefly endorse the creation of an international court of justice, but the obvious goal of the speech was to expound upon the importance of an international organization.³⁹ This was a step forward

35 US Department of State, "Punishment for War Crimes" in Taylor, *The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials*, 36.

36 Taylor, *The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials*, 36.

37 Dan Plesch, *Human Rights after Hitler: The Lost History of Prosecuting Axis War Crimes*, 1st ed. (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2017), p. 71.

38 Hull, "Address Cordell Hull on The War and Human Freedom."

39 Hull, "Address Cordell Hull on The War and Human Freedom."

32 Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, 1183.

33 Franklin Roosevelt Administration, "Statement on Punishment of War Crimes," 21 August 1942.

34 Taylor, *The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials*, 36.

from Roosevelt's October 25 address of the previous year, as the State Department had now recognized the possible need for an international court to serve justice, though by this time it was becoming evident that the State Department's postwar policy would not feature a separate trial for war crimes.

Regardless, the signers of the Declaration of St. James's needed more explicit assent from the United States concerning their declaration and the continuing atrocities in Germany. A week after Hull's address, they sought public support from the Big Three in the form of a joint letter pleading for a stronger statement so "the enemy understand that the determination and power of the United States of America are to be considered as a guarantee that the warning previously given [on October 25, 1941] will be carried into effect."⁴⁰ The State Department still erred on the side of caution even though isolationism had vanished from public opinion. This was evident when Hull collaborated with Roosevelt to release a statement on August 21 that repeated verbatim the warning from the previous year.⁴¹ Hull's personal belief in the virtue of a peace organization continued to punctuate foreign policy, even as the United States remained non-committal to any international plans, institutions, or congregations that did not directly involve the creation of an international organization.

On October 7, 1942, almost 10 months after the Declaration of St. James's Palace, the Allies took their first official step towards establishing international justice for the victims of war criminals when the United States and United Kingdom simultaneously announced the United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC).⁴² Based in large part on a memorandum from presidential advisor Harry Hopkins and subsequent British alterations, the UNWCC's primary goal was to "investigate and collect evidence for war crimes" and act as a recommendatory body to

the United Nations in naming and prosecuting war criminals.⁴³ The State Department assented to the memorandum and the minor British changes, then quickly went to work drafting a joint statement.⁴⁴ In the statement, Roosevelt further specified the scope of the international justice system the United States envisioned to create with the UNWCC, noting that the only war crimes this international body would deal with were those committed by "the ringleaders responsible for the organized murder of thousands of innocent persons and the commission of atrocities."⁴⁵

The line of demarcation denoting who was a ringleader was obscure. Roosevelt specified the definition of a ringleader in his speech, and Hull's call for an international court of justice in his July 23 address had designated 'ringleaders' as a secondary category of war criminals to be dealt with on an international level. The primary category, all criminals exclusive of the ringleaders, would not be the focus of the UNWCC, as they would be tried according to the laws of the nation where the crimes were committed. The ringleaders, criminals who led the organized and systematic murder of millions of innocents, would be put under the

43 Taylor, *The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials*, 38; For Hopkins' 1942 memorandum to Roosevelt, see *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1942, Volume I, General; The British Commonwealth; the Far East, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), p. 56-7; For Winston Churchill's description of the object of the UNWCC, see House of Commons, "Hansard Parliamentary Debates: House of Commons," vol. 411, May 29, 1945, columns 36-7.

44 The telegram that the State Department sent to inform the British that they found the statement proposal "agreeable" does not have a listed author, though it was most likely Cordell Hull or Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, who, on October 5, sent the final word to the British – as Acting Secretary of State – that the United States assented to all changes and would announce simultaneously on October 7. See, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1942, Volume I, General; The British Commonwealth; the Far East, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), Document 47; For Under Secretary Welles's telegram, see *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1942, Volume I, General; The British Commonwealth; the Far East, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), Document 53.

45 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1942, Volume I, General; The British Commonwealth; the Far East, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), Document 54.

40 Taylor, *The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials*, 36; *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1942, Volume I, General; The British Commonwealth; the Far East, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), Document 42.

41 Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, 1184.

42 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1942, Volume I, General; The British Commonwealth; the Far East, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), Document 54.

purview of the UNWCC, as it was one of the organization's fundamental objectives to "name the persons who are responsible for the atrocities."⁴⁶ The United Nations never intended for the UNWCC to have the capacity to try the criminals themselves. Instead, the organization's purpose was fact-finding: collecting names, evidence, and information to determine which war criminals belonged in which category. They then would deliver this information to the Allies for approval and action. Neither Hull's speech nor Roosevelt's address gave any definite conclusion as to whether the ringleader category would include perpetrators of aggressive war, although the idea of aggressive war was not as primary a focus of Hull's plan compared to Stimson's, and thus was not yet a pillar of United States foreign policy.

The UNWCC was in line with Hull's grand strategy toward the ultimate goal of an international peace organization. The State Department saw the commission as a prototype for a more comprehensive organization and an opportunity to integrate the commission as part of that organization's justice division. On paper, it seemed that the UNWCC would be the vehicle for constructing a postwar justice system in accordance with Hull's preference for an international organization. Before it became operational, however, a number of hardships befell the UNWCC that limited its effectiveness. The proceedings of the Moscow Conference in November 1943 removed the option for international justice to be enacted through the UNWCC—the previous strategy of the State Department—which relegated the organization, and eventually the State Department's idea of justice, to irrelevance.

The Moscow Declaration and the Fall of the UNWCC

By Fall of 1943, the prospects of the war had improved markedly for the Allies. The British and Americans had landed an amphibious force in Sicily and were marching up the Italian Peninsula while the Soviets continued to push the German Army back from the doorstep of the Kremlin and into the Russian steppes.⁴⁷ In this atmosphere, the Big Three were set to meet in Moscow that October to discuss important policy

concerning security, Italy and the Balkans, Poland, peace feelers, and economic reconstruction.⁴⁸ Absent from the adopted agenda of the Moscow Conference was any mention of war criminals, their prosecution, or the UNWCC. On October 12, however, Churchill sent Roosevelt and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin a draft called the Declaration of German Atrocities for possible joint release at the conference. The declaration contained strong condemnations the Germans and promised swift and fair justice from the Big Three:

Let those who have hitherto not imbrued their hands with innocent blood beware lest they join the ranks of the guilty, for most assuredly the three Allied powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth and will deliver them to their accusers in order that justice may be done.⁴⁹

Thus, the Allies congregated in Moscow at the end of the month with the impassioned words of Churchill emblazoned on their minds as the baseline for their discussion on war crimes.

Although war criminals were not on the agenda, the Allies did discuss the preferred method of their prosecution throughout the conference.⁵⁰ By November 1st, the Allies had modified the British draft of the Declaration of German Atrocities and released it to the public as the Moscow Declaration on Atrocities. The declaration's last sentence was a complete shift in war crimes policy for the United States and United Kingdom:

The above declaration is without prejudice to the case of the major criminals whose offenses have no particular geographical location and who will be punished by a joint decision of the Governments of

⁴⁶ *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1942, Volume I, General; The British Commonwealth; the Far East, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), 56-7.

⁴⁷ Liddell Hart, *History of the Second World War*, 476.

⁴⁸ *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1943, Volume I, General, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), Documents 640.

⁴⁹ *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1943, Volume I, General, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), Documents 558

⁵⁰ Hull, *Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, 1289-90.

the Allies.⁵¹

With one stroke of the pen, the entire ringleader group of war criminals was removed from the UNWCC's and its participating governments' jurisdiction and placed into the hands of the Big Three with no defined structure as to the methods of their trial. Without jurisdiction over the major war criminals or the war criminals with crimes in specific geographic locations, the UNWCC lost much of its purpose. The commission still went on to gather evidence for other trials but lost its purpose in shaping any future war crimes trial.⁵² The UNWCC, a British undertaking which had the full support of the State Department, was invalidated by the very nations that created it.

For the State Department, the Moscow Declaration had a debilitating effect on its vision for international justice. No longer would justice for World War II's war criminals be served under the context of an international organization; any trial or military tribunal would be a political agreement of the three Allies, parallel to but not in concert with any such organization created in the future. Since 1941, the State Department had publicly welded its idea of international justice to a global organization, and, up until the Moscow Declaration, American policy agreed with this understanding. Once Roosevelt agreed to the language of the declaration, Hull's policy on international justice broke ranks with American foreign policy for the first time since the signing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1928, and the balance of power in the matter was shifted away from the State Department. With this all but set in stone, Hull and the State Department committed their focus to construct what would become the United Nations, and forewent the role in creating a justice system or defining America's role in it.

Conclusion

The Moscow Declaration marked a notable shift in the roles of other American institutions concerning the American view of international justice. The United States experienced a lull in war crime planning

after November 1943, though it resurfaced in September 1944 without the State Department contributing as a notable figure.⁵³ While Stimson and other parts of the United States government clashed on their views on what the nation's proper stance concerning international justice should be, the State Department began to focus its attention almost exclusively on the creation of the United Nations organization, even after Hull's resignation in December 1944. Concurrently, the State Department faded further into the shadows as it became clear that the method of international justice would be an International Military Tribunal with some of the charges—namely the charge of perpetrating aggressive warfare—based legally upon none other than the Kellogg-Briand Pact: an idea championed by Stimson and several lower level members of the War Department.⁵⁴

51 Jewish Virtual Library, "The Moscow Declaration on Atrocities," November 1, 1943, <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-moscow-declaration-on-atrocities>.

52 Taylor, *The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials*, 39.

53 Taylor, *The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials*, 44.

54 Taylor, *The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials*, 48-9

Liberty, Equality, Motherhood: An Examination of Gender, Republicanism, and Politics in Vichy France

ZOE GOLOMB

ABSTRACT

The establishment of the puppet Vichy regime following France's surrender to Nazi Germany ushered in an era of conservatism and repression for the nation. Faced with the impossible task of obtaining popular support despite coming to power in a context of defeat, Marshal Pétain sought to shift the blame of France's defeat onto the shortcomings of the liberal Third Republic. Condemning Republican values such as feminism for the nation's fall from grace, Pétain pointed to changing gender relations and increased sexual equality as the reason for France's ultimate defeat. Yet at the same time, France's conservative resurgence may not have been so radical given the proliferation of similar movements in the global and domestic context. This paper examines the extent to which the Vichy government fostered an unprecedented degree of conservatism and repression in French society compared to the Third Republic politics of the interwar years, providing a telling warning of the ease through which intolerance and repression can proliferate—even in the seemingly most progressive and democratic of societies.

The establishment of the puppet Vichy regime following France's surrender in June 1940 to Nazi Germany ushered in a new era for the nation. Espousing promises to reject the values of liberalism and republicanism that had once defined France, the Vichy government under Philippe Pétain vowed to restore glory and power to the country through the implementation of its own conservative agenda. Yet the regime faced an impossible task: obtaining popular support despite coming to power in the context of defeat. Pétain sought to shift the blame for France's defeat onto the shortcomings of the Third Republic to achieve this end. Condemning the former government's progressive ideology as the root cause of France's instability and ultimate downfall, Pétain aimed to distance himself and his government from any association with the Third Republic through the adoption of his plan for a *Révolution Nationale* that aspired to correct the supposed wrongs wrought by Republi-

canism in order to return France to its former greatness.

This paper defines liberalism as an ideology centered around the promotion of individual rights, civil liberties, and equality.¹ Among the Republican values that weakened the French state, the corrupting force of modern liberal feminism provided a perfect scapegoat on which to blame the nation's fall from grace. Pétain targeted Republican liberal ideology as the source of France's internal weaknesses, the proliferation of which left the nation unable to effectively defend itself against external threats and brought about its defeat in 1940. The devastating population losses wrought during the First World War sparked fears of depopulation, and France's declining birth rate was attributed to the changing gender relations and increased sexual equality of 1920s. Vichy policy thus aimed to return women to the home, encouraging them to resume a more domestic role as mothers and caregivers to aid in the nation's repopulation.

Vichy's implementation of traditional gender roles and conservative agenda seemed a radical change from the progressive ideologies that had defined the Third Republic. This rejection of liberalism, focused on the subjugation of women, was motivated by the government's desire both to strengthen the country via repopulation and attract popular legitimacy through a rejection of the former regime and its ideologies. Yet despite Vichy's purported rejection of the Third Republic and its politics, the new regime nonetheless borrowed heavily from a number of policies, movements, and rhetoric that featured heavily in Republican-era politics. Interestingly, the Vichy regime appeared to be replicating the very government they were attempting to suppress. While the policies and rhetoric of Vichy France appeared to be an extreme shift from the national politics of the interwar years, the developments befalling France both before and during wartime were in actuality not so radical given the domestic and global context. Many policies and movements enacted during the Third Republic had portended Vichy-era politics, indicating these traditionalist conservative elements had existed long before Vichy popularized them. Additionally, a comparative perspective of policies emerging across Europe during the interwar period and wartime era suggests many similarities among pronatalist strategies adopted by countries

1 Debbie Lackerstein, *National Regeneration in Vichy France Ideas and Policies, 1930-1944* (Farnham, Surrey, England: Ashgate, 2012), 30.

regardless of ideology or political alignment. Vichy's traditionalist gender aspirations were not unique—France's worries regarding depopulation following the First World War were shared throughout many European nations. Vichy-era policies even invoked contemporary models of constitutional familialism.² The 1937 constitution of the Irish Free State included a provision defining the family as the “natural primary and fundamental unit group of Society.”³ Ireland's profamily and Catholic politics provided a compelling model for Vichy France to follow. Even the radical socialist government of the Soviet Union similarly endorsed the promotion of pronatalist and familialist policies by the 1930s.⁴ Ultimately, the Vichy regime and several governments across Europe sought to increase their populations through the evocation of conservative sentiments and traditional familial values.

This paper will examine the extent to which the Vichy government fostered an unprecedented degree of conservatism and repression in French society. Focusing on policies targeting women and the family, this approach will examine how official government legislation, policies, and rhetoric encouraging traditional family values aimed to repress women's rights and freedoms while considering the extent to which these measures predated the Vichy regime. While the promotion of traditional gender roles and conservative values under Vichy seemed a shocking turnaround from the era of progressivism and liberalism that had defined France during the 1920s, the Vichy regime may have actually fostered a period of continuity and change. Rather than sparking a conservative resurgence, Vichy instead rebranded the presentation and purpose of existing traditionalist conservative values that had already begun to proliferate both within France and throughout Europe to advance the regime's own objectives.

Government Rhetoric and Communications

From its conception, Pétainist rhetoric was replete with anti-republican sentiment. A longtime national hero and figurehead of the Vichy regime, Pétain directed many of the new government's communications and organized the regime's ideological direction. In an attempt to distance himself and his government from the shame of defeat, Pétain sought to frame France's surrender as a result of the Third Republic's harmful ideologies and detrimental culture of liberal excess. This message featured prominently in official government communications and Pétain's own rhetoric—just months after the nation's official surrender to Nazi Germany, Pétain made his vision of a plan for France's rebirth clear in a speech given on August 15, 1940. Declaring that the French people should be “animated by a single spirit...in the service of France,”⁵ Pétain clearly delineated the importance of unity and national loyalty under the new government.

Much of Pétain's rhetoric during the early months of the occupation centered on the ultimate goal of returning France to its former glory. His *Révolution Nationale*, or National Revolution, aimed to reframe the country's political culture and social order to redefine French national identity.⁶ This message was central to Pétain's August 1940 communication, in which he applied this goal to education reform. In his speech entitled “L'Éducation Nationale,” Pétain condemned the influence of Republican ideology in education. Focusing on the educational system's promotion of the Republican principle of individualism, Pétain's assertion that “it is French individualism we nearly died from” in its fight against Nazi Germany suggested that these values posed an inherent threat to French society.⁷

The manifestation of fascist ideology in France called for loyalty to *la patrie*, or the fatherland, above all else—the promotion of individualism appeared to form a direct contradiction to this ideal. Pétain thus demand-

2 “Ireland's Constitution of 1937,” *Constitute Project*, accessed November 28, 2022, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Ireland_2012.pdf.

3 “Ireland's Constitution of 1937.”

4 D. L. Hoffmann, “Mothers in the Motherland: Stalinist Pronatalism in Its Pan-European Context,” *Journal of Social History* 34, no. 1 (January 2000): 35-54

5 Philippe Pétain, “L'Éducation Nationale,” Transcript of speech delivered on August 15, 1940.

6 Lackerstein, *National Regeneration in Vichy France Ideas and Policies*, i.

7 Pétain, “L'Éducation Nationale,” 194.

ed a rejection of any “frivolous” excess in French society,⁸ condemning the superfluous education system of the Third Republic in favor of a more utilitarian approach. Insisting that a greater value should be given to manual work to support the “service of France,”⁹ Pétain’s emphasis on extracting direct utility from education suggested that everyone had a role in French society, and this role should be focused towards serving the state.

Both the Third Republic and Vichy France maintained the idea that a citizens’ ultimate role was providing service to their country. However, conceptions of this fundamental commitment were rebranded under National Revolutionary ideology. This shift was especially evident as it pertained to the use of gender roles in exhibiting this commitment: under Vichy, the greatest service a woman could contribute to her nation was childbirth. In the work *Manuel de père de la famille* by Vice Admiral de Penfentenyo, a foreword written by Pétain states that “the woman’s National Service lasts for all her life in the home, and it is through motherhood that she pays her blood tax” to her country.¹⁰ Pétain’s statement here suggests that engaging in the act of childbirth and raising a family was the highest form of service that a woman could contribute to her country. This ideal defines the woman and her worth as a citizen through her utility in fulfilling her maternalistic role of providing a natalist contribution to France—a vital task for combatting France’s pressing depopulation issue that many had attributed to women and their failure to maintain a higher birth rate during the interwar years.

Themes of repentance and punishment became common features of Pétainist rhetoric. Among Pétain’s efforts to distance the Vichy government from France’s Republican legacy was an attempt to impose shame upon the populace for even having partaken in the Third Republic. In her reflections on life in the early years of the occupation, former Resistance member Claire Chevrillon recalled the all-encompassing hold that Pétain and his government held on French society. Radio communications constantly aired his “Pétainist exhortations” calling for the French

people to “repent [their] pre-war depravity and endure...punishment.”¹¹ Pétain’s evocation of an almost-religious penitence seemed to suggest that France’s 1940 defeat was a deserved punishment for its people’s own past transgressions. Such communications once again served to invoke a guilty conscience among a people who were responsible for their own nonpermissible past.

Family Policy

The Vichy regime pursued numerous techniques to distance itself from the Third Republic. Featuring traditionalist familial sentiments at the forefront of its rhetoric, Vichy’s conspicuous promotion of conservative gender roles seemed a radical departure from the past. However, the government’s pronatalist rhetoric often centered around the issue of depopulation, a subject long constituting major concern in French society even prior to Vichy. France’s 1940 defeat was often attributed to the country’s inability to sufficiently repopulate following the heavy losses sustained during the First World War.¹² The immense social disruptions brought about by the war and its aftermath accelerated the erosion of traditional gender roles, morality, and family patterns. As a result, many believed France was unable to sufficiently repopulate due to deteriorated moral standards.¹³ These fears were not unique to France—several countries across Europe shared the worrying sense that the traditional family had begun to disintegrate. Brought about by the social upheavals of wartime, the rise of feminist thought and emergence of new employment opportunities for women only seemed to further challenge these prevailing gender roles.¹⁴

Consequently, a slew of pronatalist programs began to emerge across a number of Catholic countries during the interwar years. The Irish Free State’s 1937 constitution provided a compelling model of con-

8 Pétain, “L’Éducation Nationale.”

9 Pétain, “L’Éducation Nationale.”

10 D. de Penfentenyo, *Manuel de père de famille*. Paris: Flammarion, 1941, 12.

11 Claire Chevrillon, *Code Name Christiane Clouet: a Woman in the French Resistance*, (College Station: Texas A and M Univ. Press), 1995, 24.

12 Miranda Pollard, *Reign of Virtue: Mobilizing Gender in Vichy France*. (Chicago, ill., Illinois: The University of Chicago Press), 1998, 38.

13 J. Delevsky, “Le Problème de la Dénatalité.”

14 Hoffmann, “Mothers in the Motherland.”42.

temporary pro-familialist constitutionally-ingrained policy that would inspire similar legislative efforts in Vichy France. Reflective of the ideals of a Catholic nationalist state, the Irish constitution specifies a definition of the family, clarifying the role of the state in protecting this conception of the family while even going so far as to establish women's role in society in relation to the state and the family. For instance, Article 41 of the Irish Free State's 1937 constitution held that a woman's contribution to the state must be provided through "her life within the home."¹⁵ The clear pro-familial, traditionalist language of the Irish constitution provided a compelling model of constitutional familialism that the Vichy government aspired to emulate in its own legislation.

Efforts to develop pro-familial legislation in Vichy France can be observed through the drafting of a 1941 constitutional model. Called "Constitutional Act Number 6 Concerning the French Family," the act sought to define the family and its relationship with the state in a manner similar to the Irish State's 1937 constitution. For instance, Vichy's 1941 constitutional act affirmed that the "Family is the foundation of the social [unit],"¹⁶ similarly to the Irish constitution's definition of the family as the "natural primary and fundamental unit group of society."¹⁷ The similar political cultures of these two states attest to the popularity of traditionalist and profamilialist policies throughout Europe at this time.

Vichy cast itself as a regime radically different from the Third Republic, whose traditionalist conservative values marked it an unequivocal departure from the Republic's all-encompassing liberal progressivism. Yet despite this compelling rhetoric, the Vichy government did not actually create or legislate any new systems.¹⁸ Rather, Vichy retained the family policy of the Third Republic. While Vichy rhetoric persistently advertised the profound differences between the regime and the Republic, many of the regime's conservative views had already begun to proliferate within France prior to Vichy's rise to power. As worries of depopulation burgeoned following the First World War, many French pronatalist

movements first emerged during the interwar years of the Third Republic. An examination of some of the basic provisions of the Code de la Famille can provide insight into Republican-era familial economic policies.

The passing of the Code de la Famille on July 29, 1939 came during a time of growing concerns regarding France's falling birth rate and demonstrated a clear effort on the part of the French government to address such worries. This decree "relating to the family and French birth rate" proved to be fundamental in helping to set the roots of the pronatalist and familial policies that would become a central tenet of Vichy ideology,¹⁹ falling in line with the notion that a woman's "blood tax" to her country lay in motherhood and childbirth.²⁰ The Code's main features included the allocation of a single salary allowance, a monetary bonus received for the birth of the first child, policies aimed towards repressing abortion, and heavy restrictions placed on divorce procedures. While some aspects of the Code marked a progressive leap forward in family social policy, others were rooted in a reactionary line of thinking likely inspired by a conservative backlash to the Republican ideals of modernity. Nonetheless, the passage of such a piece of legislation was welcome in interwar France. As the disillusioned country drifted closer to the onset of yet another conflict, the government's adoption of these directives lent a sense of national cohesion and direction to the lost nation and offered a degree of crisis management in the face of a rapidly worsening political situation.²¹

Ideological Origins

The Code de la Famille seems to largely have been inspired by a conservative backlash to Republican conceptions of modernity. Blaming the rise of the so-called new woman on the advancement of progressive notions such as gender equality and social mobility, these more traditional elements of French society viewed factors such as divorce or in-

¹⁵ "Ireland's Constitution of 1937."

¹⁶ W. Garcin, and H. David, "La famille," *Cahiers de Formation Politique*, no. 6 (1941).

¹⁷ "Ireland's Constitution of 1937."

¹⁸ Pollard, *Reign of Virtue*.

¹⁹ "Official Journal of the French Republic. Laws and Decrees of 07/30/1939,"

Legifrance.gouv.fr, <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/download/securePrint?token=%2lkRSjno4Xhxp%21xArSEy4>.

²⁰ Penfentenyo, *Manuel de père de famille*, 12.

²¹ Pollard, *Reign of Virtue*, 22.

creased opportunities for women to join the workforce as the reason why less women were reproducing. These frivolous, materialistic Republican ideals were thus blamed for the nation's falling birthrate.²² The Code de la Famille served to directly address these fears, as seen through the Code's efforts to specifically target and eliminate issues like divorce. For instance, one of the greatest concerns regarding childbirth among young people living in France during the 1930's was the cost of raising children and fears of unemployment²³—the allocation of a single salary allowance or additional monetary bonus for the birth of the first child under the Code helped alleviate such concerns. Meanwhile, the Code's provisions for familial allowances aimed to ease the financial burdens of raising a family so that women did not feel compelled to work, eliminating another barrier that might prevent a woman from fulfilling her domestic and maternal responsibilities.²⁴

Ultimately, the notion of the modern woman provided an easy target on which to place the blame of France's repopulation struggles. The Third Republic's promotion of trivial ideals only detracted from the productivity and strength of French society. While concerns of gender equality began to take precedence over the desire to start a family among many female French young adults during the 1930s,²⁵ these concerns not only seemed absurd under the Vichy era—they also indicated a woman had neglected to fulfill her obligation to her nation. The Vichy regime even implemented efforts to reward women for their maternal contributions. Once again borrowing a symbolic gesture of the interwar period, the French government enacted a system of reward in 1920 whereby a woman was gifted with a bronze medal for having “five or more living children, a silver medal upon those with eight or more, and a gold medal upon those with ten or more.”²⁶ The Vichy government thus sought to

celebrate motherhood in hopes of dissuading French youth from subscribing to liberal materialistic ideals, instead encouraging an acceptance of familialism in the name of the good of the country.

Conclusion

Emerging from a context of national humiliation and surrender, the Vichy government sought to gain popular support from the French people through its promises to restore France to its former national glory while pursuing its own national agenda while collaborating with Nazi Germany. As a result, occupied France found itself replete with a wide variety of actors, ideologies, and desires. In this elusive atmosphere, the Vichy government itself ultimately relied on popular support around its leader, Marshall Pétain. Promising a return to national glory, Pétain aimed to reject the liberal Republican ideals responsible for France's downfall. Featuring anti-republican atmosphere of shame and punishment that attempted to evoke sorrow and humiliation upon the public for France's 1940 defeat.

Vichy's attempts to create this conservative narrative of traditional gender roles permeated all spheres of French society—from official government communications and propaganda to legislative policies, education reform, and social connotations, the Vichy regime co-opted many of the ideas behind right-wing traditionalist movements emerging during the late years of the Third Republic. While these ideas gave way to the outright promotion of these conservative values under the Vichy regime during its attempts to assert itself as a strong authoritarian order, Vichy's decision to borrow policies and practices from the Third Republic indicates a lack of true revolutionary thought. The Vichy government did not invent any new material policies or legislation regarding the family. The basis of National Revolutionary ideology was primarily rhetorical—while Vichy had preoccupied French society with vague, grand promises and symbolic gestures, the puppet government provided no new actual avenues for familial support or foster any real, tangible legislative change in this arena. Much of the legislation that exemplified Vichy's ideals had predated Vichy.

While the policies, rhetoric, and values of Vichy France appeared to provide an extreme shift from French society only ten years prior, this was not the reality. Vichy's adoption of Republican-era policies and rhetoric suggested a strong degree of continuity with the France of the

22 Pollard, *Reign of Virtue*, 39.

23 Pollard, *Reign of Virtue*, 37.

24 “Official Journal of the French Republic. Laws and Decrees of 07/30/1939.”

25 Pollard, *Reign of Virtue*, 37.

26 Karen Offen, “Body Politics: Women, Work and the Politics of Motherhood in France, 1900-1950,” in Bock and Thane, eds., p. 138.

1920s and 1930s. Additionally, when viewed through a comparative lens, Vichy-era values, policies, and goals shared striking similarities with a number of countries across the European continent. Vichy France seemed to most notably connect with several Catholic countries during the interwar years and wartime period. Taking direct inspiration from conservative religious governments such as those of the Irish Free state, the Vichy regime even shared similarities in policy and rhetoric with nations on the opposite side of the ideological spectrum. For instance, the radical socialist government of the Soviet Union had similarly endorsed the promotion of profamilialist policies by the mid-interwar era such as restrictive abortion policies or limitations on divorce. Ultimately, an examination of the Vichy regime and its motivations, policies, and rhetoric under a comparative lens reveals the extent to which Vichy-era France was simply a symptom of a broader trend of familialist policies and resurgence of traditional gender roles. Nonetheless, the Vichy government was rife with repressive state policies and backward legislation enacted in the name of national regeneration. As the Vichy regime ultimately fell and popular support diminished, the regime's ability to draw popular support on the basis of repressive policies provides a telling warning of the ease through which intolerance and repression can proliferate, even in the seemingly most progressive and democratic of societies.

Plucked Chrysanthemum: The New Showa in the Ashes of the Empire

DIXIE BOHR

ABSTRACT

As the dust settled over Japan in wake of the Second World War, the Emperor's voice was broadcast for the first time in history. Through a meticulous analysis of this speech, it is clear that this moment was Emperor Hirohito's last attempt at maintaining the imperial family's divine status, The Chrysanthemum Throne, as he skirted around the reality of the atomic bombings and unconditional surrender. The address justifies the war, shifts blame away from his persona, and reminds listeners of his family's glorious past, especially the near-distant Meiji period. This effort ultimately failed, as eyewitness testimony details that Japanese populace was more concerned with the looming occupation than any ideological solace. Through these two factors, combined with published rhetoric established by the American occupying force, we are able to conclude that the rupture of imperial divine sovereignty in Japan was a direct result of the Japanese defeat in the Second World War

In far-away Germany, the moment had a name; it was called Stunde Null, or "Hour Zero." When the 1945 surrender was made known, citizens who had dedicated years of their lives to victory against the Allied Powers learned of their country's loss. Some may have shed bitter tears that their efforts were wasted, perhaps some rejoiced that the war and its trail of destruction would cease. Most, however, felt shocked and confused. People across Japan felt this moment of stillness as well and were perhaps even more uniquely confused when a voice they had never heard would tell them the war was lost, in language they could not understand. It was the "Broadcast of the Imperial Voice," or Gyokuon-hoso, delivered on August 15, 1945, only a few days after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the "Broadcast of the Imperial Voice," Emperor Hirohito, or Showa, told the Japanese people that they did not surrender, but "accepted the provisions" from the Allied Powers.¹ This broadcast

disclosed little in what had transpired as the war drew to a close, but it is rich with expression of the Emperor's stern justification of the war, and thus his continued legitimacy. This stance is presented to his audience through a strategic use of vague language and archaic dialect, as well as rhetorical harkening to the beginning of the Japanese imperial venture. The Emperor's nation also came under pressure from American occupying forces who sought to contribute to the loss of Imperial sovereignty in a democratizing effort that the occupiers viewed as paternalistic reform. The Gyokuon-hoso, the testimony of those who heard it firsthand, and occupying American publications, are all evidence showing that the result of the war in the Pacific caused the rupture of imperial divine sovereignty in Japan, despite the government's best efforts.

First and foremost, the Gyokuon-hoso intended to frame the Pacific War as a necessary effort, and to maintain imperial and governmental authority. Explicitly, the Emperor stated that the war was fought from "sincere desire to ensure Japan's self-preservation and the stabilization of East Asia."² In making this particular justification, Emperor Hirohito sought to justify "Japan's" role in the war, since as Emperor, he was at that moment the human embodiment of Japan. Thus, he protected his authority from bitterly disappointed subjects who had given life and limb to the war effort, as "Japan" acted in the name of defense, and its loss was outside of "Japan's" control. The broadcast contains a recurring theme of shirking accountability from imperial and governmental authority, even as far as its esoteric spoken language. The classical Japanese the Emperor used was archaic and inaccessible, as it had not been commonly spoken in Japan since the 9th century. Witness Kenzaburo Oe, a child at the time, even described the adults around him as "trying without confidence to decipher the Emperor's words."³ When juxtaposed against commentary following the broadcast, which clarified the Emperor's vague "acceptance of provisions" to mean the reality of unconditional surrender, the Emperor was no longer the bearer of bad news. He was instead the one who told his "loyal" subjects that they would be the arbiters of Japan's future

² "Text of Hirohito's Radio Rescript" *The New York Times*, 3.

³ Oe, Kenzaburo, "The Day the Emperor Spoke in a Human Voice" *The New York Times* (May 7th, 1995), 103.

¹ "Text of Hirohito's Radio Rescript" *The New York Times*, (August 15th, 1945), 3.

“prosperity and happiness.”⁴ Thus, through the devices used in the speech alone, the long-standing status quo was to be protected, as the Emperor himself was free from blame for the result of the war.

As far as the broadcast went to frame the war as necessary, and to perpetuate the continued belief in the Emperor as a deity, its lofty language fell upon deaf Japanese ears. Returning to the Oe account, the surrender lingered in his mind much more than the broadcast. He felt that the Emperor and Empress he had learned about in his formative years had “lost their power,” since they no longer held the role of “governing the ‘picture of the world.’”⁵ Ultimately, it was nearly impossible for listeners to reconcile the broadcast with the very different reality they experienced. It did not matter that it was not the Emperor’s fault that the war had been lost, as it was still lost. There existed a terrible contrast, since the Imperial government had resignedly accepted dealings with the nations that Oe was taught “made women and children lie down in the roads to be crushed by tanks.”⁶ The address and its reception show a clear conflict of needs that made it largely ineffective. The Emperor provided ideological solace, assuring his subjects that Japan had acted in the right and must continue to do so for a peaceful future, when his citizens, like Oe, instead needed to know that they would not be massacred by the enemy as they were taught to expect. In the context of Imperial sovereignty, this meant that citizens overall would at least be less concerned with their living God during the struggle for survival that total war had brought upon the Japanese people. As the war changed the citizenry on a personal level, it would be a difficult task for the Emperor to regain the popular perception he had once had, one that he arguably was never able to fully achieve. The broadcast was therefore a clear move to maintain Imperial sovereignty in Japan, as Emperor Hirohito himself even recognized the war was as a catastrophic event for his status as Japan’s living God.

As historian Andrew Gordon asserts, the Emperor even invoked “Meiji-era rhetoric” of “emulating the progress of the Western world,”

4 “Text of Hirohito’s Radio Rescript” *The New York Times*, 3.

5 Oe, “Human Voice,” *The New York Times*, 103.

6 Oe, “Human Voice,” *The New York Times*, 103.

making reference to his highly revered grandfather, Emperor Mutsuhito.⁷ This invocation of the glamorous Meiji past was a tool Hirohito utilized since the beginning of the wartime period, when the Japanese populace were meant to look outwards, to prosperity in places such as the newly conquered Manchuria. The Emperor’s government pressed messages of peace, “resuscitation” for ethnic minorities, “triumphal songs” and “newborn babies,” which framed the colony as a utopia.⁸ Japanese people on the mainland were meant to look towards this utopia, and support its protection from “bandits” by doing their part in the wartime period.⁹ Overall, the imperial officials framed the continued prosperity and safety of the Japanese people as being at stake, the only way to protect it being to obey and pledge fealty to the imperial government. This external focus is an intentional continuity by Showa’s government that had been perpetuated since Meiji’s rule. Emperor Meiji’s adherents long before took a similar defensive stance that we can see through art of the time, showing their countrymen two key images of European and American imperial ventures. The first was to be looked at in admiration, similar to the promise of Manchukuo; their wealth and civilization, often represented through beautiful clothes or new technology, a bustling world that the Japanese populace could be a part of, given that they abide by the new regime’s requirements, such as widespread conscription.¹⁰ Duty to the state was also emphasized by the second image of the European empires, the threat they posed to Japanese sovereignty. Meiji himself was restored to power by Japanese frustration with encroachment from European and American imperial projects, such as the Harris Treaty and other “unequal treaties” placed upon Japan. The term “unequal treaties” itself was borrowed from Qing China, who coined it to name the dynamic between themselves and the foreign governments imposing treaties on them under

7 Andrew Gordon, *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), 233.

8 *Manchuria Graph*, (December 1936), 226.

9 *Manchuria Graph*, (December 1936), 226.

10 Adachi Ginko, *Illustration of Ladies Sewing*, woodblock print, 1887, (Museum of Fine Arts, Boston) https://visualizingcultures.mit.edu/throwing_off_asia_01/toa_essay02.html.

threat of war in order to exploit their resources and economies.¹¹ Meiji's government thus kept these events in the popular memory in order to obtain legitimacy. They created images that served as an outward "window" into the threat Western empires still posed; unlike the portrayal of the Chinese as rag-tag and inferior during the Sino-Japanese war, ukiyo-e of the Russo-Japanese war showed Russian and Japanese officers as looking strikingly similar in uniform and appearance, implying equal power, and thus, a threat (See Fig. 1). This looming threat encouraged the growing prestige of the military in Japanese society, and subsequently increased-military strength for empire-building. Therefore, as Showa justified the Pacific War as a means of maintaining Japanese sovereignty, he echoed his grandfather, as Meiji justified Western-style empire building as the means of establishing Japanese sovereignty in the first place. Any reference to these past ages and the imperial line encourages listeners to be reminded of the Emperor's unique status, as they were to trace it back to Amaterasu herself, the traditional sun goddess from which all emperors were said to be directly descended. In doing so, the Emperor is meant to further soften the blow that he is aware the war has dealt to this status, meaning that contemporaries and historians can recognize the result of the Pacific War for Japan was a turning point in the Emperor's role in Japanese society.

The loss of power of these divine governing bodies would not have been as dramatic without the intervention of the occupying American forces, who placed clear responsibility for the war on the government and Emperor. SCAP (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Gen. Douglas MacArthur) directives and operations were very explicit in their belief that Japan should be democratized and modernized for the good of itself and of the world. They outlined this democratizing goal to servicemembers in many ways, including films such as *Our Job in Japan*. The purpose of this short film was to give American servicemembers context as to why the Japanese had started the war, which SCAP attributed to the concept of imperial divinity. *Our Job in Japan* makes this attribution in the form of "warlords" appropriating familiar Shinto customs to suit their

warmongering goals.¹² Shinto is depicted as outdated and superstitious "mumbojumbo," but this can be attributed to prejudices of the time rather than a particular American issue with Shinto itself.¹³ Thus, the conflict in the film was not with Shinto as an expression of faith, but with this appropriation that was portrayed as manipulative and immoral.



Fig. 1: Nobukazu Watanabe, *Illustration of Russian and Japanese Army and Navy Officers*, 1904, (Museum of Fine Arts, Boston) https://visualizingcultures.mit.edu/throwing_off_asia_03/toa_essay02.html.

The narrative went that now, in 1945, Americans in Japan would need to instill the idea that "religion is a matter of a man's own conscience" and not a tool to start wars.¹⁴ This point harks back to freedom of religion as one of America's most fundamental ideas, an important appeal to the film's American audience. This individualistic American principle was entirely incompatible with imperial sovereignty. If a Japanese person chose to practice a religion that does not hold the Emperor in divinity as Japanese belief systems did, the person would no longer be obligated to him, nor the state he represents, as an ultimate ruler. Although the film claims that only the Japanese themselves can convince their countrymen of honest and modern ways, it is clear that the American administration

11 Dong Wang, *China's Unequal Treaties: Narrating National History*, (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2005).

12 *Our Job in Japan*, written by Theodore Geisel, (Army Pictorial Service, Signal Corps, 1945), 4:40-5:35.

13 *Our Job in Japan*, 5:35-6:35.

14 *Our Job in Japan*, 13:33-13:45.

wanted to remove imperial divinity from the Japanese consciousness as a necessary part of democratization.¹⁵ In the film, this comes to light when the narrator states that “the truth” is out there for the Japanese to see, accompanied by a visual of a newspaper, featuring a photo of Hirohito with the headline “I am no deity.”¹⁶ Therefore, the result of the war serves as a blow dealt on imperial sovereignty due to the fact that it was entirely incompatible with the goals and mission of the occupying United States.

This active attack on imperial divinity is also seen in an infamous photograph that Japanese officials attempted to censor, one of General Douglas MacArthur and Emperor Hirohito standing side by side (See Fig. 2).¹⁷ In the photo, the General looks casual, with his hands on his hips, towering over the shorter, more formal Hirohito. This image could be interpreted as emasculating the Emperor, but the Americans who had pushed past the censors to publish it felt it “encapsulated the change that their occupation of Japan represented.”¹⁸ Therefore, although American relations with Japan dictated the Emperor keep his throne, this throne was no longer to be placed in the heavens. The occupying Americans were largely responsible for instigating this movement. The photograph is also telling in what it does not show; the Emperor and MacArthur only differ physically, they are nonetheless on the same footing and state of dress, the photo is not deliberately lampooning Emperor Hirohito in any way besides pointing out that he was physically small, inevitable considering the other conditions of the photo. This modicum of respect reveals further SCAP understanding of the Emperor’s place in Japanese society. Contrary to the democratizing mission, MacArthur’s administration chose not to depose him, although the Emperor had theoretically been leader of the “warlords.” The Emperor as a figure had lost divinity, but was still a symbol of Japan, as he was for hundreds of years. The existence of the Emperor implied Japanese sovereignty, and if the Americans were to depose Japan’s “leader” entirely, it would create the diplomatic

¹⁵ *Our Job in Japan*, 11:50-12:06.

¹⁶ *Our Job in Japan*, 14:28-14:35.

¹⁷ John Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999), 293-295.

¹⁸ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 293-295.

atmosphere that the country was a leaderless, conquered American property, rather than the little brother in democracy that it was meant to be. *Our Job in Japan* rails against the “warlords,” but the narrator never mentioned the Emperor specifically, only the brief picture is shown with the headline that challenges his divinity.¹⁹ Therefore, the Emperor was to exist as a symbol of Japan to foster good relations in Asia. MacArthur in particular would become very open about the looming threat of the nearby Soviet Union and later Maoist China but could no longer be a divine, mobilizing force to the Japanese people against American-style republicanism.²⁰



Fig. 2: Gaetano Faillace, Photographer. “[Emperor Hirohito pays a precedent shattering visit to Supreme Commander MacArthur]”. Photograph. United States Army Photography, c1946. From Harry S. Truman Library and Museum. <https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/photograph-records/98-2431>

Where *Our Job in Japan* and the photograph converge is the common theme of positive American-Japanese relations in wake of the war. In

¹⁹ *Our Job in Japan*, 14:28-14:35.

²⁰ Douglas MacArthur, “Address to Congress, April 19, 1951,” Transcript. April 19, 1951, <https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/researchfiles/transcript-general-douglas-macarthur-address-congress>.

the former, the repeated message of “teaching the Japanese mind” framed this as paternalistic; Japanese minds are equally capable of democracy as American minds, but they have been misled, and must be brought back to the herd. In the photograph, MacArthur, who represents the United States, is larger and more relaxedly able to handle “itself” than Hirohito’s slight, tense representation of Japan, which implies the American responsibility of leading the Japanese, if they are to have these positive relations. Thus, imperial sovereignty would not be feasible in wake of the Japanese surrender, if the Japanese government wished to be in an advantageous position against the nearby Soviet Union in the coming cold war.

Understanding the Emperor’s historic role as a deity, and why it transformed with the surrender, is a crucial detail that can be applied to Japanese history of many eras. Hearing the Emperor’s voice was for all purposes a turning point in Japanese history. Rhetorically, it sought to recuperate the Emperor’s image from the devastation of the war, making reference to “greater” Japanese eras, but the grim reality of the surrender overshadowed this attempt at continuity, as total war had spun the former Japanese empire into a state of disarray. This disconnect was then compounded by open discouragement of this long-standing norm, led by the American occupiers of Japan in the name of a paternalistic democratizing mission in light of the looming Cold War. Therefore, the result of the war in the Pacific and how it was handled by both Emperor, citizens, and occupiers alike was the main catalyst for the Emperor’s descent into the human sphere, the sphere where Emperor Naruhito, or Reiwa, resides today.

LATIN AMERICAN INFLUENCE

The Agency of Indigenous Female Brewers in Colonial Latin America: An Evaluation of Women's Power Through the Alcohol Economy

EMILY VINING

ABSTRACT

Some of the historical questions I asked came from my primary sources. The most helpful primary sources available to me were the wills of Indigenous women. Through these sources I found that a number of women had used the alcohol trade to accumulate wealth. These sources confirmed that Indigenous women had been able to make a considerable wage from producing alcohol. Another primary source I used was contracts between women and, most often, wealthy colonial Spanish households that had Indigenous women produce alcohol. Through these primary sources I developed the questions: How did Indigenous women quickly take on the colonial role of brewer and how was colonial society dependent on these women? After evaluating these questions, my thesis became that the production of alcohol as a feminine profession allowed Indigenous women of Latin America to exercise autonomy and, in many cases, effectively reject Spanish colonial and patriarchal systems of oppression.

Alcohol and its many forms have been regarded as one of the cornerstones of civilization. Some even credit it as the reason humans settled and evolved from their hunter-gatherer ways and allowed them to harvest crops for the production of alcohol.¹ Whether theories of this sort are true, there is no denying the fact that alcohol and humanity's reliance upon it is a major part of human history. One of the most interesting aspects of alcohol is the influence it played in the lives of women. In this paper, I will argue that the production of alcohol as a feminine profession allowed Indigenous women of Latin America to exercise autonomy and effectively reject Spanish colonial and patriarchal systems of oppression. Specifically, this paper will proceed from the establishment of alcohol production as a woman's trade in pre-Hispanic

times. I will explain that this pre-Hispanic feminine role of brewer was easily transferred into the economy of colonial Latin America. I will argue that all levels of society became reliant on Indigenous-produced alcohol once supplanted into the colonial market. Native women utilized the reliance of the Spanish upon their alcohol to effectively resist efforts made by colonial authorities. Finally, I will remind the reader that, though alcohol-provided independence, the risks Indigenous women faced due to patriarchal oppression were ever-present. Ultimately, this paper hopes to successfully utilize the limited information and micro-histories available to reveal how the trends of Indigenous women encapsulated their agency and ingenuity and contribute to an aspect of Latin American and women's history.

Pre-Hispanic Tradition as an Anchor of the Indigenous Woman's Trade

In order to understand the role that alcohol production played in the economic autonomy of indigenous women, it is important to establish the fact that Indigenous women had long held a monopoly over the sale and manufacture of alcohol before the arrival of the Spanish. This monopoly was derived essentially through the fact that the production of alcohol and the majority of all food and drink goods was a uniquely feminine ability. It is this responsibility of the feminine to produce alcohol in Indigenous tradition that translated into Indigenous women's economic power through a monopoly on the manufacture of alcohol in Spanish colonies.

To begin, in areas subject to the Viceroyalty of Peru, the main alcoholic beverage was a type of corn beer the Spanish called chicha. Similar to other alcoholic beverages in Latin America, chicha was made through a labor-intensive process that had many steps. After the chicha had been manufactured, it had a shelf-life of less than a week, making it a delicate process of production to be undertaken only by women who knew of the intricacies of the beverage.² The reason women were the masters of chicha production was due to pre-Hispanic Andean tradition that saw women as sacred producers of the drink. For instance, the most

1 Gina Hames, *Alcohol in World History*, (New York: Routledge, 2012), 1.

2 Karen B. Graubart, *With Our Labor and Sweat* (California: Stanford University Press, 2007), 72.

prized and sacred of all women in the Inca empire were the women titled 'acllas'. These women were designated as virgins of the Sun god and carried with them an air of mandatory respect. This respect was given to them in many forms. They would reside in a comfortable temple, with their each and every need met.³ To emphasize the importance of acllas, men who slept with these women and defied the sexual restriction of purity placed upon them would be executed.⁴ The acllas' job was to brew chicha for the Inca king.⁵ The protections that surrounded the acllas and the punishments applied to those who dared to defy these rules demonstrate the intertwined nature of Indigenous Andean women and chicha production. Chicha's production by the most protected and respected women in the empire elevated the drink to a similar level of importance. In addition, there was no male equivalent to the acllas; in fact, men had no role in the brewing of chicha. This proved that chicha production was inherently reserved for females. This tradition carried into colonial rule because men were not assigned the duty of alcohol producers in Inca and Andean culture; therefore, chicha brewing and sale remained a female space.⁶

Shifting north to the region of Central Mexico, the trend of females as alcohol producers matched those seen in the Andes. Indigenous women of New Spain would receive from their husbands harvested maguey plants, a type of agave, and then proceeded to break down the plant and juice it. Once juiced, the liquid would be fermented into a type of alcohol called pulque and then the beverage would be sold by Indigenous women in the markets of urban centers. As seen in the Andean region, women of central Mexico were intrinsically linked to pulque through pre-Hispanic tradition. The beverage was used as a simple substance that accompanied meals, religious ceremonies, and political negotiations, but perhaps more interesting is the mystical link between pulque and wom-

3 Irene Silverblatt, *Sun, Moon and Witches: Gender Ideologies and Class in Inca and Colonial Peru* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987), 83.

4 Silverblatt, *Sun, Moon and Witches*, 92.

5 Irene Silverblatt, *Sun, Moon and Witches*, 92.

6 Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala, *The First New Chronicle and Good Government* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2006), 80

en. Pulque was drunk after a woman endured labor to regain strength as well as towards the end of a woman's menstrual cycle to halt bleeding.⁷ The importance of pulque in an Indigenous woman's life was that that pulque remained deeply ingrained in femininity. The bond between women and the alcoholic drink transcended boundaries of economics and enjoyment but was rooted in women's reproduction. Reproduction was a pivotal, regenerative phase of a woman's life; pulque's presence in this process speaks volumes to the beverage's importance in Indigenous women's lives. Therefore, it is understandable how the production of pulque would not cease to remain in the woman's domain post Spanish conquest.



Figure 1. A Pre-Hispanic Indigenous woman serving chicha to men as they plow crops in Guaman Poma de Ayala, *The First New Chronicle and Good Government*.

Maintaining the Indigenous Women's Monopoly After Spanish Colonization

Indigenous women's monopoly on alcohol production in pre-Hispanic cultures translated into a similar monopoly in Spanish

7 William B. Taylor, *Drinking, Homicide & Rebellion in Colonial Mexican Villages* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1979), 52-53

colonial society. This colonial monopoly on alcohol sale and production was made possible and maintained because of the ability of Indigenous women to produce alcohol in the home where, though on a small scale, they could simultaneously complete the domestic duties placed upon them. The monopoly was also maintained as Indigenous women moved to sell their product in the street markets of cities once enough capital was gained through at-home production. Once the monopoly of alcohol production by Indigenous women was upheld in accordance with Indigenous established tradition, Spanish colonial territories then developed a reliance on Native brews. Colonial society's reliance on Indigenous alcohol meant that Indigenous women held the advantage of necessity. More specifically, the advantage of necessity was created by the permeance of Indigenous alcohol types throughout all levels of class in colonial Latin America. Alcoholic beverages were a necessary commodity from the elites all the way to the lowest levels of society.

Indigenous women's monopoly on the production and sale of alcohol was made possible by two factors. The first factor that prevented the encroachment of Spaniards into the alcohol economy depended on the type of colonialism used by the Spanish. Contrary to the British, Spanish colonialism was not focused on encouraging white settlers to immigrate to the colonies.⁸ The lack of white settlers meant that there simply were not enough foreigners to hijack the alcohol economy at a scale large enough to threaten the influential and established brewing monopoly of Indigenous women. Furthermore, if there were not enough immigrants from Spain to brew at a scale rival to Native women, the Spanish had no choice but to promote the Indigenous female's trade by purchasing their alcohol.

The second factor was that alcohol production and sale could take place from within the home. In colonial society, just as in pre-Hispanic society, women were forced into the role of wife or daughter which saw them spending the majority of their time solely performing domestic duties. As the word 'domestic' implies, a married woman, especially with children, would have been restricted from operating a business due to her patriarchal obligation to cook, rear children, clean, and so on. Fortunately,

ly, the idea that alcohol could be made and sold from the home liberated women and enabled them to engage in the economy. This unstifled economic prowess of women meant they would be able to maintain their pre-Colombian monopoly of alcohol manufacture.

In order to understand how prevalent the production and sale of alcohol from Indigenous women's homes were, we can turn to wills and personal accounts from the colonial time period. For instance, in 1828, missionary Henry Dunn observed in Guatemala the scene of two Indigenous women sitting on mats in their hut while they surrounded a large pot of boiling, fermented sugar. Dunn recalled three or four dirty children being present elsewhere in the tent.⁹ Though this example is slightly past the colonial period, the anecdote of Dunn provides a few unique perspectives. First, Henry Dunn was an Englishman far removed from the Latin American Indigenous presence. He offered a set of fresh eyes because those born in Guatemala would have been accustomed to the sight of Indigenous women producing alcohol in the domestic sphere. They would not have recorded this account as it was simply not a significant sight. In addition, this instance taking place past what would be labeled as the colonial period demonstrates that Indigenous women producing alcohol in the home was ingrained deeply enough in colonial society to last hundreds of years, from the time of the Spaniards' arrival to post-revolution. Turning to the Viceroyalty of Peru, three women named Haqui, Cocssi, and Capan included in their wills that they produced chicha from their homes for a group of Spanish nobles. The reason these three women included their profession of chichera, a woman that brews chicha, is because there were several debts their noble customers owed them in exchange for chicha.¹⁰ This way, women could have a trusted friend, family member, or churchman to collect these debts after they passed. Specifically, this example demonstrates that Indigenous women were the preferred suppliers of alcohol for even those as prestigious as

8 Hanns J. Prem, "Spanish Colonization and Indian Property in Central Mexico, 1521-1620," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 82, No. 3(1992): 445

9 Alvis E. Dunn, "Alcohol, Taverns, Vinaterias, and Bourbon Reforms in the Mid-Eighteenth Century", in *Distilling the Influence of Alcohol*, edited by David Carey Jr (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2012), 81.

10 Paul J. Charney, "Networks of Trust," in *Native Wills from the Colonial Americas*, edited by Mark Christensen and Jonathan Truitt (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2016), 225.

Spanish nobles. It is also important to recognize that these Indigenous women were producing from their homes and for elites. Elites chose to purchase chicha from Indigenous women, rather than someone of Iberian descent, which illustrates that Indigenous women had a large presence in the trade of alcohol and that they could maintain this presence from within the home.

Indigenous Women's Expansion Throughout the Colonial Economy

Once Indigenous women reaped the benefits of making their own revenue from the domestic sphere, they redistributed their capital in order to expand their economic power into realms other than that of alcohol production. Therefore, they capitalized on the full potential of their monopoly. These additional business endeavors also demonstrated the agency of Native women to become economically powerful. An instance of economic expansion can be found in the proclivity of prominent chicheras in the Andean region of South America to grow their home-operated business into a type of manufacturing center, and then to distribute their product to areas other than the home. Frances Hayashida details examples of chicha vendors acquiring buildings through renters in the colonial mining city of Potosí and then hiring other Indigenous women or African slaves to produce the brew and sell it from the tavern.¹¹ This indicated that certain Indigenous women reinvested their home earnings to create for themselves a source of passive income. This passive income freed women from the stress of having to provide a comfortable life for themselves and their families. Reducing this stress would have been an avenue of liberation for Indigenous women, as the reduction of stress related to finances is inherently relieving for any individual. Also, Indigenous women used this wealth to employ other Native women, free Afro-Latinas, and enslaved African women to aid in production. By reemploying Indigenous women to produce chicha in larger chicheria operations, they reaffirmed that the trade would remain a feminine, Native sector in the colonial economic system. Though chicherias would purchase slaves or

hire mulatta and African women, the trend would still lean heavily to alcohol production being an Andean woman's trade. And regardless, the idea that alcohol production was a feminine business remained as the African labor hired or purchased was female.¹²



Figure 2. An Indigenous woman's 'stall' in the markets of colonial city Potosí. Note the presence of pots that likely held *chicha* for sale, Melchor Maria Market in Mangan, Trading Roles, 2.

Another example that demonstrates Native women expanded their economic power beyond the solely domestic production of alcohol is given through the example of chichera Francisca Vilcacabra. Vilcacabra, an Indigenous woman of colonial Quito in the Viceroyalty of Peru, owned a chicheria that also acted as a pawn shop. This pawn shop would help to settle the debts of borrachos ("drunkards"). While she owned a tavern, Vilcacabra simultaneously brewed and supplied chicha for a wealthy Spanish man. To add an additional layer of respect for this Quito businesswoman, she even held one hundred forty tostón, a form of colonial currency, against her boss.¹³ The example of the chichera Vilcacabra

11 Frances Hayashida, "Pre-Hispanic Brewing in the Andes", in *Drink, Power and Society in the Andes*, edited by Justin Jennings and Brenda J. Bowser (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2009), 244-247.

12 Jane E. Mangan, *Trading Roles: Gender, Ethnicity, and the Urban Economy in Colonial Potosí* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 91.

13 Frank Salomon, "Indian Women of Early Colonial Quito as Seen Through Their Testaments," *The Americas* 44, no. 3 (1988): 338.

communicates that the production of alcohol was merely a steppingstone for Indigenous women to gain a foothold into the colonial economy. Once this foothold was established, Indigenous women oftentimes became aggressive businesswomen who created lives free of dependence upon other providers, such as husbands or fathers. Therefore, it is easy to visualize the economic independence Native women gained through producing alcohol in their homes. Furthermore, the revenue women saved through their sale of alcohol in the home, enabled them to reinvest said capital in business endeavors outside of the home.

An additional aspect to Indigenous women's expansion in the colonial economy was their clever pairing of alcohol with food goods and other types of beverages. As Jane Mangan revealed in her work, many Indigenous women would hardly remain within the realm of alcohol once they acquired sufficient capital from selling chicha. Particularly market chicheras, who would sell in small stands in the plaza of urban centers, would pair the sale of chicha with items such as bread, ají, and coca leaves or tea.¹⁴ The ingenuity of pairing chicha with food items and other drinks resulted in greater economic gain for Indigenous market women. Additionally, chicha is a type of corn beer, meaning it is a light alcohol in comparison to other more heavily distilled liquors. Therefore, it made the accompaniment of bread a well-matched pair. This combination of food with chicha was similar to market schemes seen in the modern economy, such as coffee shops having food options available in order to convince customers to spend more money. The combination of food and chicha showed the economic agency and ingenuity of market women to entrench themselves deeper into the urban economy of colonial Latin America, and therefore reap the opportunities presented to them through their monopoly of alcohol production.

Women's Resistance of Colonial Authority

As Indigenous women firmly rooted themselves in the colonial economy by means of their monopoly of alcohol and economic expansion, the Spanish developed a dependence upon their services. This meant that Indigenous women became a necessity in all classes of colonial society. For instance, Karen Graubart states that in the Andean colonies, chicha

was a drink found in the poorest of classes all the way to the wealthiest of the Spanish elites.¹⁵ Furthermore, chicha appeared to have largely replaced the drinking of wine that was heavily relied upon in Iberian society. As water was often dangerous to ingest due to disease, wine became the drink of choice in Spain with which to quench thirst. In Spanish Andean lands, however, chicha was shown to have replaced wine as the most sold alcohol.¹⁶ Therefore, Indigenous women outproduced and outsold even wine, making chicha a beverage all strata of society relied on in order to avoid disease-ridden water. As women outsourced wine in the Spanish colonies, they provided for themselves an advantage. This advantage was the fact that, as Spanish officials attempted to exercise their power to suppress the sale of Indigenous alcohol, they were met in the courts and the economic battleground with female Indigenous resistance. This female resistance proved to be effective because of the advantage Indigenous women had through society's reliance upon the alcohol they produced.

Preserved court records demonstrate the leverage female Indigenous alcohol producers had over their colonial lords, prove the resistance of Native women, and showcase how this resistance prevailed due to colonial society's reliance upon Indigenous-made alcohol. For instance, within the court records of Potosí in modern day Bolivia, there were protests in the legal system by Indigenous women. Under Spanish colonial law all women aside from widows needed the signature of a husband or father in order to conduct business. Obviously, this proved to be an issue for many chicheras and market women of all types because they were cited as petitioning court to have the requirement of a man's signature removed.¹⁷ To the credit of female petitioners, the court in many cases approved the demands of women. An explanation of why these courts yielded to Indigenous market women's demands can be found in the previously explained idea that colonial society was dependent on Native-produced alcohol of which women had a monopoly. What choice did court officials have but to approve women's requests for economic

¹⁵ Graubart, *With Our Labor*, 72.

¹⁶ Mangan, *Trading Roles*, 83.

¹⁷ Mangan, *Trading Roles*, 138.

¹⁴ Mangan, *Trading Roles*, 89-90.

independence? Authorities would simply look the other way as women illegally produced and sold alcohol. If the court decided to reject Indigenous women's economic autonomy, then they would lack immediate accessibility of a light, alcoholic beverage.

Furthermore, as explained in the wills of certain chicheras, they had arrangements to provide chicha to wealthy Spanish men. Such an instance can be found in a preserved contract between a chichera named Maria Pazna and a wealthy Spaniard, Pedro Hernandez. Pazna never missed a shipment of chicha to Hernandez.¹⁸ Therefore, these female producers of alcohol realized they had powerful figures that relied on their services. Additionally, wealthy elites would also take issue with restricted economic activity of Indigenous women because without this female autonomy, they would be inconvenienced. It can be inferred that Indigenous women were aware of this leverage when they submitted their petitions to the court, and they would have been reaffirmed with the confidence that their petitions could not be denied, lest the court officials wanted to upset the prominent and powerful figures of the city. Therefore, Indigenous women used their necessity as alcohol manufactures to protest attempts to stifle their economic autonomy.

Aside from having protested Spanish rule in the courts, women also defied efforts to reduce their economic prowess through other means. Before delving into the specific example of Native women having resisted colonial authority through avenues other than the courts, it is important to understand the stigmatization faced by Indigenous people of both genders. The exact stereotyping and oppression faced by Indigenous individuals was centered around the idea that Spanish officials took issue with the degree to which Native peoples enjoyed their alcohol. To deny that Indigenous peoples had higher levels of alcoholism would be misleading and false.¹⁹ The brewed beverage could definitely lead to an increase of crime and violence as will be explained later in this paper. As provided by Victor Uribe-Uran, indigenous men of Mexico often used drunkenness as

an excuse for violent acts committed against their wives.²⁰ Additionally, statistics from court records in colonial Mexico reveal that a large portion of assaults and homicide directly correlated with the offender being intoxicated.²¹ As the rates of alcoholism rose alongside violence, Spanish colonial authorities were quick to label all Indigenous people as borrachos that must be controlled with legal interference. Now, it can be assessed how these attempts at legal control over Indigenous populations came into direct conflict with female Indigenous producers.

As Spanish authority attempted to reduce Indigenous peoples' access to alcohol as a response to the stigmatization that all Indigenous individuals were raging alcoholics, officials tried striking at the source of the alcohol. The dominant source of alcohol in Indigenous society was indigenous women; as colonial powers attempted to reduce the manufacture of alcohol, they came into direct opposition with female brewers. An example of this clash can be seen in the colonial mining center of Potosí, beginning in 1565.²² In order to curb the Indigenous population's indulgence in chicha, officials banned the sale of corn flour in 1605.²³ Corn flour is an essential ingredient in the fermentation process of chicha, so as a consequence of having banned corn flour, the amount of chicha in economic rotation decreased.²⁴ Colonial authorities had not expected what would happen as a result of banned corn flour. With corn flour inaccessible, Indigenous women simply substituted the ingredient with wheat flour. Not only did the substitution of wheat not curb the Indigenous woman's ability to produce alcohol that would be ingested by other Native peoples, but it also created a shortage of wheat flour. This lack of wheat flour reduced the production of bread, which led to a bread shortage in Potosí. After realizing how terribly the ban of corn flour

20 Victor M. Uribe-Uran, "Innocent Infants or Abusive Patriarchs? Spousal Homicides, the Punishment of Indians and the Law in Colonial Mexico, 1740s-1820s," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 38, no. 4 (2006): 807.

21 Taylor, *Drinking, Homicide & Rebellion*, 84-85.

22 Mangan, *Trading Roles*, 76.

23 Mangan, *Trading Roles*, 76.

24 Mangan, *Trading Roles*, 76.

18 Graubart, *With Our Labor*, 72.

19 Taylor, *Drinking, Homicide & Rebellion*, 45.

impacted food supply in the city, officials removed the ban.²⁵

This example established the idea Indigenous female brewers boycotted colonial rule in spheres other than legal. The ability of women to successfully retain their economic autonomy through different strategies sent a signal to colonial officials that controlling Indigenous women was an uphill battle. For instance, not only could Indigenous women counter Spanish authority in the courts, but they could also effectively render market bans mute. Therefore, Indigenous women demanded from colonial rule a level of respect, and if this respect was not given, then Indigenous women would use the society's reliance on basic necessities as a weapon. Furthermore, as Indigenous brewers contested colonial authority in legal and market spheres, officials had lost their confidence to control Native women. In two of the most powerful and prominent avenues, law and economy, Spanish officials had exhausted all of their options and were successfully opposed by Indigenous women. This was a demoralizing blow to the Spanish. Considering there were a limited number of avenues Spanish authorities could manipulate, they turned to alternative ways to reduce Native people's access to alcohol. Therefore, Spanish authorities engineered methods that hoped to appease Indigenous women while simultaneously reducing alcohol production, specifically to avoid the issue that Native females could not be rendered economically powerless.

As colonial authorities aimed to reduce Indigenous alcohol consumption, they were met with successful resistance by Indigenous women who fought to protect their economic independence. Because female brewers were dependent on a livable salary from alcohol sales, colonial authorities devised a method that would reduce Indigenous alcohol consumption, while maintaining that at least some portion of female producers would be appeased. Therefore, the Spanish would be faced with less opposition. An instance of this concept of appeasement was observed in Colonial Mexico. The powers of New Spain issued the decree that the production of alcohol be reserved to one old, respectable Indigenous woman for every hundred Natives.²⁶ Additional restrictions were placed on the importation of alcohol into cities. In 1635 and 1639, it

was decreed that pulque could only enter the city during daylight hours and be distributed by two Indigenous females for each barrio.²⁷

These examples demonstrated that a number of female producers were allowed to retain their economic independence, but this appeasement was not effective. As explained previously, female Indigenous producers were numerous, meaning that the appeasement of a select few would not be enough to successfully reduce Native alcohol purchases. In fact, local governments would still accept tax revenue from the illegal sale of alcohol.²⁸ Therefore, though deemed illegal through decree, alcohol sales remained at high levels. In addition, if Indigenous women were able to continue their production at the behest of tax, they would not reduce their output. There seemed to be no repercussions placed on women for illegal sale, as they were protected by local government's wishes to continue receiving the alcohol tax revenue. This instance revealed that Indigenous women had forced colonial powers to be dependent on their alcohol sales. In return, they were protected from efforts aimed at reducing women's economic agency. Cleverly, Indigenous women devised a system that would continue to serve them, regardless of outright bans on their necessary brewing ingredients or the placement of legal hurdles. Finally, they opposed appeasement methods by the Spanish that would have alienated a large number of women from earning a living wage from alcohol sales.

Conclusion

Ultimately, the trade of alcohol provided Indigenous women an avenue through which they could claim autonomy. The divinely feminine ability to brew alcohol made the supplementation of Indigenous produced drink in colonial Latin America an obvious replacement for the unavailable product of wine in Latin America. Therefore, through the transition of economies, pre-Hispanic and colonial, Native females retained their role as brewers of alcohol. The necessity of alcohol in colonial society also provided Indigenous women with a great deal of power. More notably, it gave them leverage. Their use of society's dependance on their product helped Indigenous women resist attempted oppression

²⁵ Mangan, *Trading Roles*, 76

²⁶ Taylor, *Drinking, Homicide & Rebellion*, 38.

²⁷ Taylor, *Drinking, Homicide & Rebellion*, 38.

²⁸ Taylor, *Drinking, Homicide & Rebellion*, 38.

by Spanish colonial authority. Indigenous women were aware of their importance through the manufacture and sale of alcohol, and they used threats of scarcity in order to manipulate the Spanish into recognizing their economic agency.

The note this paper hopes to conclude with is that of interest. The lack of secondary literature on this topic made writing this work a challenge. Luckily, through the resources of wills, court records, and economic contracts, there was a sufficient number of primary sources for argumentation. But, in terms of existing narratives that expand exclusively on the prevalence of Indigenous women as brewers of alcohol, the list is surprisingly short. Therefore, the hope is that this paper could possibly inspire readers to add to the literature of alcohol and women's place in its production. In addition, through interest in the topic and subsequent research, the preservation of these ancient alcohol techniques may be preserved.



Figure 3. Indigenous women of modern-day Andean culture producing chicha. The technique used here is strikingly identical to pre-Hispanic cultures. Hayashida, "Pre-Hispanic Brewing", 232.

In modern day Latin America, the Indigenous tradition of brewing Native alcoholic beverages is dying. With this erasure of Indigenous culture, lost to us will be the identity of descendants of Native peoples.

Striving for Medical Utopia: Health Politics and Cancer Treatment in Revolutionary Cuba

HOLLY SMITH

ABSTRACT

Cuba is gaining a reputation as a biotechnology superpower thanks to its unique cancer treatments such as CIMA-vax EFG, hailed as a “vaccine against lung cancer” since 2011. Considering Cuba’s reputation as a poor, authoritarian state frozen in time and cancer’s reputation as an advanced, baffling illness, many view these treatments with skepticism. By examining rhetoric from revolutionary leaders, state-produced newspapers, and interviews with patients who lived during the Special Period, this paper argues that Cuba’s symbolic approach to healthcare made it uniquely suited to addressing cancer even while it struggled to guarantee basic medical services in the 1990s.

On December 5, 1994, Comandante Fidel Castro inaugurated the Center of Molecular Immunology of Havana, Cuba. In his speech, Castro praised the work ethic that brought this project to fruition, lambasted those who were apathetic to the project, and proclaimed this building to be a socialist victory against the imperialist power of the United States and its “fascist mafia in Miami.”¹ Castro then explained to his audience what functions the center would fulfill, both for the sciences and the Cuban economy:

The medical transnationals already look at our country with respect and recognize the enormous capacity that has been developed in a few years, first in the mind of the people, and second in the construction, in the equipment. This will be a very important industry in the future, an important branch of science for the economy, even though we must break through fighting arm-in-arm with a terrible international competition...²

The project to develop CIMA-vax-EGF, a preventative treatment for non-small cell lung cancer released in 2011, began with the completion of CIM three years into the Special Period. The vaccine was an unprecedented development in cancer treatment. However, healthcare since the 1990s has contradicted any image that presents Cuba as a medical superpower. The period is littered with instances of neglect and misinformation about health, alienating Cuban bodies from the operations of the government which guaranteed health services. Health and medicine were central in narratives about perfecting the Revolution. The promise of a society that provides for its people without the restraints of imperialism galvanized revolutionaries on the island. The poverty of the Special Period exhausted the popular forces that propelled the Revolution in the 1960s, but the government’s commitment to the image of medical exceptionalism remained.

Traditional theories of development in Latin America, such as those posited by the Latin Ibero-American Association of Technological Management, are market-driven.³ According to such market-driven theories, it is impossible for a country that did away with for-profit healthcare to be successful in medical development, especially during a period of economic turmoil. However, Cuba’s reputation as a biotechnological force lies in the political and social movements which emerged from its 1959 Revolution. The defiance of neocolonialism and creation of an egalitarian Cuba was at the core of revolutionary culture, and the government’s restructuring of the healthcare system was one manifestation of that idea. If the Cuban market drove medical innovation, the production of treatments for a disease as complex as cancer during the Special Period would have been unbelievable. However, the Revolution took a different approach to medical development.

Discussions about cancer, like the Revolution, are rich with symbolism. Cancer is inevitable, overwhelming, and any casual conversation about a cure is rooted in the belief that it must occur by chance: one exceptional Messiah (who may be a fetus or uneducated Samaritan or any

1 “Fidel en el Centro de Inmunología Molecular,” *Granma* (Habana, Cuba), Dec. 7, 1994.

2 “Fidel en el Centro de Inmunología Molecular,” *Granma* (Habana, Cuba), Dec. 7, 1994.

3 Jorge Núñez Jover and Galia Figueroa Alfonso, “Biotechnology and Society in Cuba: The Case of the Molecular Immunology Center,” *Trilogía, ciencia, tecnología y sociedad* 6, no. 10 (2014): 14.

given charity) will one day cure cancer and we have no way of predicting when. Only a movement convinced that utopia is obtainable would be so driven to tackle a disease like cancer. According to historians such as Lillian Guerra and Louis A. Pérez, symbolism was instrumental in the success of the Cuban Revolution.⁴ The Castro government capitalized on its “moral victory” in 1959 by galvanizing popular support with the use of Messianic images. State education and propaganda in the 1960s empowered the Cuban youth to labor for the creation of an autonomous, egalitarian Cuba. Revolutionary sentiment inspired Cubans to challenge the status quo-social hierarchies, wealth distribution, Americanism, and illness itself. Restructuring the healthcare system and culminating a global reputation allowed the government to pursue its technological ambitions, but it also reflects a disparity between Cuba’s international image and domestic reality.

Cuba’s biotechnology research *appears* to be the culmination of the Castro government’s shrewdness. Julie Feinsilver, John Kirk, and Don Fitz attribute the nation’s medical exceptionalism to the reorientation of the healthcare system in the 1960s and 1970s, medical diplomacy, and medical training.⁵ While the results of these changes are undeniable, they do not account for how the biotechnology industry flourished as Cuba entered the Special Period, a time of extreme scarcity. Pierre Sean Brotherton details the failures of the Cuban healthcare system in this period and how shortages caused disillusionment for many who previously had faith in revolutionary ideals.⁶ Cuba faces ongoing deprivation by a gov-

ernment that prioritizes its international image, which casts a shadow on their astounding medical achievements. This article explores the political structures and social movements that allowed Cuba to excel in the field of biotechnology and investigates how the economic strain of the 1990s led the state to pursue international attention at the expense of Cubans’ wellbeing.

Health in Revolutionary Rhetoric

Central to revolutionary rhetoric about public health were the ideas that preventative treatment would make the most of Cuba’s resources and that perfecting it fell on the shoulders of altruistic healthcare workers. From the first calls to overthrow Batista, reimagining public health was integral to revolutionary idealism. In his “History Will Absolve Me” speech, at his sentencing for the attack on the Moncada barracks, Fidel Castro specified six major problems in Batista’s government, the last among them being that of the people’s health.⁷ In his later book, Castro elaborated on his concerns, stating, “[s]ociety is moved to compassion upon hearing of the kidnapping or murder of one child, but they are criminally indifferent to the mass murder of so many thousands of children who die every year from lack of facilities.”⁸ Castro made health a mechanism for critiquing the past and marked it as a potential point of perfection for the Revolution. He was not manufacturing a point of rage; his speech was compelling because the healthcare of the time alienated so many. As Pérez points out, Cubans “lived in the past as a condition of their times, sometimes as a burden to bear, sometimes as an ideal to celebrate, but always as a presence to confront.”⁹ It would be impossible to claim that Cubans did not previously question the norms Castro described simply because they were standard under Batista. Castro tapped into a popular vigor to perfect the nation in whatever way possible. Medicine was, for revolutionaries, rich with material and symbolic potential from the start.

4 Lillian Guerra, *Visions of Power in Cuba: Revolution, Redemption, and Resistance, 1959-1971* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012); Louis A. Pérez, *The Structure of Cuban History: Meanings and Purpose of the Past* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2013).

5 Julie Margot Feinsilver, *Healing the Masses: Cuban Health Politics at Home and Abroad* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); John M. Kirk, *Healthcare Without Borders: Understanding Cuban Medical Internationalism*, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2015); Don E. Fitz, *Cuban Health Care: The Ongoing Revolution*, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2020).

6 Pierre Sean Brotherton, *Revolutionary Medicine Health and the Body in Post-Soviet Cuba* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012).

7 Fidel Castro, *History Will Absolve Me: Fidel Castro’s Self Defense Speech before the Court in Santiago de Cuba on October 16, 1953*, (Havana: Radio Havana Cuba, 1953).

8 Fidel Castro Ruz, *History Will Absolve Me*, 83.

9 Louis A. Pérez, *The Structure of Cuban History: Meanings and Purpose of the Past*, 19.

Once the Revolutionary government came to power in 1959, its leadership specified how it would tackle each problem Castro listed. Their solutions entailed the mobilization of altruistic sentiment; individuals needed to embrace personal sacrifice if the collective was to succeed. Ernesto “Che” Guevara’s 1960 speech “On Revolutionary Medicine” explicitly tied the selflessness of medical personnel to the success of planned public health initiatives. According to Guevara, “more lasting than all the gold that one can accumulate is the gratitude of a people. And each doctor, within the circle of his activities, can and must accumulate that valuable treasure, the gratitude of his people.”¹⁰ Guevara called for individuals to sacrifice profit in a profession that was financially lucrative in prior years. In 1956, 42.8% of all public health institutions in Cuba were privately owned or “mutualist” (in which patients would pay a monthly payment to cover hospitalization, care, and medication).¹¹ Furthermore, 52% of those institutions were in Havana.¹²

In the thirty-sixth year of the Revolution, through all the contradictions of the Special Period, these core elements remained in rhetoric about revolutionary health. In his speech at the inauguration of CIM, Castro asserted, “A man in socialism is not merchandise that is bought and sold. We procure protections for all and do not close a school, do not close a hospital, do not leave anyone on the street and find a way to give labor protection to all.”¹³ The quote maintains that universal healthcare is a vital revolutionary value, and that not providing services to those in need is a moral failure. The rhetorical thread that spans these decades is that Cubans have a duty to protect their *compañeros* as medical providers. In 1994, the major threat to Cuban livelihood was cancer. Between 1982 and 1989, survival rates significantly fell for Cubans afflicted with

cancers of the colon, lung, or prostate.¹⁴ By 1994, cancer was the second leading cause of death in Cuba.¹⁵ Cubans supported the message; the problem was the credibility of the messenger.

The success of campaigns that relied on voluntarism like the literacy campaign and vaccine campaign indicates that Cubans recognized it as a way to participate in their own history. As Guerra noted, the mobilization of revolutionary rhetoric lay in “shaping people’s perceptions of what was possible and by conditioning at key junctures... what they could say or do in response to events, including those beyond their control.”¹⁶ As early as 1962, cracks showed in the Revolution’s commitment to its leaders; campesinos, rebels, and scholars created a runaway revolution defined by the most active participants rather than the loudest speakers. Even when key figures like Vilma Espín criticized farmers for not dedicating more time to work in the aftermath of the U.S. trade embargo, it affected food production little.¹⁷ The revolution did not draw credibility from its leaders, but rather from the promise of improving material conditions.

Changing the perception of healthcare’s role in a socialist state was not just a way to gain popular support – it was necessary to restructure the healthcare system for the purpose of pursuing medical advancements that were not otherwise profitable. In a speech at the opening of a polyclinic on January 8, 1969, Castro identified both medicine and illness as “merchandise” in a capitalist system, stating that their commercial use will disappear under socialism.¹⁸ Providing universal health care was extraordinary for the time because it challenged the theory that medical progress was a product of profit-driven entrepreneurialism. Jover and Al-

10 Che Guevara, “On Revolutionary Medicine,” *Monthly review* (New York 1949) 56, no. 8 (2005): 45.

11 Don E. Fitz, *Cuban Health Care*, 24-25.

12 Don E. Fitz, *Cuban Health Care*, 25.

13 “Fidel en el Centro de Inmunología Molecular,” *Granma* (Habana, Cuba), Dec. 7, 1994.

14 Margarita C. Graupera Boschmonar, Pedro J. Jiménez Chaviano, Antonio A. Martín García, Yaima H. Galán Alvarez, Leticia M. Fernández Garrote, and R. Sankaranarayanan “Trends in survival rates of cancer in Cuba,” *European Journal of Epidemiology* 15, no. 6 (1999): 524.

15 Graupera Boschmonar et al., “Trends in survival rates of cancer in Cuba,” 522.

16 Lillian Guerra, *Visions of Power in Cuba: Revolution, Redemption, and Resistance*, 1959-1971, 3.

17 Lillian Guerra, *Visions of Power in Cuba*, 182.

18 Garófalo Fernández, Nicolás, and Ana María Gómez García, ed. *Pensamientos de Fidel sobre la salud pública*, (Havana: Editorial Ciencias Médicas, 2011), 17.

fonso claim that revolutionary health rhetoric enabled the establishment of CIM, stating that the Revolutionary government “has permitted giving special attention to the use of scientific and technological knowledge with emphasis on the goals of justice, inclusion, and social equality.”¹⁹ In a profit-driven healthcare system, medical development caters to those who can afford it. Once their primary health needs are met, pharmaceutical companies can then only profit by providing aesthetic or luxury treatments. It was necessary to reorient healthcare philosophy to address the illnesses that afflicted *el pueblo*.

Implementing Revolutionary Medicine

The Castro government adapted the healthcare system to embody revolutionary idealism. The first step was to ensure that campesinos in rural Cuba had access to healthcare as they never had before. Securing healthcare for all required ensuring “equal access to services, an integral approach to health care, and popular participation in health initiatives.”²⁰ This meant that healthcare had to be geographically, economically, legally, and culturally accessible to the diverse populace of Cuba.

In 1964 the government established polyclinics, which provided primary care services to their designated health area of about 30,000 residents.²¹ These services included preventative care and treatment through “internal medicine, pediatrics, obstetrics and gynecology, and dentistry, along with environmental sanitation and hygiene services and psychological services.”²² A doctor whospecialized in one of these areaswould serve two-thousand to four-thousand patients in the given community.²³ Specialized services remained in areas of high population density due to cost.

The change’s tangible effect on healthcare was astounding for those living in rural areas. In 1962, 80% of all Cuban children aged fifteen

or younger were vaccinated against polio within eleven days; in 1970, they accomplished the same in just one day.²⁴ Such campaigns relied on cooperation between medical staff who traveled without substantial compensation and the rural families who were receptive to the urban strangers in their homes. Although half of the country’s doctors left early in the Revolution, it is clear that engaging the passions of those who stayed was key to the Revolution’s momentum.

By 2020, there were 451 polyclinics throughout Cuba, and on top of primary care services, some also grew to offer secondary care services such as electromagnetic therapy.²⁵ Each policlínico comunitario directed thirty consultorios, which focused on primary care while directing patients with more advanced health concerns to the polyclinic; those with even more advanced concerns went to the hospital.²⁶ This system has become a centralized hierarchy of healthcare. Don Fitz explains this contradiction as the centralization of executive guidelines with the decentralization of implementation; practices would adapt to best suit the local patients.²⁷ This design attempts to equalize healthcare while accommodating a diverse population of patients. Building public trust with healthcare providers would become necessary for the state to address other obstacles to public health.

The Revolution was not meant to be specific to Cuba; as soon as Batista fled, revolutionaries took the fight elsewhere. However, according to revolutionary rhetoric, to serve one’s comrades as a doctor “is one of the most beautiful tasks there is and one of the most important in a war.”²⁸ As such, Cuba sent doctors along with its soldiers to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Republic of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and other African countries in which liberation movements resisted colonial ties during the early 1960s.²⁹ Revolutionary idealism had a broad defini-

19 Jorge Núñez Jover and Galia Figueroa Alfonso, “Biotechnology and Society in Cuba,” 15.

20 Julie Margot Feinsilver, *Healing the Masses: Cuban Health Politics at Home and Abroad*, 28.

21 Don E. Fitz, *Cuban Health Care*, 40.

22 Julie Feinsilver, *Healing the Masses*, 35.

23 Julie Feinsilver, *Healing the Masses*, 36.

24 Don E. Fitz, *Cuban Health Care*, 40.

25 Don E. Fitz, *Cuban Health Care*, 220-221.

26 Don E. Fitz, *Cuban Health Care*, 220-221.

27 Don E. Fitz, *Cuban Health Care*, 44.

28 Che Guevara, “On Revolutionary Medicine,” 47.

29 Don E. Fitz, *Cuban Health Care*, 58.

tion of “war.” It was not merely the act of one country encroaching upon another, but rather any situation that, regardless of aggressor, caused hardship and left people susceptible to exploitation.

The “war” Guevara spoke of was against all human conflict, much like Marxist theory. The government’s decision to send aid to those hit by natural disasters reflects this core idea. In 1960, Cuba sent a medical team to Valdivia, Chile after an earthquake killed 5,000 people there.³⁰ In 1970, when another earthquake shook Peru, Cuba sent a medical brigade and 106,000 Cubans donated blood despite having poor diplomatic relations at the time.³¹ They even offered aid to the United States in 2005 following Hurricane Katrina.³² Cuba’s persistence as a source of disaster relief reflects an ambitious interpretation of the purpose of healthcare as a way to overcome even blameless suffering.

Feinsilver labels Cuba’s medical diplomacy an effort to attain “symbolic capital,” which is the result of investing material capital into a project that can later be converted back to material capital.³³ Cuban disaster relief typically goes towards nations that do not have many economic favors to offer in return, and their involvement in Peru indicates that they did not discriminate on the basis of international politics. “Symbolic” is an apt description for this aid, not just globally, but also domestically. Providing such aid reinforces a utopian and altruistic vision of Cuba for those living on the island whose support was integral to the popular initiatives of the 1960s and 1970s. By the 1980s, the government attempted to cash-in on its decades of constructing socialist symbols.

The government took advantage of its reputation to combat the “brain-drain” of Cuban doctors leaving after 1959. The Hermanos Ameijeiras Hospital in Havana offered treatments that were usually only available in more “developed” countries and collaborated with foreign research institutions. The government sent 140 to 160 doctors, engineers, biologists, biochemists, and other scientists to twenty-nine other countries to learn

how to incorporate new techniques and devices in the hospital.³⁴ In 1999, Cuba also established the Latin American School of Medicine (ELAM) after two hurricanes ravaged Central America and the Caribbean. As of 2015, 24,000 students from 80 different countries have graduated from the institution.³⁵ The curriculum is primarily concerned with incorporating revolutionary ideals into medical training; the 2001 textbook used in ELAM begins with a foreword from Castro emphasizing the importance of the doctor as a “Guardian of Health” and creating an integrated health system.³⁶ In their first four semesters, students took courses on health promotion, prevention, community medicine, and parasitology.³⁷ Then, as they traveled to rural areas, they took two courses on medicine for natural disasters.³⁸ In an interview with Don Fitz, one student stated he learned of ELAM through the Cuban doctors offering aid in his country.³⁹ Cuba’s efforts to acquire symbolic capital abroad have allowed them to pursue international projects and garnered global attention.

Cuba capitalized on its symbolic investment to initiate its first endeavors into biotechnology research in the 1980s. It started when Dr. Randall Lee Clark, president of the Tumor Institute at M.D. Anderson Hospital in Houston, visited Cuba in 1980. There, he advised Castro about how to produce interferons, which play a key role in antiproliferative treatments.⁴⁰ Cuban researchers traveled to the United States, Finland, and France to learn more about the production of interferons, and they

34 Julie Feinsilver, *Healing the Masses*, 61.

35 John M. Kirk, *Healthcare Without Borders*, 43.

36 Roberto Álvarez Sintes, *Temas de Medicina General Integral*, Vol. 1, *Salud y Medicina* (Havana: Editorial Ciencias Médicas, 2001), vii.

37 John M. Kirk, *Healthcare Without Borders*, 57.

38 John M. Kirk, *Healthcare Without Borders*, 58.

39 Don E. Fitz, *Cuban Health Care*, 166-171.

40 Jorge Núñez Jover and Galia Figueroa Alfonso, “Biotechnology and Society in Cuba,” 16; Marco De Andrea, Raffaella Ravera, Daniela Gioia, Marisa Gariglio, and Santo Landolfo, “The interferon system: an overview,” *European Journal of Paediatric Neurology* 6 (2002): A41.

30 John M. Kirk, *Healthcare Without Borders*, 119.

31 John M. Kirk, *Healthcare Without Borders*, 119.

32 John M. Kirk, *Healthcare Without Borders*, 121.

33 Julie Feinsilver, *Healing the Masses*, 24.

tested the first Cuban interferon in 1981.⁴¹ Today, their application in cancer treatments such as CIMAvax is clear: the treatment inhibits the growth of existing non-small cell lung cancer tumors.⁴²

In the following two decades, the government invested an estimated one-billion dollars into its biotechnology program, resulting in the creation of fifty-two institutions that collectively employed 20,000 scientists, engineers, and technicians.⁴³ They took a “closed loop” approach to biotechnology research, which emphasized communication and cooperation among its various institutions, distinguishing itself from the competitive approach of more industrialized nations.⁴⁴ Cuban scientists are also working in collaboration with Beijing to develop monoclonal antibodies for cancer treatment.⁴⁵ In 2011 they signed an agreement with Brazil for 11 anti-cancer products to be produced in Brazil using Cuban technology.⁴⁶

Through its commitment to revolutionary medicine, the Cuban government created global networks and garnered funds for its research in biotechnology. The structure of the healthcare system gave the government the authority to decide what research was worth pursuing rather than leaving such decisions up to the demands of the market. This was especially crucial for funding projects during the Special Period.

Skepticism and Scarcity in the Special Period

As remarkable as it is for a nation to become a biotechnology producer while coping with an embargo, it would be inaccurate to claim that Cuba met its goal of creating a medical utopia. The drawback of depending on image is that, even in the absence of material substance, the state claimed moral superiority by clinging to its reputation. This was effective at gathering support from foreigners. By 2015, Cuba earned \$800

million from exporting biotechnology,⁴⁷ but that money goes back into bolstering its international image rather than alleviating the burden of material scarcity.

Guaranteeing free healthcare in the Special Period meant little to those living on the island. The Ministry of Public Health reports that, from 1989 to 1993, expenditures in the health sector plummeted from \$227 million to \$56 million.⁴⁸ When asked about how they perform their work without basic clinical necessities, most doctors made vague reference to the “inventiveness” of Cubans, or else admitted that they advise their patients to get medicine from relatives abroad.⁴⁹ For those who could access secondary care, neglect still defined their experience. Those undergoing chemotherapy, for example, did not have access to clean sheets or food while in treatment. Carmen Vallejo runs a charity for children with cancer in Havana, which provides them with food, cooler fans, mattresses, refrigerators, and even toys.⁵⁰ Vallejo and her charity have a contentious relationship with the Cuban government. Its Catholic origin may account for some state hostility, as Cuba was an atheist state when Vallejo started the charity in 1988. However, since the government relaxed restrictions on religion in 1992, it is apparent that the true offense of the charity is that it disrupts the illusion of a comprehensive healthcare system.

Despite the lack of government investment in health care, many statistics indicate that primary care was effective throughout the Special Period; deaths by infectious disease or parasitic infections fell from 45.4 per 100,000 in 1970 to 6.8 per 100,000 in 2009,⁵¹ and infant mortality fell from 11 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1990 to 6 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2001.⁵² Given the testimony of physicians on the island, it is more appropriate to attribute this success to Cuban people upholding the core

41 Jover and Alfonso, “Biotechnology and Society in Cuba,” 16.

42 Naomi C. Schoenfeld, “Vivir En Cronicidad: Terminal Living through Cuban Cancer Vaccines,” *Medical anthropology* 41, no. 2 (2022): 142.

43 John M. Kirk, *Healthcare Without Borders*, 141.

44 Debra Evenson, “Cuba’s biotechnology revolution,” *MEDICC review* 9, no. 1 (2007): 8.

45 John M. Kirk, *Healthcare Without Borders*, 149.

46 John M. Kirk, *Healthcare Without Borders*, 156.

47 John M. Kirk, *Healthcare Without Borders*, 142.

48 Pierre Sean Brotherton, *Revolutionary Medicine Health and the Body in Post-Soviet Cuba*, 18.

49 Pierre Sean Brotherton, *Revolutionary Medicine*, 22.

50 Carmen Vallejo, email message to author, January 11, 2022.

51 Pierre Sean Brotherton, *Revolutionary Medicine*, 113.

52 Pierre Sean Brotherton, *Revolutionary Medicine*, 19.

tenants of revolutionary medicine. In the healthcare vacuum of the 1990s, Cubans assumed responsibility for their own wellbeing however they could. Doctors matched their patients in dedication, adjusting to scarcity by advising them on preventative techniques.

Cubans' commitment to revolutionary health ideas did not translate to commitment to the government's health policy. Those on the island resist the hypocrisy of what Kirk and Fitz call medical tourism, the trend of foreign patients coming to Cuba to access its best treatments. In 1995, the Cuban Foreign Investment Act allowed for foreign investment in all sectors "excluding health and education services for the population and the armed forces institutions, with the exception of the latter's commercial system."⁵³ The government created programs such as Cubanacán to expand health tourism on the island, which produced ads promising foreigners treatment for drug addiction, Parkinson's disease, and cancer among other illnesses.⁵⁴ The government established a two-tiered healthcare system with clinics designed for tourists. The Cira García International Clinic provided prescription drugs, chemotherapy, and supplies like gauze that were not available in consultorios.⁵⁵ Much to the chagrin of Cuban citizens, most of the products sold at such clinics were made in Cuba, but not available in pharmacies that accepted pesos. Those in need of medication tapped into the tourist market by enlisting foreigners to help them buy medication, creating an informal economy in tourist destinations.⁵⁶ The betrayal of revolutionary health politics was clear to Cubans. Foreigners may consider Cuba a health resort, but for the professionals who labor to provide their health care and the residents who see none of its benefits, the current system is better described as medical colonialism.

Conclusion

This article has shown that the research on cancer treatment in Cuba not only defies traditional theories of medical and technological development, but also fulfills the prophecy of revolutionary health in symbolic ways. The reorientation of both the structure and ideology of Cuban healthcare allowed the government to focus its limited budget during the Special Period on biotechnology. The true rupture of 1991 was one of domestic trust. The material reality of Cubans, who suffered from neuropathy due to malnutrition and could not access the same medical supplies they produced for others, was not a medical utopia. Still, many maintained the core philosophy of collective care in the face of state neglect. It makes sense that Cuba, burdened by the weight of utopian aspirations, would stand out for its treatment of a disease as unapproachable as cancer during a time of extreme material scarcity.

Historiography about Cuban healthcare's evolution from 1959 through the Special Period tends to see one of two consistencies. The first emphasizes the radicalism of the nation's approach to healthcare, particularly in its universality and seemingly altruistic extension to other peoples. The second focuses on a lack of government accountability which the Special Period apparently laid bare. However, neither approach accounts for the dynamic relationship between the Cuban people and the Cuban state. This article proposes that revolutionary health politics galvanized all who considered themselves revolutionaries in the 1960s, and that those same ideals dictated health practices even as people became disillusioned with their healthcare system.

⁵³ Pierre Sean Brotherton, *Revolutionary Medicine*, 150.

⁵⁴ Pierre Sean Brotherton, *Revolutionary Medicine*, 149.

⁵⁵ Pierre Sean Brotherton, *Revolutionary Medicine*, 160.

⁵⁶ Pierre Sean Brotherton, *Revolutionary Medicine*, 160.

Notes on Contributors

DIXIE BOHR graduated in the Spring of 2023 with a Bachelor of Arts in History, minoring in teaching. Her research also includes her thesis, *Fool's Errand: Theodore Roosevelt's War on Vice in a Reluctant New York*. Dixie specializes in 19th and 20th century history, particularly her long-time interest in World War II. Dixie is a member of Phi Alpha Theta, the history honors society, and UF Deutschklub. She plans to pursue a career as a history teacher in order to bring her passion for history to the newer generations of students.

ZOE GOLOMB is a third-year student double majoring in History and International Studies with a certificate in European Union studies. Her research interests include 20th century European history, European democracy, and European Union history and politics. Zoe is currently expanding her research into a senior thesis to further explore gender relations in postwar France. Following her graduation in the spring of 2024, Zoe plans to attend graduate school.

CATHERINE HILL is a third-year History major with minors in French, Anthropology, and Teaching. She was born in the United Kingdom and moved to Florida at a young age. She spent the Summer of 2022 studying art history and linguistics in Paris which allowed her to immerse herself in French culture. Her main historical interest is in investigating industrialization and globalization's impact and role in driving social change in the 19th century. Catherine is a cataloging intern at the Matheson Museum Archives and volunteers as a Docent at the Historic Haile Homestead in Gainesville, Florida. She is also an Inquire Capitalism Intern at the University of Florida (UF) for Spring 2023. Outside of her history and research interests, Catherine is an active member and Captain of UF Women's Water Polo Club.

LEJS KRIVIC was born in Jacksonville, Florida, living there for most of his life, before moving to Gainesville to attend the University of Florida. Born to Bosnian immigrants, Lejs has always had a deep connection to Bosnia, learning to speak Bosnian from a young age, and often taking trips to the country to visit family. In 2020, he enlisted into the Florida Army

National Guard as a paralegal specialist, being activated for the relief efforts following Hurricane Ian, as well as Operation Vigilant Sentry in the Florida Keys. He is currently working towards a bachelor's degree in history, with minors in geography and anthropology, and hopes to pursue a career in law following his studies.

LAURA T. NANCE graduated from the University of Florida in May of 2022 with a bachelor's degree in history and a minor in education. In her senior year at UF, Laura worked with Professor Sensbach to produce her capstone project on the East Florida Seminary. As a Gainesville native and third generation UF alumni, the history of UF is a salient issue for her. Presently, Laura is a corps member with Teach For America, a nonprofit organization centered on educational equity. She is working as a 3rd grade elementary teacher at a Title I school in Rhode Island. Upon completion of her service year, Laura intends to apply for graduate school to deepen her knowledge of history.

MITCHY REID is a third-year dual degree student pursuing degrees in Business Administration and History. His interests include Labor and Movement History, Post-Colonial Latin American History, Film Criticism, and Sport Sociology. He is also a member of the Gator Marching Band and other music ensembles at the University of Florida. In the future, Mitchy plans to write more about political movements in the Southern United States and the role that American solidarity movements have played in politics abroad.

SONNY RUSSANO is a third-year history major from St. Petersburg, Florida. He began his college career in architecture and quickly realized his passion for the study of history with the help of one of his professors. Sonny's interests include American history and legal history, specifically American constitutional history and the development of international law.

HOLLY SMITH is a fourth-year student from Tampa, Florida. She is studying history and political science with a minor in Spanish. During her undergraduate career, she has been an editor for *Alpata* and interned with the Samuel Proctor Oral History Program. She has also written for *Florida Political Review* and *PRISM Honors Magazine* and is the vice

president of the UF Speech and Debate Society. Taking classes about modern Latin American history with Drs. Jeffrey Needell, Lillian Guerra, and Heather Vrana first unlocked her interest in the discipline. In 2022 she earned the Ann Regan Scholarship with which she spent four weeks in Miami researching for her senior thesis. After finishing her thesis under the advisement of Dr. Vrana, she hopes to earn her PhD and become a professor of history. Her specific interests include the history of medicine and nationalist movements in Central America.

EMILY VINING is a 3rd year student at UF majoring in History and minoring in Philosophy. Hailing from a small town in northeast Florida with the most fun activity available to a licensed teenager on a Saturday night being to browse Target with friends, she quickly found academia to be an area of wonder and imagination. That being said, no subject intrigued and obsessed her as much as history. This led her to pursue a history degree and will hopefully allow her to enter a sphere of education in the future so that other youths may experience the same wonder and importance of the past.

Submission Guidelines

Become a published author in *Alpata*, the award-winning, student-run journal of Phi Alpha Theta History Honors Society's Gamma Eta chapter at the University of Florida. All University of Florida students are invited to submit. All submissions must follow the Chicago Manual of Style humanities documentation system.

To ensure anonymity in the selection process, do not include your name or contact information anywhere within your submission other than on the contact page.

Recommended Submission Length

Undergraduate Papers: 2,500–4,000 words

Graduate Papers: 5,000–10,000 words

Book Reviews: 500–750 words

Papers may be submitted electronically to:
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